I understand why others feel compelled to defend the humanities and arts. But their direct relevance for public policy and management has always been obvious. (revised and updated)

Here are eleven examples from one practicing policy analyst.

1. Climate emergency parsed through a poem by Jorie Graham

–I liken one of our complexity challenges to that of reading Hardy’s “Convergence of the Twain” as if it were still part of the news (it had been written less than two weeks after the sinking of the Titanic).

So too the challenge of reading the first sequence of poems in Jorie Graham’s Fast (2017, Ecco HarperCollinsPublishers). The 17 pages are extraordinary, not just because of pulse driving her lines, but also for what she evokes. In her unfamiliar words, “we are in systemcide”.

–To read the sequence—“Ashes,” “Honeycomb,” “Deep Water Trawling,” and five others—is to experience all manner of starts—“I spent a lifetime entering”—and conjoined ends (“I say too early too late”) with nary a middle in between (“Quick. You must make up your/answer as you made up your//question.”)

Because hers is no single story, she sees no need to explain or explicate. By not narrativizing the systemicide into the architecture of beginning, middle and end, she prefers, I think, evoking the experience of now-time as end-time:

action unfolded in no temporality--->anticipation floods us but we/never were able--->not for one instant--->to inhabit time… 

She achieves the elision with long dashes or —>; also series of nouns without commas between; and questions-as-assertions no longer needing question marks (“I know you can/see the purchases, but who is it is purchasing me—>can you please track that…”). Enjambment and lines sliced off by wide spaces also remind us things are not running.

–Her lines push and pull across the small bridges of those dashes and arrows. To read this way is to feel, for me, what French poet and essayist, Paul Valery, described in a 1939 lecture:

Each word, each one of the words that allow us to cross the space of a thought so quickly, and follow the impetus of an idea which rates its own expression, seems like one of those light boards thrown across a ditch or over a mountain crevasse to support the passage of a man in quick motion. But may he pass lightly, without stopping—and especially may he not loiter to dance on the thin board to try its resistance! The frail bridge at once breaks or falls, and all goes down into the depths.

The swiftness with which I cross her bridges is my experience of the rush of crisis. I even feel pulled forward to phrases and lines that I haven’t read yet. Since this is my experience of systems going wrong, it doesn’t matter to me whether Graham is a catastrophizer or not. She takes the certainties and makes something still new.

–I disagree about the crisis—for me, it has middles with more mess than beginnings and ends—but that in no way diminishes or circumscribes my sense she’s right when it comes to systemcide: “You have to make it not become/waiting…”

2. Finding value through different genres

Capitalism, imperialism, militarism, racism, nationalism, atavism: with that line-up and more, who’s got a chance? Isn’t it better, then, to start at the other end and answer: “What really-existing political conditions and cultural practices allow for the expression of fallibility?”

No wonder poems matter, since poems favor words many people don’t know and new words can be new worlds–including worlds uncolonized by our very own historically-contingent “ism’s.”


cratered bromides, pockmarked and punched through by carve-outs and concessions; we seeking some sort of no-miracles settlement amidst the commotion; so true to its date and so false to its subject; a bit like the corpse having to drive the hearse;

only happiest with the work he’s defaced; jumping in with berserk ideas before fading out; on the edge of the burn pit;

so proficient are our pundits at describing the water we’re drowning in; a touch more panic-room chic, shall we?; the answer is in today’s omnipresent binary of Oppressor/Oppressed?; rather,grandiose proclamations followed by appalled second looks;

otherwise, sofa realism instead of the general strike

3. Global Climate Sprawl

You get them wrong before you meet them, while you’re anticipating meeting them; you get them wrong while you’re with them; and then you go home to tell somebody else about the meeting and you get them all wrong again. Since the same generally goes for them with you, the whole thing is really a dazzling illusion empty of all perception, an astonishing farce of misperception. And yet. . .It’s getting them wrong that is living, getting them wrong and wrong and wrong and then, on careful reconsideration, getting them wrong again. That’s how we know we’re alive: we’re wrong.

I suggest that Global Climate Change isn’t just a bad mess; it’s a spectacularly, can’t-keep-our-eyes-off-it, awful mess of getting it wrong, again and again. To my mind, GCC is a hot mess–both senses of the term–now sprawled all over place and time. It is inextricably, remorselessly part and parcel of “living way too expansively, generously.”

GCC’s the demonstration of a stunningly profligate human nature. You see the sheer sprawl of it all in the epigraph, Philip Roth’s rant from American Pastoral. So too the elder statesman in T.S. Eliot’s eponymous play admits,

The many many mistakes I have made
My whole life through, mistake upon mistake,
The mistaken attempts to correct mistakes
By methods which proved to be equally mistaken.

That missing comma between “many many” demonstrates the excess: After a point, we no longer can pause, with words and thoughts rushing ahead. (That the wildly different Philip Roth and T.S. Eliot are together on this point indicates the very real mess it is.)

That earlier word, sprawl, takes us to a more magnanimous view of what is going on, as in Les Murray’s “The Quality of Sprawl”:

Sprawl is the quality
of the man who cut down his Rolls-Royce
into a farm utility truck, and sprawl
is what the company lacked when it made repeated efforts
to buy the vehicle back and repair its image.
Sprawl is doing your farming by aeroplane, roughly,
or driving a hitchhiker that extra hundred miles home…

This extravagance and profligacy–the waste–are not ornery contrarianism. For poet, Robert Frost, “waste is another name for generosity of not always being intent on our own advantage”. If I had my druthers, rename it, “GCS:” Global Climate Sprawl.

4. War

–I finish reading the Collected Critical Writings of Geoffrey Hill, which discussed a poet I don’t remember reading before, Ivor Gurney. Which in turn sends me to his poems, which leads me to his “War Books” from World War I and the following lines:

What did they expect of our toil and extreme
Hunger - the perfect drawing of a heart's dream?
Did they look for a book of wrought art's perfection,
Who promised no reading, nor praise, nor publication?
Out of the heart's sickness the spirit wrote
For delight, or to escape hunger, or of war's worst anger,
When the guns died to silence and men would gather sense
Somehow together, and find this was life indeed….

The lines, “What did they expect of our toil and extreme/Hunger—the perfect drawing of a heart’s dream?”, reminded me of an anecdote from John Ashbery, the poet, in one of his essays:

Among Chuang-tzu’s many skills, he was an expert draftsman. The king asked him to draw a crab. Chuang-tzu replied that he needed five years, a country house, and twelve servants. Five years later the drawing was still not begun. ‘I need another five years,’ said Chuang-tzu. The king granted them. At the end of these ten years, Chuang-tzu took up his brush and, in an instant, with a single stroke, he drew a crab, the most perfect crab ever seen.

It’s as if Chuang-tzu’s decade—his form of hunger—did indeed produce the perfect drawing. Gurney’s next two lines, “Did they look for a book of wrought art’s perfection,/Who promised no reading, no praise, nor publication?” reminds me, however, of very different story, seemingly making the opposite point (I quote from Peter Jones’ Reading Virgil: Aeneid I and II):

Cicero said that, if anyone asked him what god is or what he is like, he would take the Greek poet Simonides as his authority. Simonides was asked by Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, the same question, and requested a day to think about it. Next day Hiero demanded the answer, and Simonides begged two more days. Still no answer. Continuing to double up the days, Simonides was eventually asked by Hiero what the matter was. He replied, ‘The longer I think about the question, the more obscure than answer seems to be.’

