Major read: Which “rangeland restoration”?

I

“Restore” is a very big word in infrastructure studies. It’s been applied to: (1) interrupted service provision returned back to normal infrastructure operations; (2) services initially restored after the massive failure of infrastructure assets; and (3) key equipment or facilities reactivated after a non-routine “outage” as part of regular maintenance and repair.

To be clear, what follows are overlapping examples, but good-enough for our purposes:

–An ice storm passes through, leading to a temporary closure of a section of the road system. Detours may or may not be possible until the affected roadways are restored. This is an example of #1.

–An earthquake hits, systemwide telecommunications fail outright, and mobile cell towers are brought in by way of immediate response to restore telecom services, at least initially. This is an example #2.

–A generator in a power plant trips offline. Repairs are undertaken, nvolving manual, hands-on work so as to return the unit back on line. This kind of sudden outage happens frequently and is considered part of the electric utility’s standard-normal M&R (maintenance and repair). This is an example of #3.

II

Now think of “rangeland restoration” in these terms of 1 – 3, e.g.:

#1: Stall feeding, which is here part of normal operations, is restored after an unexpected interruption in its version of a supply chain. Trucking of water and livestock, which are also part of normal livestock operations there, are temporarily interrupted.

#2: Grasslands have been appropriated for other uses (the infamous expanding agriculture), requiring indefinite use of alternative livestock feed and grazing until a more permanent solution is found.

#3: A grassland fire—lightning strikes are a common enough occurrence though unevenly distributed—takes part of the grasslands out of use, at least until (after) the next rains. Herders respond by reverting to more intensive alternative intensive grazing practices for what’s left to work with.

III

Now, here are two important implications:

First, rangeland equilibrium—and ecological disequilibrium for that matter—have nothing to do with these comparisons. The benchmark here is the normal operations of pastoralism as an infrastructure with respect to the use of pasture assets. Yes or no: Has routine stall feeding been restored back after an interruption in supply? This is pre-eminently the issue of infrastructure reliability, not range ecology (i.e., the former is an output matter, the latter more an input issue).

Second, the issue of overgrazing is often a sideshow distracting from what is actually going on infrastructurally. Because normal operations—remember, it’s the benchmark used here for comparisons—always has had overgrazing in its operations.

What, for example, do you think the sacrifice grazing around a livestock borehole is about? There is nothing to “restore” the immediate perimeter of this borehole back to. In fact, that “overgrazed perimeter” is an asset in normal operations of the livestock production and livelihood systems I have in mind.

IV

So what?

As I read them, calls for “rangeland restoration” are a contradiction in infrastructure parlance, namely: “rangeland recovery back to an old normal.” Recovery in infrastructure terms is a massively complex, longer term, multi-stakeholder activity without any guarantees following on immediate emergency response to outright full system collapse.

Thinking infrastructurally about rangeland carrying capacity

I

The key problem in my view with the notion of “rangeland carrying capacity” is the assumption that it’s about livestock. The notion wants you to conjure up livestock shoulder-to-shoulder on a piece of land and then ask you: How could this not be a physical limit on the number of livestock per unit of land? You can’t pack anymore on it and that has to be a capacity constraint. Right?

Wrong. Livestock numbers on a piece of land are not a system. The number of pipes, rods and valves are not a nuclear power plant. Yes, livestock systems that provide continuous and important services (like meat, milk, wool. . .) also have limits. But these limits are set by managing physical constraints, be it LSU/ha or not. More, this management combines with managing other constraints like access to markets, remittances for household members abroad, nearby land encroachment, and much else.

Can herders make management mistakes? Of course. That is why pastoralists-to-pastoralists learning is so important.

From this perspective, it’s not “rangeland carrying capacity” we should be talking about, but “rangeland management capacity”. Or better yet, “rangeland management capacities,” as there is not just one major type of pastoralism, but many different pastoralist systems of production and provision of livestock-related services.

II

There are other rangeland-related points that need stressing as well, including:

1. No large critical infrastructures can run 24/7/365 at 100% capacity and be reliable, and pastoralist systems are no different. This means comparing pastoralist livestock systems to some kind of “optimized” grassland ranching or intensive dairy production is ludicrous if only because the latter is more likely to headed to disaster anyway.