I think Hiero’s question was perfect in its own right by virtue of being unquestionably unanswerable. In the case of Chuang-tzu, what can be more perfect than the image that emerges, infallibly and unstoppably, from a single stroke? In the case of Simonides, what can be more insurmountable than the perfect question without answer?

–Yet here is Gurney providing the same answer to each question. War ensures the unstoppable and insurmountable are never perfect opposites—war, rather, patches them together as living: Somehow together, and find this too was life indeed.

Ashbery records poet, David Schubert, saying of the great Robert Frost: “Frost once said to me that – a poet – his arms can go out – like this – or in to himself; in either case he will cover a good deal of the world.”

5. Intertext as the Anthropocene’s long run

I’m first asking you to look and listen to one of my favorites, a short video clip of Anna Caterina Antonacci and Andreas Scholl singing the duet, “I embrace you,” from Handel (the English translation can be found at the end of the clip’s Comments):

Antonacci’s performance may resonate for some with the final scene in Sunset Boulevard, where Gloria Swanson, as the actress Norma Desmond, walks down the staircase toward the camera. But intertextuality–that two-way semi-permeability across genres–is also at work. Antonacci brings the opera diva into Swanson’s actress as much as the reverse, and to hell with anachronism and over-the-top.

–Let’s now bring semi-permeable intertextuality closer to public policy and management. Zakia Salime (2022) provides a rich case study of refusal and resistance by Moroccan villagers to nearby silver mining–in her case, parsed through the lens of what she calls a counter-archive:

My purpose is to show how this embodied refusal. . .was productive of a lived counter-archive that documented, recorded and narrated the story of silver mining through the lens of lived experience. . . .Oral poetry (timnadin), short films, petitions, letters and photographs of detainees disrupted the official story of mining ‘as development’ in state officials’ accounts, with a collection of rebellious activities that exposed the devastation of chemical waste, the diversion of underground water, and the resulting dry collective landholdings. Audio-visual material and documents are still available on the movement’s Moroccan Facebook page, on YouTube and circulating on social media platforms. The [village] water protectors performed refusal and produced it as a living record that assembled bodies, poetic testimonials, objects and documents

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dech.12726

What, though, when the status quo is itself a counter-archive? Think of all the negative tweets, billions and billions and billions of them. Think of all negative comments on politics, dollars and jerks in the New York Times. That is, think of these status quo repositories as a counter-archive of “status-quo critique and dissent.”

–So what?

A genre notion of the status quo as counter-archive means that today’s counter-archive is also to be thought of as semi-permeable and in two-way traffic with other genres. This raises an interesting possibility: a new kind of long-run that is temporally long because it is presently intertextual, indefinitely forwards and back and across different genres.

For example, if the climate emergency is violence and the Big Polluters are culprits, then violent resistance against them is a form of violence reduction (assuming resistance succeeds). This means the “violence” and the “resistance” are difficult to evaluate, let alone predict, because the long-run over which they are to unfold is itself a current but changing intertext.

As in: “the varieties of revolution do not know the secrets of the futures, but proceed as the varieties of capitalism do, exploiting every opening that presents itself”–to paraphrase political philosopher, Georges Sorel.

6. “Ridicule is the only honourable weapon we have left.” Muriel Spark, novelist

I can’t quote them because Heidegger was a Nazi, Pound a Fascist, Sartre a Maoist, Eliot an anti-Semite. I don’t read Foucault because he didn’t care if he infected guys and I don’t read that mystery writer because she was a convicted killer. I don’t go to baseball games because of the players’ strike way back when and I refuse to watch that man’s films because he’s said to have messed with his own kid.

I don’t buy Nike because of the sweatshops, listen to Wagner because he was a Jew-hater, or have a TV because it makes children violent. I can’t eat tofu because of genetically modified soybeans or cheese because of genetically modified bacteria. I don’t listen to Sinatra because he was a nasty little man or Swarzkopf because she was a collaborator. The U.S. government’s been screwed since Johnson and the Great Society (no, since FDR and the welfare state (no, since Lincoln and the Civil War (no, since Jackson and the Trail of Tears (no, since Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase (no, since Washington and his plantation slaves…)))).

I don’t trust Freud because he didn’t understand women, Klein because she couldn’t get along with her daughter, Bettelheim because he’s suppose to have hit kids, or Laing because he too wasn’t nice. I think we were never further away from nuclear war than during the Cuban Missile Crisis (only afterwards did Brezhnev insist on nuclear parity). Plus it’s a good thing Japan has lost decades of economic growth or they’d’ve been re-armed by now.

From time to time I’ve wondered if Socrates could go to heaven. Speaking of which, why is Adam painted with a belly button, where in the Bible is the turkey that keeps showing up in those tapestries of Eden and Noah’s Ark, and for that matter why do shadows first show up in early Western art only? Do you really think historical Jesus worried about who licks what where?

Dying means my total annihilation; too bad for eternity, I say. It doesn’t know what it’s missing. It’s when I’m dead that I become “will always have been.” Still, little gives me quite the exquisite pleasure as knowing my secrets die with me.

Which makes me wonder: Other than the streets, where do squirrels go to die? And whatever happened to pineapple upside-down cake and Saturday drives? I have to wonder, did Wittgenstein read Rabelais: “Utterances are meaningful not by their nature, but by choice”? Can there be anything more mind-numbing than beginning, “In hunting-and-gathering societies. . .”? And just who did say, Freedom is the recognition of necessity (Hegel, Engels, Lenin, who)? E Pluribus Unum: Isn’t that Latin for “Follow the dollar”?

Whatever, every morning I wake up and thank heaven I wasn’t born a minority in this country. If I had a magic wand, I’d solve America’s race problem by giving everybody a master’s degree. I’d make sure they’d all be white, married, professionally employed, and own homes. (BTW, every adult in China should have a car; with all that ingenuity they’d have to come up with a solution to vehicle pollution.)

But then again, I’m quite willing to say that the entire point of human evolution is there hasn’t been any worth speaking of. As for the rest, I suppurate with unease. It’s probably—possibly, plausibly?—wise not to think too much about these things.

7. Consequences and thought experiments

More times than we’d like, formal plans emerge as a by-product of a struggle between contingency and “consequences.” That is, people confront not so much discrete events with causal consequences as contingencies associated with aftermaths, about neither of which there is much causal understanding.

Because it’s difficult to predict consequences, we seek out other means to do so. For example, a thought experiment searches out other kinds of “consequences,” perhaps more tractable to the cognitive and affective limits of analysis. All these attempts to identify consequences can be analogous to trying–and failing–to find the right word.

Many people assume that writing is all about finding the right word. On the other hand, when asked how he seemed always able to choose the right phrase, the poet responded: “Dear Mr. Stein, I do not choose the right word. I get rid of the wrong one. Period. Sincerely yours, A.E. Houseman.” T.S. Eliot makes the same point: “It is supposed that the poet, if anybody, is one engaged in perpetual pursuit of the right word. My own experience would be more accurately described as the attempt to avoid the wrong word. For as to the right word, I am not convinced it is anything but a mirage.”

Identifying the wrong words because anything else is a mirage. Examples of the latter fly to mind. Consider some descriptions for the self-correcting, self-regulating, self-healing efficacy of complex adaptive systems. If fireflies can do it, why can’t humans? If fireflies can self-organize and flash in unison, why can’t humans better coordinate and synchronize their behavior? If earthworms can do it, why can’t humans? If earthworms can move tons of soil, why can’t humans do the same?

8. “Keep it simple!”

Not to worry, we’ll scale up later, soothes the techno-managerial elite. Later on, presses the happy-talk, we’ll relax assumptions and add realism. Anyway, we know how to reduce inequality (just give them money!), overpopulation (just don’t have babies!) and save the environment (just don’t cut down the trees!). So many of these just-do-this suffocate in their fat of “Well, this time is different,” “This time we really don’t have any other choice,” and “This time, you have to believe us, failure is not an option here and now.”

The chief problem with “start simple here and now” is that each scale/level is complex in its own right. The shoreline only looks smooth on the map. “Which do you find to be simpler,” asks novelist and essayist, William Gass: “The radio that goes on when you turn a single knob, or the one that won’t work because the parts are all lined up on the floor?”

When I hear someone telling us “Keep it simple!” I immediately think they’ve lost the plot, like the actor playing Hamlet, who finished the bedroom scene with Gertrude but forgot to kill Polonius.

9. Quoting our way to answering, “What happens next?” Answer: “Yes, but” 1/2

What to do when there isn’t even a homeopathic whiff of “next steps ahead” in the policy-relevant document you are reading? Yes, it’s a radical critique that tells truth to power, yes it is a manifesto for change now; yes, it’s certain, straightforward and unwavering.

But, like all policy narratives with beginnings, middles and ends, the bigger question remains: What happens next? With answers, assumed endings become provisional, if not premature. “The thing is that you can always go on, even when you have the most terrific ending,” in the words of Nobel poet, Joseph Brodsky.

II

I in fact believe that we possess valid criteria for judging when criticism is good and when it is bad…But I also think it is a mistake to assume, and self-defeating to pretend, that these criteria are simple and obvious….To get progressively clearer to the multiple and interdependent discriminations involved requires the evolving give-and-take of dialogue…[W]hen a proponent says, ‘This is so, isn’t it?’ his interlocutor will reply, ‘Yes, but. . .’ M.H. Abrams, literary critic

The motto on his shield is a bold ‘YES BUT—.’ Dwight Macdonald, the critic writing of himself

Remember, I started out learning and appreciating literature at the time of the Black Arts Movement, when people were saying, ‘Look at what’s around you. Look at the people around you. Look at all that music around you.’ I was learning poetry at that time. So I was learning poetry when people were saying, ‘We don’t need no poems about trees. We need poems about the people.’ That was one of the things that you would hear from the people who wanted a certain kind of community poetry. But see, you’ve got a guy like me who’s listening to that, and I’ve been twelve miles out on the Bermuda reef and working in Alaska. My job was with nature. So when I picked up the Black Arts Movement, I picked it up with, ‘Yeah, yeah. But—.’ Ed Roberson, poet

III

quin etiam refert nostris versibus ipsis
cum quibus et quali sint ordine quaeque locata;
. . .verum positura discrepitant res.

(Indeed in my own verses it is a matter of some moment what is placed next to what, and in what order;…truly the place in which each will be positioned determines the meaning.)
Lucretius, De Rerum Natura

In other words, one answer to “What happens next?” is to juxtapose disparate quotes in order to extend the endings we have. There must be a sense in which such extensions are forced and since forced, any resonance (no guarantees) is compelling. This is a high-stakes wager–thus, the “yes, but” as alternative versions of what I would have thought instead.

10. Quoting our way to answering, “What happens next?”: 2/2

"Who we are is what we can't be talked out of" Adam Phillips

Large proportions of the Chinese collection are perhaps copies in the eyes of those collectors and dealers, who believe that authentic African art has become largely extinct due to diminishing numbers of active traditional carvers and ritual practices. However, the ideological structure and colonial history of authenticity loses its effects and meanings in China, where anything produced and brought back from Africa is deemed to be “authentically African” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13696815.2021.1925089

But when. . .researching shanzhai art made in Dafen village, located in Shenzhen, Southern China, and home to hundreds of painter-workers who make reproductions in every thinkable style and period, I was struck by the diversity of the artworks and their makers. The cheerfulness with which artworks were altered was liberating, for example, the ‘real’ van Gogh was considered too gloomy by customers, so the painters made a brighter version (see Image 1).

In another instance, I witnessed the face of Mona Lisa being replaced by one’s daughter to make it fit the household. When I brought an artwork home, the gallery called me later to ask if it matched my interior. Otherwise, I could change it. Such practices do turn conventional notions about art topsy-turvy. And shanzhai does not only concern art, it extends to phones, houses, cities, etc. As Lena Scheen (2019: 216) observes,

‘What makes shanzhai truly “unique” is precisely that it is not unique; that it refuses to pretend its uniqueness, its authenticity, its newness. A shanzhai resists the newness dogma dominating Euro-American cultures. Instead, it screams in our faces: “yes, I’m a copy, but I’m better and I’m proud of it”.’ https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13675494251371663

So what?

Any realistic attempt of ecological restoration with cloned bucardo [the Pyrenees ibex] would have to rely on hybridisation with other subspecies at some point; the genetic material from one individual could not be used to recreate a population on its own. Juan hypothesised: “we would have had to try to cross-breed in captivity, but you never know what could be possible, with new tools like CRISPR developing… and those [genome editing] technologies that come in the future, well, we don’t know, but maybe we could introduce some genetic diversity. This highlights a fundamental flaw in cloning as a means of preserving ‘pure’ bucardo—not only are ‘bucardo’ clones born with the mitochondrial DNA of domestic goats, but the hypothetical clone would also be subjected to further hybridisation. This begs the question, could such an animal ever be considered an authentic bucardo?” https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/tran.12478

11. One honest response to the political awfulness is the ostensive definition: “These are what’s worth defending.”

(The Comments at the originating YouTube sites provide background. Subtitles are available under CC or Settings.)

The now more noticeable limits of global analytic tip (updated)

I’m hardly the first struck by the analytic tip in my profession, policy analysis: What used to be dealt with at the local, regional and even national levels, at least when I started out in the early 1970s, is now addressed first and foremost globally (think “global warming”).

What I was unprepared for was how “the local” has been consigned to analytic oblivion as the tip proceeded. Let me give an example from the field of Infrastructure Studies. To be clear from the outset, I agree with every word in the following:

Infrastructures should be understood as plural, active, and dynamic, producing a range of impacts, both planned and unplanned, on the places and societies they traverse and inhabit. These insights reinforce the characterization of infrastructures as socio-technical networks, while their multiple and often ambiguous effects partially challenge the intentionality presumed in [Michael Mann’s 1984] conceptualization of infrastructural power. For example, recent scholarship highlights the unanticipated costs or forms of violence that infrastructures can impose on disenfranchised communities and regions.

The socio-technical nature of infrastructures is clearly reflected in their politicization and contestation, which reveal competing social interests across multiple scales. Commonly regarded as background systems, infrastructures rarely occupy public attention until they fail to meet expectations, whether through malfunction, inadequate supply, or clashes with users’ interests and needs. Increasing attention has also been paid to infrastructures’ negative externalities, or “public bads,” including ecological, social, and psychological harms, revealing both conflicting local perspectives and broader changes in societal priorities and beliefs, as well as new forms of collective identity and agency, manifested in labor strikes, acts of sabotage, or protests. (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1368431026145776; internal citations deleted)

For me, this passage represents hard-won insights over years of research: the units and levels of analysis are socio-technical, networks, across scales, contingent on context, and often with unanticipated and unintended impacts.