2. Indigenous populations and their land rights are now taken by progressives as an essential part of democratic struggles (and not just in the Americas). But where are pastoralists holding livestock and claiming their land rights in the literature on this indigeneity?

3. Restocking schemes are routinely criticized for returning livestock to low-resource rangelands (as perceived by the experts). Yet government commodity buffer stocks (e.g., holding grain, wool or oil in order to stabilize the prices of those commodities) are routinely recommended by the experts, decade after decade, be the countries low-resource or not.

4. We hear about the need to move infrastructure change away from powerful actors towards more inclusive low-carbon futures. But where is the focus on pastoralists already practicing such futures? We hear about the methane contributions of livestock to global warming, but what about the reverse climate risks associated with curtailing pastoralism and in doing so its pro-biodiversity advantages?

5. When was the last time you heard pastoralist livestock exports from the arid and semi-arid rangelands of the world being praised for reducing, considerably, the global budget for virtual water trading from what it could have been?

And yet, that is exactly what pastoralism as a global infrastructure does.

Major Read: Development as repair & maintenance

Preliminaries

While this blog entry centers on one subset of the many varied camps and audiences “doing development,” what follows doesn’t aim to undermine the other values and principles. The climate emergency has to be mitigated, income inequality and wealth must be reduced, wars are to be stopped, and much more needs to be done. My argument is that, if you are looking for accomplishments in these areas, start with repair and maintenance of what now has been left.

My bête noire are the controlists inside and outside development who endanger us as much as do the wider economic and political forces they cannot control. The controlists I’m talking about believe that the inputs to complex sociotechnical processes can be specified and stabilized, that processes to transform inputs into outputs can also be identified and activated as required, and that the outputs produced are in turn the best possible with low and stable variability as well. But it doesn’t work that way.

Controlists are found across the political spectrum from left to right and in the middle; they are found at the top of hierarchies and at the bottom and in between. They are embedded in professions that matter for public policy and management (not just engineers or economists, but designer-ecologists for example). Their cumulative effect is that what used to be singled out as “government blunders” are far more widespread and non-denominational these days.

None of what follows, however, will stop controlists from asserting rights as our techno-managerial elites. They will continue to give directions because the latter are “evidence-based,” or because they know that incentives and behavioral nudges work, or better yet, they say they know that getting the institutions or the price right means the right behavior follows. All this is so, even when it’s blisteringly obvious we’re in unchartered times.

I’m interested in how to manage better in spite of the controlists, while nevertheless facing the wider forces that no longer can be controlled (if they ever were). My audience here are those working in Anthropocene who recognize not only are we being harmed by the wider forces under no one’s control, controlists are inflicting further injury through their blunders in insisting otherwise. What we know, instead, is that development carries on by better means.

How so? Because manage when you can’t control and you cope even when you can’t manage. Managing means maneuvering across processes to transform inputs you can’t control into outputs that you still can use for your livelihoods. Coping means planning the next steps ahead for outputs over which can no longer managing as reliably as you’d like. You do this because, right now when it matters in real time, you cannot control inputs, processes and outputs any more than you can cut clouds in half. And if things can’t be managed better now, why ever believe the promises of evergreen controlists to manage, well, far better?

My argument, in brief

My audience is, in short, those who want to manage better what is left behind by controlists and the forces they cannot and could not control. From this point on I call this domain of interest, development as repair and maintenance. This is the subset of development audiences who are focused on repairing what we can and want to maintain.

Controlists will of course see this as suboptimal, or anti-utopian, or the quietism of despair. Again, we won’t convince them otherwise. We have instead to rely on our own experiences and the increasing numbers around us.

Many of us have come to realize the centrality of repair and maintenance in development from different directions, no one of which is all that new. Some remember the recurrent cost crises of governments in the 80s and later. Others see the deteriorated facilities and critical infrastructures on the ground. Still others shutter in the face of the overhang of commitments relative to resources (think welfare-state pensions) and wonder how to square that and other such circles. There is also recognition that “doing development” in light of these changes is a decidedly “developed” world problem as well. More contributing factors could be itemized but the realization remain the same: “Doing development” is unavoidably about repairing and maintaining the infrastructures that make us a “we.” It’s also about other aspirations, but we know that development is unavoidably about repair and maintenance throughout.

How the latter happens is the subject of the next section. That discussion is followed by an example of how development-as-repair-and-maintenance recasts a controlist-dominated green finance and humanitarian aid (namely, the setting of thresholds and triggers for resourcing). The blog ends with a short conclusion on further policy and management implications.

What is development as repair & maintenance?

Let me start where you, the readers, are. Like me, you’ve attended presentations where we’re told of the enormous losses to be incurred if we did not make huge capital investments for a better society and economy. At a conference on sea-level rise, storm surges and flooding in the greater San Francisco Bay Area, I was told that:

**The Bay Area would need some 477 million cubic yards of sediment–the vast majority of which can’t be sourced locally–so as to restore area wetlands and mudflats;

**Also required would be an estimated US$110 billion to locally adapt to higher sea levels by 2050, this being based on existing plans in place or used as placeholders for entities that have yet to plan; and

**We should expect much more sea-level rise locally because of the newly accelerated melting of the ice cap in Antarctica and Greenland.

It’s not surprising that the actual mitigation interventions presented that day and all the hard work they already required paled into insignificance against the funding and work demands posed by the bulleted challenges. And so too before and elsewhere. I remember a meeting half a century ago about water point development in Machakos Kenya. The good news that day was that after overcoming implementation difficulties, construction was underway for the planned water supply! The bad news was that even if everything was constructed as planned, the project wouldn’t cover even the population increase in new water users over the plan period.

So, how can we talk about repair and maintenance when capital development needs are so massive? It’s been my experience–I stand to be corrected–that none of these estimated losses take into account the losses already prevented from occurring by operators and managers who avoid supply failures from that would have happened had they not intervened beforehand, sometimes at the last moment. (No guarantees!)

Why are these uncalculated millions and millions in savings important when it comes to responding to sea level rise, increased storm surges, more inland flooding, rising groundwater levels and other sequelae? Because it is from this pool of real-time talent and skills and practices that society will be drawing for operationally redesigning the inevitable shortfalls in new technologies, macro-plans and regulations proposed by controlists for climate restoration and recovery. It is from other pools of real-time reliability professionals in healthcare, education and social protection that any master strategies for poverty and inequality and the transformation of society will be modified necessarily on the fly and necessarily in the face of unpredictable/uncontrollable contingencies.

Three very important implications for policy and management follow, I believe. First, these considerations turn the notion of “capital investments” on its head. We necessarily shift to ongoing operations as a source of innovative change. Ongoing maintenance and repair lead the inevitable re-design and modification practices for the built infrastructure in real time.

Second, the focus on real time has the advantages of highlighting the important roles of both contingency and the long term in all this. Maintenance and repair (M&R) is very often an official stage of infrastructure operations precisely because of the time it takes for the infrastructure to be implemented and then operated as constructed and managed. Consequently, the infrastructure becomes more vulnerable to unpredictable or uncontrollable contingencies along the way that have to be responded to during routine and nonroutine M&R.

Third, and the most important for our purposes, those savings and innovative responses in preventing infrastructure failures from happening are better understood and appreciated as investments in an infrastructure-based economy and society. I argue that actually-existing operations–often most visible in the real time activities of those charged with maintenance and repair–are the core investment strategy for longer term reliable operations of societal infrastructures faced with uncertainties from the outside (e.g., those external shocks and surprises over the infrastructure’s lifecycle) and inadvertently produced by controlists with their policy macro-designs, promised markets, and fool-proof technologies.

If one considers these three implications together, then terms like “short-run,” “adaptive” and “flexible” are frequently not granular enough to catch the place-and-time specific–that is, often improvisational–properties of maintenance and repair under real-time urgencies. Obviously, the livestock watering borehole in Botswana’s Western Ngwaketse and the Contra Costa Country water supply in the San Francisco Bay region differ in kind and degree. But what does not differ is the importance of both as investments in their respective local and regional economies. And by “investments” I mean precisely as just discussed in terms of the real-time operations via repair and maintenance of foundational infrastructures.