But then comes the irresistible updraft in the article’s next sentence:

These dynamics are not confined to the local scale: transnational infrastructures are increasingly implicated in broader geoeconomic contexts, as exemplified by the Houthi attacks on the Red Sea shipping lanes, the shutdown of major Chinese ports under Beijing’s zero-COVID policy, and the disputes surrounding the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

Well, yes, that too is true, but still: Just what is happening at the lower scales of analysis? Indeed, how do actual operations of critical infrastructures unfold at the local and regional levels?

The article, like so many others, is off and running to the international, global and now planetary levels–understandably so, since that’s global analytic tip after all–but! Even if what the article continues to say is just as true as what was said to that point, that truth needs to be pushed further, especially as variation in inter-infrastructural connectivities at the local and regional levels matter so often and so directly for policy and management.


NB. For more on this analytic tip, see my 1994 Narrative Policy Analysis.

Key Blog Entries: Updated October 18, 2026

—Latest blog entries include

**”‘The greater danger may lie not in catastrophism itself but in the tendency to discount unwelcome historical diagnoses because their authors cannot specify what comes next.’“

**”Worth repeating. . .Constant’s complexities“

—When Complex is as Simple as it Gets: Guide for recasting policy and management in the Anthropocene can be found at

When Complex is as Simple as it Gets: Guide for Recasting Policy and Management in the Anthropocene (links to the Guide and schematic)

–Those interested in newly updated extensions of the Guide, please see:

**”Sourcing new ideas from the humanities, fine arts, and other media for complex policy analysis and management (newly added)“

**”17 examples on how genre differences affect the structure and substance of policy and management [newly added]” structure-and-substance-of-policy-and-management-last-newly-added/

**”Instead of “differentiated by gender, race and class,” why not “differentiated by heterogeneity and complexity”? Ten examples of racism, class, capitalism, inequalities, border controls, authoritarianism, COVID and more”

**”New method matters in reframing policy and management (recently added)”

**”Emerging counternarratives on: migrants, border controls, digital networks, remittances, child labor, COVID’s impact (Africa and Europe), and global neoliberalism”

—Other major new reads:

**”The ‘future’ in HRO Studies: the example of networked reliability”

**”The siloing of approaches to discourse and narrative analyses in public policy“

**”A National Academy of Reliable Infrastructure Management”

**”‘Learning discrepantly’ for policy & management (updated and expanded)“

**”The value added from rethinking ‘prediction’ and ‘imagination’ in more granular terms“

**”I understand why others feel compelled to defend the humanities and arts. But their direct relevance for public policy and management has always been obvious.“

**”The Centrality of Restoration Resilience Across Interconnected Critical Infrastructures for Emergency Management: A Framework and Key Implications”

—Key blog entries on livestock herders, pastoralists and pastoralisms are:

**”If not corpse-pastoralism, then what are we seeing? Four other suggestions and key upshot for re-seeing what we thought we knew.“

**”Time to think more radically: three new policy narratives extremely different from current positions in pastoralist development”

**”Working pastoralism as a scene-making infrastructure“

**”Other fresh perspectives on pastoralists and pastoralism: 17 brief cases (last newly added)”

**”A ‘reliability-seeking economics in pastoralist development”

**”Twelve new extensions of “pastoralists as reliability professionals” and “pastoralism as a critical infrastructure”

**”First complicate those for-or-against-pastoralism arguments and then see the policy relevance: four brief examples”

—Key blog entries on updating Narrative Policy Analysis are:

**”Updating NARRATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS (1994)“

**”Narrative policy analysis: then, now and ahead”

**”The policy relevance of Michel Riffaterre and Algirdas Greimas: the example of global climate change (GCC)”

“The greater danger may lie not in catastrophism itself but in the tendency to discount unwelcome historical diagnoses because their authors cannot specify what comes next.”

We are told the original Cassandra knew, with absolute clarity, that the catastrophes she prophesied would happen. Our really-existing Cassandra’s cannot have that certainty about their predictions of catastrophe, no matter how sure they may feel about this or that. Indeed, that is what the rest of us know.

But catastrophe-with-respect-to-what? Our scenarios for what’s next or later vary in terms of their details. Indeed, the more detailed, the more likely the scenario will not happen the way specified. If the latter is the starting assumptions, then it’s no surprise you respond to catastrophe (or its prospect) in real time by trying to keep your options to maneuver now and in the next steps ahead. You work through “what-ifs,” yes; but not so specific as to foreclose taking different pathways ahead, should they prove needed. The buzz term, “building in resilience,” often obscures this open-endness.

Whether you and your associates are able to keep options open is, of course, another matter. Here I want to underline that such real-time scenarioizing imports into it the “near real time”. The next steps ahead are also being prepared for, imagined if not actually anticipated. I take this to mean cognition in these circumstances is not an entire presentism where the current moment is what’s immediately real. Real time also incorporates some planning ahead and planning ahead imports elements of the future just as real as the moment now.

So, to return to the question posed in the title, even those who undertake the real-time operation of our large critical infrastructures typically have longer-than-immediate time horizons when confronted by unanticipated shocks or worse. Real-time operation of large, complex critical infrastructures is not rapid emergency response. This in turn means that those who predict catastrophe with respect to this or that failure scenario should at least avail themselves of the what-if scenarios discussed in the operation centers of the critical infrastructures with respect to the said catastrophe. That may not be certainty, but it is useful knowledge.

My experience–and here I stand to be corrected–is that not only do catastrophists not avail themselves of such operational scenarioizing, so too do some serious historical discussions evince prognostications devoid of any interest in the particulars. For them, this is the weeds–as if Cassandra shouldn’t have needed to be that specific in order to be heeded.

Worth repeating. . .Constant’s complexities

From: Stephen Holmes (1984). Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism. Yale University Press: New Haven, CT. Constant was a late 18th century – early 19th century French political thinker; Holmes is an American political scientist; and the book has been called a landmark study.

In truth, Constant’s hostility was never directed against democracy itself, but only against the pretext of democracy. He did not fear popular government, though (like Rousseau) he took it for granted that direct, polis-style self-rule was impossible in large modern states. He did not worry that if democracy were carried too far it would be transmogrified into its opposite. What he dreaded was the perverse exploitation of democratic rhetoric to justify the concentration of all power in a few hands and to conceal acts of oppression. In other words, Constant did not share the apprehensions of Tocqueville and Mill about a potential tyranny of the majority. He could not have been more explicit on this point. In 1829, he wrote: “during the last forty years, every time there has been tyranny in France, minorities have governed.” Even more emphatically: “The majority never oppresses. One confiscates its name, using against it the weapons it has furnished.” Not the majority but the all-justifying name of the majority, confiscated by a few, was his fundamental concern. (Holmes 1984, 25; internal endnotes deleted)

Refuting the crisis narrative: abandon third-person prophetic by admitting first-person uncertain

For those who surely know catastrophe is to come, I commend the initial section of Helen Vendler’s essay, “Loose Quotes” (in the journal, Liberties). Here, Vendler disrupts the understanding many of us have had about the familiar crisis lines opening “The Second Coming” by W.B. Yeats. She begins with the full poem and I quote Vendler’s analysis thereafter at length. I conclude with an upshot.