So what? A too-brief example of thresholds and triggers in green finance and humanitarian aid

Green finance includes financial risk assessments of the impacts of the climate emergency on economic investments along with the activation of different thresholds and triggers for varied financial instruments, including green bonds and catastrophe bonds/insurance. Central banks are becoming more and more involved in green finance. The establishment and use of thresholds–which if breached, trigger different, at times financial responses–also extend to humanitarian aid and emergency response, whether or not related to the climate emergency.

I want to focus on the use of these thresholds and triggers from the repair and maintenance perspective just offered. I was recently involved in workshop, where one of the participants summarized for me:

I was trying to highlight how a whole institutionalised paraphernalia has evolved in the humanitarian/development space of late focused on early warning, anticipatory action, parametric insurance, early financing, all governed by models, and so creating ‘science-based’ triggers for response etc. It’s becoming more and more significant as climate finance is channelled through these mechanisms, in part a consequence of reduced field capacities/experiences in agencies/governments (in part a consequence of aid cuts that fall on people first). . . .

The problem of course is that this whole financialised ‘technostructure’ as you term it acts to exclude those very people we call high reliability professionals and all the tacit, informal, storytelling and improvisation that goes on that continuously prevents disasters and responds to them in real time.

We know that the models fail (the triggers are based on risk based calculus and don’t embrace uncertainty, in fact they can’t by definition) and so the responses too often are inappropriate, late, inadequate and so on, while at the same time the networks that keep the systems running, governing on the go etc. become deskilled and ignored, making matters worse.

These concerns are very pertinent from the high reliability literature’s reliability-matters test: Would the threshold/trigger, if activated, reduce the task volatility (the unpredictability and/or uncontrollability of the task environment) that real-time operators face? Even if not, does activation of the threshold/trigger increase their options to respond to existing task volatility? Now something that does both is a real investment in economy, society and polity!

So yes, given the ubiquity of humanitarian aid, there clearly must be situations where thresholds/triggers increase task environment volatility for field staff, reduce their front-line options, or do both (see https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20539517251318268 for one among many examples). I would, however, feel more confident in drawing a conclusion if situations where the threshold/trigger is or has been a positive resource were also identified (even if, especially if unintended). In either case, other things are also at play. The broader issue isn’t so much the planner/regulator’s Who is going to implement my major controls? as it is the infrastructure operators’ What are my major real-time failure scenarios?

Speaking personally, I can no more object a priori to an innovation like formal thresholds/triggers than I would say herders cease to be pastoralists when adopting cellphones and modern crop insurance. That reindeer herding by some Sami also relies on helicopters for round-ups in no way argues, at least for me, that pastoralism and its improvisations have disappeared. The issue for me is whether the threshold/trigger is a single resource that has multiple uses for operators in the field–or could be made to have multiple uses through more investigation or in different contexts of ongoing operations. So too when it comes specifically to the kinds of repair and maintenance operations discussed here and even more generally. “The examples are legion,” writes Graham and Thrift in an early major article on the centrality of maintenance and repair to economies, adding

maintenance and repair can itself be a vital source of variation, improvisation and innovation. Repair and maintenance does not have to mean exact restoration. Think only of the bodged job, which still allows something to continue functioning but probably at a lower level; the upgrade, which allows something to take on new features which keep it contemporary; the cannibalization and recycling of materials, which allows at least one recombined object to carry on, formed from the bones of its fellows; or the complete rebuild, which allows some- thing to continue in near pristine condition. And what starts out as repair may soon become improvement, innovation, even growth. . .

(accessed online at https://raley.english.ucsb.edu/wp-content/Engl800/Graham-Thrift-repair.pdf)

Conclusion

Since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, we’ve heard and read a great deal about the need for what are called macroprudential policies to ensure interconnected economic stability in the face of global challenges, including but not limited to the climate emergency. These calls have resulted in, e.g., massive QE (quantitative easing) injections by respective central banks and new infrastructure construction initiatives by the likes of the EU, the PRC, and the US.