THE SECOND COMING 

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

       W.B. YEATS

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

….

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

In every crisis they appear, those famous and familiar lines from “The Second Coming,” written in 1919 by W. B. Yeats. Journalists and critics alike seem to take them as final assertions of Yeats’ own beliefs. Such innocent judgments do not ask why those lines open the poem, or for how long their assertions remain asserted. The poem itself has become lost behind the quotability of its opening lines. And Yeats, it seems, wants to be a pundit.

In our ready “yes, yes” to those lines, we think we are accepting the judgment of a sage, but by the time we reach the close of the poem — which is a question, not an assertion — we are driven to imagine the changing states of the writer composing this peculiar poem, and we raise questions. . .In order to understand this poem, to free it from its ubiquitous misuses, and to restore it to both its opening grandeur and its subsequent humiliation, those are the questions that we must answer. . . .

“The Second Coming” is a lurid refutation of the lurid Christian expectations of the Second Coming of Christ, which Jesus himself foretells in Matthew 29-3:

Immediately after the distress of those days, the sun will be darkened, and the moon will refuse her light, and the stars will fall from heaven, and the powers of heaven will rock; and then the sign of the Son of Man will be seen in heaven; then it is that all the tribes of the land will mourn, and they will see the Son of Man coming upon the clouds of heaven, with great power and glory.

Yeats proposes a surreal alternative to Jesus’ prophecy, proposing that on the Last Day we will see not Christ in majesty but a menacing, pitiless, and coarse beast who “slouches toward Bethlehem to be born.” “After us, the savage god,” Yeats had said as early as 1896. He watched through the decades, appalled by the sequential horror of world events: The World War from 1914-1918; the failed Easter Rising in Ireland in 1916; the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. And his first assertions in “The Second Coming” are indeed thoughts prompted by such political upheavals. . . .

The quotability of Yeats’ opening passage derives, of course, from the total and unmodified confidence of its initial reportage, impersonal and unrelenting, offering a naked list of present-tense events happening “everywhere.” Stripped to their kernels, these are Yeats’s truculently unmitigated hammer-blows of grammar:

The falcon cannot hear
Things fall apart
The centre cannot hold
Mere anarchy is loosed
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed
Everywhere the ceremony of innocence is drowned
The best lack all conviction
The worst are full of passionate intensity

The break, after Yeats’ introductory eight-line block, leads an educated reader to expect that a six-line block will follow, completing a sonnet [of 14 lines]. Yet the poet finds himself unable to maintain his original jeremiad, which has been aggressive, omniscient, panoramic, and prophetic. Yeats “begins over again,” and utters in the fourteen lines following the break a complete second “sonnet,” a rifacimento of the one originally intended, in which he rejects his earlier rhetoric of impersonal omniscience as inauthentic from his human lips. Who is he to speak as though he could see the world with the panoramic scan proper only to God? That so many successive writers have been eager to reissue his lines reveals how greatly the human mind is seduced by the vanity of the unequivocal. Can we requote without unease what the poet himself immediately rejected?

Although “The Second Coming” begins with an attempt at couplet-rhyme, soon — as Peter Sacks has pointed out to me — the couplets begin to disintegrate, as though they themselves were intent on demonstrating how “things fall apart”. . .The second, revisionary octave replaces the certainty of the poet’s original octave with the self-defensive uncertainty of “Surely.” Longing for a revelation more humanly reliable than an unsupported façade of godlike prophecy, Yeats insistently utters his second “Surely,” one no less dubious than the first. The second “Surely” attempts to locate a cultural myth to which he can attach the vision vouchsafed to him in a revelation arising within his human consciousness. “Surely the Second Coming is at hand. / The Second Coming!”

For the first time in the poem, we hear Yeats speaking in the first person, declaring that “a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi / Troubles my sight.” The poet is the sole spectator of this vast image, and he claims that it stems not from his own bodily sense of sight but from the World Spirit, a universal Spiritus Mundi always potentially able to rise into human awareness. (Poets so often describe the initial inspiration for a poem as something coming unbidden that the reader is not troubled by Yeats’ myth of a World-Spirit supplying the image for his revelation.) The poet has decided that it is more honest, more tenable, to write in the first person, to present himself as one whose imagination has reliably generated a telling and trustworthy “vast image” of his historical moment. He has forsaken his impressive but fraudulent rhetoric of omniscience for an account of his private inspiration.  

Once Yeats has repudiated his initial “divine” posture as a guaranteed seer-of-everything-everywhere, he can take on, in the first person, his limited historical image-making self and create with it a “human” sestet for his newly “remade” sonnet. Admitting the fallibility of any transient metaphorical image, he acknowledges that his image vanishes, “the darkness drops again,” and he is left alone. Yet he grandly maintains, in spite of his abandoning a prophetic stance, that he now definitely “knows” something.

The “something” turns out to be a single historical fact: the exhaustion of Christian cultural authority after its “twenty centuries” of rule. His “vast image” — its nature as yet unspecified — has shown him that Christianity will be replaced by a counter-force, a pagan one. Drawing on his reading of [Giambattista] Vico and Herbert Spencer, Yeats believed that history exhibited repetitive cycles of opposing forces. Just as Christianity overcame the preceding centuries of Egypt and Greece, now it is time for some power to defeat Christianity.

In his private “revelation” the poet has seen the Egyptian stone sphinx asleep “somewhere” in sands of a desert. (The uncertain “somewhere” admits the loss of the initial “everywhere” of Yeats’ prophetic opening.) The “stony sleep” of the Sphinx has lasted through the twenty centuries of Christianity, but now Fate has set an anticipatory cradle rocking in Bethlehem, birthplace of the previous god, and a sphinx-like creature rouses itself to claim supremacy:

The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle…

Although the poet “knows” that Christianity is undergoing the nightmare of its death-throes, he cannot declare with any confidence what will replace it. He can no longer boast “I know that…”: he can merely ask a speculative question which embodies his own mixed reaction of fear and desire to the vanishing of a now outworn Christianity, the only ideological system he has ever known. What will replace the Jesus of Bethlehem, he asks, and invents a brutal and unaesthetic divinity, a sphinx seen in glimpses — “with lion body and the head of a man, / A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun”. . .The indignant birds, their movement in the sky inferred from their agitated cast shadows, “reel about,” disoriented, projecting, as surrogates, the poet’s own indignation as he guesses at the future parallel upheaval of his own world. . .:

And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

(Accessed online at https://libertiesjournal.com/articles/loosed-quotes/?cache_busting=6ac95a404e605 and appearing in Chapter 1 of Helen Vendler (2025). Inhabit the Poem: Last Essays. Library of America: New York, NY)


Vendler continues her exegesis, but my upshot is established. What makes this a fine poem for Vendler is that its narrative of feeling also opens up to “an analysis of the origin and evolution of such feelings” (2025, xii). Fear and dread driving crisis narratives are, in contrast, more third-person societal and coarser than first-person uncertain–at least for this policy analyst.

Separating pastoralists out from pastoralism(s) leaves a category error driving policy & management

I

Let’s just say that governments and their donors are quite willing to distinguish pastoralists from pastoralism when their saving pastoralists means destroying the ways of pastoralism, e.g., sedentarize these herders as a way of bringing them more fully into modernity’s fruits of development.

But what are the policy and management implications in insisting that the primary unit and level of analysis are in fact systems/societies of pastoralism, not their “individuals”? For those who see older forms of pastoralism fast disappearing into history, this question seems moot. It is not, however, for those who still find a variety of pastoralisms not only in the past but now as well. I include myself in the latter group.

What is underway in “pastoralism” is complex enough for multiple interpretations. Outside-induced dynamics and change are evident, but also institutional inertia, interpersonal habits, and routine “second nature.” Some in the resulting mixes of memories and expectations are more relevant for policy and management, e.g., Ian Scoones and his PASTRES colleagues on implications of a new pastoralism narrative for agrarian studies (“Rethinking agrarian studies from a pastoralist perspective” in https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2020.1802249#d1e1561).

My own work has been to suggest a “critical infrastructure” approach to understanding the policy and management implications of contemporary pastoralisms. But, to repeat, today’s complexities open up other ways of reframing pastoralism collectively rather than individually. Below are four other “system-level” illustrations of reframing and their policy and management relevance (culled from previous blog entries with full references). Warning: I’ve chosen to be provocative in my selection.

II

1. Scenes, not issues. Instead of talking about grazing practices, herd mobility, shortage of herder amenities, overall poor living conditions for herders and their marginal social status, think of their practices as performance, their mobility and herding itineraries as travel, their scant amenities as the role of, say, everyday music while herding, and all that poor or picturesque herder clothing as, well, fashion in its own right. To do so means we end up describing “scenes” more than “issues”. As in, e.g., the frequently narrativized “downtown” scenes for the arts, music and lifestyle alternatives, where that “alternative” carries a quite different valence that the “marginal” of many pastoralism studies.

In shifting the policy and management focus from issues to scenes, we are explicitly shifting to what have been called frictional, improvisational contact zones that everyday pastoralism shares with other scenes organized around (alternative) performances, travel, music and fashion. That this analytic shift complicates official and academic policy narratives about pastoralism is a welcome one in my view. How so?

If we stick with the conventional view of herders as their own unit and level of analysis, we’ve been trained to think of informal contact zones as the decreasing space between two blades of modernity’s scissors: One blade is everyday pastoralism commodified by really-existing markets and state interventions; the other blade is everyday pastoralism disciplined into categories from really-existing officials, consultants, and social scientists.

The contact zones I am talking about, however, are a response to the scissors cutting one way only. Whether the zones are formal or informal is not the point. Pastoralism is, to use the phrase, an “infrastructural form.” It is a scene-making device that is exceptionally adept at rendering all that unromantic, unsentimental dust and sand and dirt in photos of herds and herders alive with working relations and affordances–a shared repertoire of practices and atmospheres–that necessarily extend beyond market and state. (One of the great virtues in looking at pastoralist practices at the event and situation level is that policy scenes can turn just as center-stage as discrete policy issues or processes.)

2. Mobility as shifts in interconnectivity. Think of herd/er mobility as the interconnections and their different configurations managed spatially and temporally by herders for what are still called the factors of livestock production (land, water, labor). Livestock “moving between different sites with variable forage resources within a mosaic of harvested crop fields, open pastures and thickets” necessarily refers to more than the uni-directional interconnection of livestock and herders moving from a ‘here’ to a ‘there.’ Shifts in reciprocal, mediated and pooled interconnectivity are also being managed as part and parcel of more granular, fine-grained mobility.

To expand: Livestock move sequentially from here to there, but their inter-relationships with sites along the way are anything but serially uni-directional. Reciprocal (bi-directional) relationships are also much discussed in the literature (the stubble for livestock, the manure for the crop field). Extensively-raised livestock fattened up at special sites just before sale or slaughter are examples of a mediated interconnection between the herders and that off-take. The grazing itinerary of moving livestock across time and space is a kind of pooled interconnectivity guiding the herders and herds involved. More, shifts in configurations are a centerpiece of mobility discussions in the literature, e.g., improvising and responding opportunistically, as livestock and herders move along the itinerary, if there is one.

I want to suggest that “land mosaics” are more than primarily a set of property relations, or a set of different species in a habitat, or as a landscape with heterogeneous habitats. Practices associated with mobility as shifting interconnectivities over time and space are to my mind central. Practically, the notion of mosaic complexifies analysis. Because it is now “mobility with respect to the mosaic(s) of interest,” not just: “mobility as a response to task environment variability.” So what? The mosaic is the intervening template–if you will, the scenes–for understanding interconnected exogenous and endogenous variabilities, now more granular with respect to practices than the critics’ usual suspects of climate, prices, and conflict.

3. The methodological problem of “pastoralists” as a social figure.

We consider a timeless model of a common property resource (CPR) in which N herdsmen are able to graze their cattle. The model has been constructed deliberately along orthodox economics lines. . . .We begin with a timeless world. Herdsmen are indexed by i (i = 1, 2, …, N). Cattle are private property. The grazing field is taken to be a village pasture. Its size is S. Cattle intermingle while grazing, so on average the animals consume the same amount of grass. If X is the size of the herd in the pasture, total output – of milk – is H(X, S), where H is taken to be constant returns to scale in X and S.Dasgupta, P. (2021), The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review. London: HM Treasury: 221 (internal footnotes deleted)

After such bloodless abstractions, it’s a wonder even more readers don’t rush to anthropology for descriptions of really-existing pastoralists and their herding practices.

The methodological problem, though, remains: It’s pastoralists who are interviewed and quoted, not societies and systems. The policy-relevant compromise is to treat the pastoralists studied as one or more social figures, a composite assembled to represent the typical features of pastoralists who have been studied (or not).

A problem arises because use of social figures extends significantly beyond the confines of anthropology and the social sciences. Social figures “potentially have all the characteristics which would be considered character description in literary studies,” notes a cultural sociologist, adding, “unlike ideal types, for example, which are written with a clear heuristic goal in a scientific context, social figures can also appear in public debate or be described in literary texts.”

So what? “For theorizing, this means. . .attention must be paid to a good figurative description: Is the figurative description vivid, descriptive and, as a figure, internally consistent? Does it accurately reflect the social context to which it refers? Therefore, the criteria to assess quality in theorizing must be complemented by literary criteria.”

And one of those literary conventions helps explain why the social figure of pastoralists today is frequently compared and contrasted to the social figure of pastoralists in the past. “[T]here are often antecedent figures for a social figure. . .The current social figure can then be understood as an update of older social figures.”

A small matter, you might think, and easily chalked up to “this is the way we do longitudinal analysis.” It is not, however, a slight issue methodologically, when comparing your pastoralist informants today with the social figure of pastoralists in the past ends up identifying “differences” that are more about evaluative criteria than about comparative empirics. Beware any benchmark of “pre-capitalist” pastoralism!

4. When government’s recurrent cost budget is the informal sector. Humor me and start with current debates over periodizing World Wars I and II. It’s one thing to adopt the conventional periodization of the latter as 1939 – 1945. It is another matter to read in detail how 1931 – 1953 was a protracted period of conflicts and wars unfolding into and from a central paroxysm (primarily but not exclusively) in Europe and the Pacific.

In the latter perspective, the December 1941 – September 1945 paroxysm, with carnage across multiple front-lines, and military engagements both in Europe and the Pacific, were embedded in a longer series of large regional wars. These in turn were less preludes than unfolding processes worldwide. (Think: Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the late 1940s Dutch war in Indonesia, the French war in Indochina from the late 1940s through early 1950s, and the Korean War.)