What we haven’t seen are comparable increases in the operational maintenance and repair of critical infrastructures without which you would not economies, societies and polities. Nor have you seen in the subsequent investments in science, technology and engineering anything like the comparable creation and funding of national academies for the high reliability operations of backbone (actually foundational) critical infrastructures, like water, energy and transportation. Few if any are imagining national and international institutes, whose new funding would be for more context-rich practices and research to enhance infrastructure maintenance and repair, innovation prototyping, and proof for scaling up to better practices across different cases. (For efforts to protect and extend already-existing pockets of reliability management, please see the calls for a National Academy of Reliable Infrastructure Management and state government Commissions for Inter-Infrastructure Resilience).

If I am right in thinking of longer-term reliability of critical infrastructures as the resilience of an economy, society and polity that is undergoing shocks and surprises, then infrastructure repair and maintenance–and their endogenous innovations–move center-stage in ways not yet appreciated by those politicians, policymakers and private sector decisionmakers who still operate as if control is to be found and once found, it is theirs.

So what happens next? Or: another publication ends where we all—repeat, all of us—know it should have begun

VI. CONCLUSION: DISMANTLING THE SYSTEM
Surveillance capitalism is not just a business model. It is a system, geopolitical, institutional, and epistemic. It is held together by regulation (or lack of), trade rules, policy, and narratives. It is reinforced by governments, especially the United States, and advanced through international institutions that shape how the digital economy works and who it serves. It is legitimized by expert networks and sanitized through language that turns extraction into efficiency and concentration of power into innovation.

Artificial intelligence has made this system even more powerful. AI technologies—especially predictive models, automated decision systems, and generative tools feed on the data extraction pipelines that surveillance capitalism built. AI provides a new layer of legitimacy framed as progress, innovation, or national competitiveness, even as it deepens asymmetries of power and concentration of market and control. The surveillance capitalist order now markets itself as an AI revolution.

This system did not emerge by accident. It was built through policy frameworks, trade negotiations, legal exemptions, deregulation, development finance, and decades of strategic inaction. And because it was built, it can be dismantled. But dismantling surveillance capitalism will take more than new laws or one-off reforms. It will require structural change of how data is governed, how power is held to account, and how knowledge itself is produced and deployed in policymaking.

This paper has taken a bird’s-eye view of that system. It has traced the foundations of surveillance capitalism, not just to Big Tech companies, but to the governments, international institutions, and expert and academic infrastructures that sustain it. It has argued that surveillance capitalism is not just a market problem, but a governance problem. A democracy problem. A global problem.

The road forward will not be easy. Many actors across sectors, government, academia, and civil society continue to benefit from the system as it is. But cracks are showing. Resistance is growing. What’s needed now is not just critique, but coordination. Not just opposition, but alternatives.

If surveillance capitalism is to be replaced, we must be ready to build something better in its place: a model of digital governance that serves people and the environment, protects rights, promotes the public good, and treats democratic control as a tool.

(accessed online at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr-ryan/publications/geopolitics-surveillance-capitalism)

With that concluding word, “tool,” the report dies for want of anything like a Plan B.

Colonial violence & domestic terror: another example of how genre renders center-stage

–Start with “The Canto of the Colonial Soldier” (sung in English). From the opera, Shell Shock, by Nicholas Lens (libretto by Nick Cave) from 3.25 minutes to 10.00 minutes in the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F3bGhqROG8E&list=RDF3bGhqROG8E&start_radio=1

–Then listen to “IT” (Scene XI) from the opera, Innocence, by Kaija Saariaho (multilingual libretto by Aleksi Barrière of the original Finnish libretto by Sofi Oksanen) from 44.25 minutes to 49.33 minutes in the following link.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZz2bxnAQfs&lc=Ugzut1S6c6UsP2ED_vx4AaABAg

This particular scene is about a mass school killing, sung by the students and in different languages. You will want to read the English translation below before watching the clip.

–Saariaho stipulates that the Shooter should not appear on stage. The Colonial Soldier is, in contrast, the first shooter heard in Lens’s work. So what?

The opening words in Hamlet are “Who’s there?” Indeed: at center-stage, and how.