Now, reframe the most recent extended East Africa drought as one such paroxysm, with drought-related conflicts leading up to and following from it. Current emergency management terminology about this or that “longer-term recovery” are considerably problematic when the longer term is one drought unfolding into another and then over again. Immediate emergency response would look considerably less proactive when embedded in a process of recurring response always before the next disaster.

What does this mean practically? One major follow-on is giving renewed attention to government budgets for their recurrent operations in dryland communities. Or more pointedly, you’re looking at the recurrent cost crises of East Africa governments–which, to my mind, far too few critics analyze when fixated on failures of capital development projects and programs for pastoralists (as individuals and as systems).

My view is that you have to have recurrent operating budgets already in place in order to get recurring drought response and recovery more effective on the ground over time. This means opening up our understanding of “government’s recurrent cost budget.” Networks and communities of pastoralist households already on the ground are the de facto recurrent budget.

More, this “informal sector as recurrent budget” centers around the fact that when acting like other networks of reliability managers, these teams or groups of pastoralists give ongoing priority to the real-time prevention of other disasters from happening along the way and the need for their improvisational behavior to do that.

III

“But that’s not pastoralism!,” you insist–and you may be right as far as you go.

My position is we need to go further. Despite “the mountains of research evidence about contemporary pastoralists,” to be told what not to do only increases uncertainty in the absence of recommendations for doing what instead. That is why the drive to more counternarratives, rather than more critiques, is so important.

Indeed, the second anyone recommends “interventions should heed African pastoralists’ understanding of environmental change and uncertainty and support their approach to dealing with these,” there are always those who immediately problematize by asking “which pastoralists and which approaches are we to listen to?” and “how do we listen to them without instrumentalizing those worldviews?”

In these and other ways, the researching of “pastoralists” can reduce to bearing witness, professions of solidarity with those totalized as victims, and calls for Big-T transformations without much detail. This too can be policy relevant in the sense of, say, the Black Sash vigils by white women in the mid-1950’s apartheid South Africa.

If only tyrants were extinguished by their own contraptions

The Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm I felt compelled to refuse the request of Tsar Peter the Great that they try out the former’s new execution gallows on one of their own men. It’s also recorded that Phalaris, 6th century BCE tyrant in Sicily ordered the inventor Perillus to design a huge bronze bull in which to roast the former’s victims alive. Their screams would, that tyrant hoped, sound just like the bellows of a bull. Phalaris was so impressed with the contraption that his first victim was Perillus.

Civilization, it seems, would be one where Friedrich Wilhelm I, Peter the Great, Phalaris, and all the other tyrants end in their own contraptions. And yet: It’s hardly helpful to know that modern cosmology–string theory plus black holes–implies there is a planet out there, just like this one in virtually every way, save that its US President is being water-boarded for crimes against humanity.

Radical political complexities that still matter: three examples

If a researcher only ever studies one political context, then the horizons of explanation are constrained because of selection bias. If one only studies the United States, without comparison to other countries, then this leads to a sample selection bias where one cannot answer why the United States has comparatively high poverty. To paraphrase [sociologist and political scientist, Seymour Martin Lipset], poverty scholars who only know one country, know no country.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10446494/

Radicalism is plural because of the many different practices and, accordingly, the benchmarks are comparative. So too today’s complexities make comparative radicalism a living force.

I.

The notebooks of Victor Serge, revolutionary, novelist and journalist, provide this example of how the radicals we need differ from the ones we are often stuck with:

13 September 1944. Second meeting of the Commission of independent socialists to study the political document drafted by Marceau Pivert, Gironella and Wilebaldo Solano. It is a kind of rudimentary Communist Manifesto, rehashing all the old phrases of that genre. I criticize it harshly—thinking that texts of this sort can do nothing but discredit the handful of men who take responsibility for them. They listen to me with interest and silent resentment. . .I say that the state has changed its nature and is no longer the armed body of one class for the domination of another, as Engels had it, with the exception of the totalitarian regimes; the modern state is also the organization of communications, of schools, of public health, etc. Indignation of Pivert, Gironella, Jean Malaquais: for a moment, I sense that they might cry treason! . . . .

My theses: that this war differs profoundly from that of 1914–18, of which it is the successor, and that it notably involves aspects of an international civil war (strong objections from Pivert). That the economic structure of the world has changed, traditional capitalism giving way to a planned economy, thus with a collectivist bent, which could be that of monopolies, of totalitarian parties—or of democracies of a new type, if they succeeded in coming into being (strong objections from Pivert). That the defeats of European socialism are not solely attributable to the inadequacy of leaders, although that is of some significance, but can be better explained in terms of the decline of the working class and of socialism as a result of modern technology—chronic unemployment, declassing of the jobless, tremendous increase in the productive capacity of machines, with less human labour required; greater influence of technicians. (Pivert rejects the entirety of these views without attempting to refute them; to speak of the weakening of the working class as a class appears sacrilegious to all; what can I do if it is the truth? A good Old Bolshevik, one of those who expelled and imprisoned us only to go before the firing squads themselves, would have given me this answer: there is no truth that can prevail over the interests of the party.)

That we are being carried along by the current of an immense revolution, but that the Russian Revolution will not repeat itself except in episodes of secondary importance. That socialism must renounce all ideas of dictatorship and of working-class hegemony and make itself the representative of the great masses among whom a socialistic consciousness is germinating, obscure and without doctrinal jargon. That the essential thing for the immediate future will be the restoration of traditional democratic rights, precondition for the rebirth of the workers’ and socialist movement; that we must try to break out of the void we are now in, to seek out the support and sympathy of the democratic masses wherever they are, make ourselves understood by them, bring our ideas up to date. That Stalinism, which has formed and nurtured armed resistance movements in France, Yugoslavia, Greece and elsewhere, constitutes the worst danger, the mortal danger that we would be crazy to claim we can face alone. That the years to come will be ones of confused struggles in which the socialist movement can do no more than re-establish itself—if it does not commit suicide through insurrectional demagogy. That it should seek influence on the terrain of democracy, in the Constituent Assemblies and elsewhere, accepting compromise in an intransigent spirit. That if the socialist left mires itself in an extremism bereft of influence, with a language barely intelligible to people and an out-dated ideology dating from 1920, the Stalinists will confect a fake socialism, subtle and without scruple, which might very well prevail.

No matter what I say, agreement is impossible, and the discussion difficult and sterile. Those who possess inner flexibility will change under the cudgel-blows of events; the others will vegetate in groupuscules on the margins of life (which offers many satisfactions) or will be crushed.

(Available online from the New Left Review at https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii82/articles/victor-serge-mexican-notebooks-1940-1947)

II

From the jurist and essayist, Carlos Moreno, re: political freedom, repression and humanitarianism:

The first proposition must be stated without qualification: the GDR had elements of an authoritarian state. It restricted political pluralism, controlled the press, restricted freedom of movement, imprisoned political opponents, and built a security apparatus that penetrated deeply into East German society. Chilean refugees [to East Germany] do not alter these facts, and the humanitarian assistance provided to them should not be used to rehabilitate the East German political system; to argue otherwise would be to replace one mythology with another. The GDR was not a democratic alternative to Pinochet’s Chile. But this is usually where the conventional Cold War narrative stops, treating that classification as though it explained everything that followed. It does not.