English translation of Scene XI, “IT” (from https://www.wisemusicclassical.com/work/58414/Innocence–Kaija-Saariaho/; apologies for the clumsy cut and paste below)

Managing vacancy across urban and rural landscapes

This photograph shows what were formerly residential lots now abandoned and empty in a part of Detroit, Michigan:

According to a major expert, these instances require us “to think about innovative and productive ways to manage and transform vacancy for long-term sustainability” not only in Detroit but in like now peri-urban areas (Dr. Toni Griffin, Professor in the Practice of Urban Planning at the Harvard Graduate School of Design commenting on the presentation, “Last House on the Block: Black Homeowners, White Homesteaders, and Failed Gentrification in Detroit,” accessed online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umqU1xj5yPA).

I agree and take this opportunity to recast what you see in that picture in equally policy relevant ways for low-density grasslands in parts of Africa.

I

The poet, A.R. Ammons, also talks about the empty lot (TCP1, 28) and vacant land (TCP1, 49), and vacancy for him can indeed be complete emptiness (TCP2, 277). But many other times, vacancy is–as empty lots and vacant land–a bounded set full of properties (in multiple senses of that word). Here is an extract from his poem, Unsaid:

. . . . . .

To revert to social science terms, those gathered “boundaried vacancies” are both inlined and outlined. The above photo outlines only what we see at that time. What’s missing are the multiple inlined versions: not just the biophysical activities out of sight at that time and place, but the dense socio-economic relations that crisscross the space and the times we don’t see.

For all I know, there could be tents there at another time of year; or a craft and arts fair; or new construction to start the day after. Property is still being held, memories have been recorded; invisible expectations remain active for and about the photographed. The painter Gérard Fromanger noted that a blank canvas is ‘‘black with everything every painter has painted before me.” So too is the photo far more dense and opaque than what you see or can see.

II

So what? Just what does this mean for “the management of vacancy,” be it in peri-urban Detroit or the low-density rangelands of East or Southern Africa?

It means we have to think more densely, more granularly, than photographic reality could ever permit.

For example, what if the former settler ranches now subject to the mixed (arable, horticultural, animal) uses found in contemporary East and Southern Africa are in fact the result of that having “to think about innovative and productive ways to manage and transform vacancy for longer-term sustainability”?

In Detroit, we see by and large white urban farmers moving into these depopulated neighborhoods. In Africa examples, the racial demographics are largely reversed, but the analogy remains its strongest: Just as this urban farming has been mistakenly criticized as failed gentrification (the first wave of Detroit urban farmers never saw themselves as gentrifiers), so too arable and agro-pastoral farmers are mistakenly criticized for falling short of a livestock ranching thought to be more suitable by governments and their experts. Yet what to do with the finding that neither gentrification nor ranching, as ideal types, were ever part of the mixed-use practices on the ground?

More important (at least for me) the policy implications differ depending on the benchmark against which to assess really-existing variety on the ground. Is it any wonder that “gentrification”, like “dryland livestock ranching”, have no agreed-upon definitions? (Academics are still debating the causes and consequences of gentrification here in the US.) Is it any wonder then that both concepts are never so fiercely argued over as when they’re offered up as “solutions”?

But still: What to do? Here I think Ammons nails our collective starting point: It’s only that what is missing cannot be missed if spoken out.


Source

Ammons, A.R. (2017). The Complete Poems of A.R. Ammons, Volume 1 1955 – 1977 and Volume 2 1978 – 2005. Edited by Robert M. West with an Introduction by Helen Vendler. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, NY. (The poem, Unsaid, can be found in TCP1, 54 – 55.)

For more Ammons, see Major Read: Ammons and regulation

Major Read: Ammons and regulation

The proposition I write to support is: “When having less knowledge is key to knowing more.” I want to demonstrate how tomorrow we might get all manner of official regulations right—when today we rethink “regulation” as a category of knowledge. In arguing so, I appeal to the poetry of A.R. Ammons.

Ammons, a great American poet of the last half of the 20th century, was tenacious in returning again and again to a set of topics he felt he hadn’t gotten quite right. One of the subjects was how knowing less entails “knowing” more. It’s his analytic sensibility in persistent revisiting a topic from tangents affording different insight and nuance that I rely on as an optic to parse my own topic of government regulation.

Policy types typically fasten to knowledge as a Good Thing in the sense that, on net, more information is better in a world where information is power. Over an array of accounts—and his tenacity meant he wrote a great deal—Ammons insists that the less information I have, the better off I am—not all the time, but when so, then importantly so. (To be clear and telegraph ahead, he is not talking about “ignorance is bliss.”)

For those working in policy and management—and I include myself—how could “the less we know, the more we gain” be the case and what would that mean when it comes to the heavy machinery called official regulation? Is there something here about the value of foregrounding inexperience—having less “knowledge”—as a way of adding purchase to rethinking difficult issues, in this case, regulation?

***

Start by dispensing with popular meanings of “the less I know, the more I know.” It is easily reversed to “the more I know, the less I really know.” This is the conventional wisdom that “data and information” are not knowledge—in fact the opposite. I also do not pursue another sense of “the less I know, the more I know” that Ammons foregrounds from time to time: the hiving off what we thought we knew creates the stuff from which new knowledge is formed. It is my failing—not Ammons’s—that I cannot see how “from-ruins-and-waste-come-something-altogether-better” applies to the 70,000+ paged IRS code and other volumes of government regulations.

My focus instead is on a very difficult set of insights in some of his poems. Let’s jump into the hard part—Ammons’s poem, “Offset,” in its entirety:

Losing information he
rose gaining
view
till at total
loss gain was
extreme:
extreme & invisible:
the eye
seeing nothing
lost its
separation:
self-song
(that is a mere motion)
fanned out
into failing swirls
slowed &
became continuum.
(TCP1, 418)

Please reread the poem once more.

Part of what Ammons seems to be saying is that by losing information—the bits and pieces that make up “you”—you gain by becoming whole and continuous. As it were, “loss gain” becomes a single term. You cease to be separate, your bits and pieces slow down, fan out, spread into a vital one. We empty our minds so as to attend to what matters—emptying the eye to have the I. An obvious example others have noted: If obsessive thoughts, compulsive behaviors, and restraining inhibitions are, in their own ways, altogether absorbing forms of self-knowledge, then this is knowledge we need not to know in order to have more to know better.

How, though, is this different from ignorance is bliss or, less pejoratively, seeking to know only what you need to know? Part of Ammons’s answer appears to be getting to the point where you know enough to be naïve again, to be open to the wonder of it all, to give yourself up to the kind of attention that is, if you will, self-reabsorbing. To telegraph ahead once again, naïveté does not center around knowing and not-knowing for Ammons: There’s feeling and living, wishing and dreaming, desire and more, and such are different kinds of “knowing,” as if thinking feels and feeling thinks.

Naïveté here is the adult version of child-like, decidedly not the childish that gutters out early. It is positive, because adult wonder and curiosity are the space for noticing and being alert to more—an orientation that gains from the loss of information. Compare this, however, to what is expected of government regulators: Whatever happens, they must not be uninformed or naïve—in a word, inexperienced—and when they are, shame on them.

The ways in which this wonder and inexperience do matter for regulation means staying with Ammons a bit longer. For him, staying uninformed and open to new experiences is the hard work of an affirming study:

….my empty-headed

contemplation is still where the ideas of permanence
and transience fuse in a single body, ice, for example,
or a leaf: green pushes white up the slope: a maple
leaf gets the wobbles in a light wind and comes loose

half-ready: where what has always happened and what
has never happened before seem for an instant reconciled:
that takes up most of my time and keeps me uninformed:
(TCP1, 497-498)

Being empty-headed is part of knowing enough: having to know less so as to be ready for whatever the next experience you proved to have been half-ready for in hindsight. It’s as if Ammons is asking us to be smart enough to see it’s more than about a knowing doubt and a knowing certainty.

Living is the space for feeling, which is where “knowing,” writ large, belongs: “how can I know I/am not/trying to know my way into feeling/as//feeling/tries to feel its way into knowing,” he asks in “Pray Without Ceasing” (TCP1, 779). This notion of a half-readiness open to new experience and the wonder awaiting is nicely caught in the ending lines of one of my favorites, “Cascadilla Falls”:

Oh
I do
not know where I am going
that I can live my life
by this single creek.
(TCP1, 426)

By the time you surge to those lines, there is so much feeling in that “Oh” you might miss how living takes place beyond not-knowing.” Or better, the line break of “do/not know” intimates that the doing of “not know” is a good part of living that life.