The second proposition matters equally: the GDR provided genuine protection to Chileans persecuted by the Pinochet dictatorship. For some, that protection was the difference between imprisonment and freedom, between torture and safety, between disappearance and survival; Carlos Altamirano’s experience makes the point with unusual clarity. Whatever the ideological calculations behind it, East German officials helped a major Chilean political leader escape a dictatorship that wanted him captured, and the fact that the GDR had political motives does not make the rescue unreal. States rarely act for one reason; humanitarianism and strategy are not mutually exclusive; a government can use a refugee’s story for propaganda while simultaneously saving the refugee’s life. To deny either fact because of the other is equally reductive. Nieves Ayress’s experience makes a related point with a different kind of clarity, because in her case there was nothing left to rescue, only someone left to treat; and the GDR treated her, hospitalized her, gave her work and a functioning life, and did not, by her own account, subject her to the surveillance some of her compatriots experienced. Altamirano’s case proves the GDR was capable of protection. Ayress’s case proves something logically prior to protection and easily overlooked: that the same state was also capable, once protection had already failed elsewhere, of care.

This is perhaps the central argument of the paper: the GDR’s solidarity with Chile was neither purely humanitarian nor merely cynical. It was political and human at once. The state had strategic reasons to oppose Pinochet, and the coup gave East Germany an opportunity to demonstrate its anti-imperialist credentials, strengthen its international propaganda, and define its own legitimacy against a violent alternative. All of this is true; and it is also true that East Germans and Chileans formed real friendships, that Chileans built real lives in East Germany, that East German institutions provided real education, employment, medical care, housing, and political space, and that many Chileans remembered the GDR not as an abstraction but as the place where they had survived. The historian’s task is not to decide which of these realities was the “real” one. It is to understand how they existed simultaneously; and to remember, in doing so, that one of these authoritarian states killed and disappeared thousands of its opponents while the other jailed and surveilled dissidents without approaching that scale of lethal violence. Proportion is not a minor footnote to this argument. It is close to the argument’s whole point. . . .

There is a temptation to resolve the contradiction at the heart of this history rather than sit with it. Was the GDR a refuge or a dictatorship? Both. Was its solidarity genuine or propagandistic? Both. Were Chileans grateful to the GDR? Many were. Did some become critical of it? Certainly. Did East German authorities monitor the people they had sheltered? The archival record, once fully assembled, can help answer the extent and character of that surveillance; this remains the paper’s most important piece of unfinished work. Did that surveillance erase the meaning of the refuge? No. Did the refuge erase the authoritarian nature of the state? No. The contradiction is not a problem for historians to solve; it is the historical phenomenon that needs explaining, and Chile provides a useful case precisely because it places two authoritarian systems beside one another without making them equivalent. Political freedom is not distributed neatly between opposing geopolitical camps. Neither is political repression, and neither, for that matter, is humanitarianism.

Carlos Moreno (2026), “From Allende to Honecker: Chilean Exile, Internationalism, and the Cold War -The Stories of Carlos Altamirano and Nieves Ayress” (August 07, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7501038 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7501038 (my bold)

III

From the conclusion of yet another biting critique of capitalism:

If public and open markets are no longer the main mechanism of distribution of goods and services, if the allocation of financial resources is subject to the idiosyncratic whims of a few gargantuan corporations, if Big Tech companies acquire a significant part of their capital for free because consumers do not own their data – that is, if rent has displaced profit in our political economies – then indeed, are we still speaking of capitalism?. . .That is, [this means] facing up with the fact that along with neoliberalism, the familiar toolbox of progressive politics (e.g. taxation, regulation and mobilisation), has also become passé – or at least inadequate for the challenges that lie ahead. Perhaps we must think and act more radically.

https://www.postneoliberalism.org/articles/what-comes-after-neoliberalism-big-tech-and-asset-managers-as-the-new-rentiers/

Or we just ignore such conclusions. There is no “perhaps” when it comes to demanding details that differ case-by-case, for our next steps ahead.

These political complexities are also a matter of record. . .

The first proposition must be stated without qualification: the GDR had elements of an authoritarian state. It restricted political pluralism, controlled the press, restricted freedom of movement, imprisoned political opponents, and built a security apparatus that penetrated deeply into East German society. Chilean refugees [to East Germany] do not alter these facts, and the humanitarian assistance provided to them should not be used to rehabilitate the East German political system; to argue otherwise would be to replace one mythology with another. The GDR was not a democratic alternative to Pinochet’s Chile. But this is usually where the conventional Cold War narrative stops, treating that classification as though it explained everything that followed. It does not.

The second proposition matters equally: the GDR provided genuine protection to Chileans persecuted by the Pinochet dictatorship. For some, that protection was the difference between imprisonment and freedom, between torture and safety, between disappearance and survival; Carlos Altamirano’s experience makes the point with unusual clarity. Whatever the ideological calculations behind it, East German officials helped a major Chilean political leader escape a dictatorship that wanted him captured, and the fact that the GDR had political motives does not make the rescue unreal. States rarely act for one reason; humanitarianism and strategy are not mutually exclusive; a government can use a refugee’s story for propaganda while simultaneously saving the refugee’s life. To deny either fact because of the other is equally reductive. Nieves Ayress’s experience makes a related point with a different kind of clarity, because in her case there was nothing left to rescue, only someone left to treat; and the GDR treated her, hospitalized her, gave her work and a functioning life, and did not, by her own account, subject her to the surveillance some of her compatriots experienced. Altamirano’s case proves the GDR was capable of protection. Ayress’s case proves something logically prior to protection and easily overlooked: that the same state was also capable, once protection had already failed elsewhere, of care.

This is perhaps the central argument of the paper: the GDR’s solidarity with Chile was neither purely humanitarian nor merely cynical. It was political and human at once. The state had strategic reasons to oppose Pinochet, and the coup gave East Germany an opportunity to demonstrate its anti-imperialist credentials, strengthen its international propaganda, and define its own legitimacy against a violent alternative. All of this is true; and it is also true that East Germans and Chileans formed real friendships, that Chileans built real lives in East Germany, that East German institutions provided real education, employment, medical care, housing, and political space, and that many Chileans remembered the GDR not as an abstraction but as the place where they had survived. The historian’s task is not to decide which of these realities was the “real” one. It is to understand how they existed simultaneously; and to remember, in doing so, that one of these authoritarian states killed and disappeared thousands of its opponents while the other jailed and surveilled dissidents without approaching that scale of lethal violence. Proportion is not a minor footnote to this argument. It is close to the argument’s whole point. . . .

There is a temptation to resolve the contradiction at the heart of this history rather than sit with it. Was the GDR a refuge or a dictatorship? Both. Was its solidarity genuine or propagandistic? Both. Were Chileans grateful to the GDR? Many were. Did some become critical of it? Certainly. Did East German authorities monitor the people they had sheltered? The archival record, once fully assembled, can help answer the extent and character of that surveillance; this remains the paper’s most important piece of unfinished work. Did that surveillance erase the meaning of the refuge? No. Did the refuge erase the authoritarian nature of the state? No. The contradiction is not a problem for historians to solve; it is the historical phenomenon that needs explaining, and Chile provides a useful case precisely because it places two authoritarian systems beside one another without making them equivalent. Political freedom is not distributed neatly between opposing geopolitical camps. Neither is political repression, and neither, for that matter, is humanitarianism.

Carlos Moreno (2026), “From Allende to Honecker: Chilean Exile, Internationalism, and the Cold War -The Stories of Carlos Altamirano and Nieves Ayress” (August 07, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7501038 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7501038 (my bold)