***

Regulation from this viewpoint is never a case of regulators starting with knowledge and assuming what matters for living resides elsewhere. Regulation isn’t about expunging naïveté as inexperience but—in ways not yet clear—cultivating it. What is clear is the starting point, however: Wonder is not dread; naïveté is not ignorance; and no-longer-knowing is not not-knowing.

In this way, Ammons makes a frontal attack on what policy types hold very dear: the notion of usefulness. In his essay, “A poem is a walk,” Ammons defers to a paradox: “Only uselessness is empty enough for the presence of so many uses”. Only uselessness is a sufficiently capacious category to embrace all the uses that come and go with experience and ensuring space for more feeling and living.

What could better capture all the many uses as they shift to the wayside than uselessness, “an emptiness/that is plenitude” (TCP1, 503)? Less and less information, against this backdrop, empties us and thereby makes us—leaves us open—differently. It is, in Ammons’s wonderful turn of phrase, to be “emptied full” (TCP2, 4). To seek more and more knowledge and information and never waste what has already been gotten leads to in Ammons’s acid throwaway, “total comprehension is/a wipe-out” (TCP1, 659). It’s a wipe-out because this totality leaves no room for more. 

Where, then, does this leave us when it comes to “knowing” regulation better?

***

In answer, I ended up going back to Ammons’s “The Eternal City”—“After the explosion or cataclysm, that big/display that does its work but then fails/out with destructions, one is left with the//pieces. . .” (TCP1, 596). These lines resonate with what I had read in one of Rainer Maria Rilke’s letters. He is writing about the sculpture studio of Auguste Rodin:

It is indescribable. Acres of fragments lie there, one beside the other. Nudes the size of my hand and no bigger, but only bits, scarcely one of them whole: often only a piece of arm, a piece of leg just as they go together, and the portion of the body which belongs to them. Here the torso of one figure with the head of another stuck onto it, with the arm of a third. . .as though an unspeakable storm, an unparalleled cataclysm had passed over this work. And yet the closer you look the deeper you feel that it would all be less complete if the separate bodies were complete. Each of these fragments is of such a peculiarly striking unit, so possible by itself, so little in need of completion, that you forget that they are only parts and often parts of different bodies which cling so passionately to one another.

I read the passage—at least one other translation captures the same sense—as suggesting that Rodin’s “cataclysm” incorporated fragments that were, in a sense that matters for our purpose, more complete as separate fragments. So too Ammons’s “cataclysm” in “The Eternal City” refers to pieces that are themselves whole—asynoptic, unassimilable, piece next to piece. Another of Ammons’s lines, “all the way to a finished Fragment,” catches the sense I am after here (TCP1, 366).

By extension, we’d have to believe that official regulations ad seriatim, while appearing a growing shambles, are in fact more complete as the piece-work of individual regulations than they would be were they improvised into something new or part of, in policy-speak, a more integrated body of regulations for use over time.

How could this be?

***

One way ahead, Ammons implies, is to see how the waste of regulation isn’t decline-and-fall, but rather the rearguard action against such declension narratives: an argument for creating room for us to recast decline. Ammons directs our attention, for example, to waste-as-generosity in “The City Limits,”

. . . .when you consider
the abundance of such resource as illuminates the glow-blue

bodies and gold-skeined wings of flies swarming the dumped
guts of a natural slaughter or the coil of shit and in no
way winces from its storms of generosity; when you consider

that air or vacuum, snow or shale, squid or wolf, rose or lichen,
each is accepted into as much light as it will take, then
the heart moves roomier. . .
(TCP1, 498)

The “heart moves roomier” not because the pile is any less shite, but because it opens to being more—certainly more than that mortal coil. This is the hot mess of feeling and living expansively, of being somatically sprawled all over the place, now. Regulatory waste in this mode is a spectacularly, can’t-keep-our-eyes-off-it sight/site to behold, maverick and inciting at the same time.

The hot mess that you can’t keep your eyes—our inner and physical I’s—off and the incitements it offers take us to Ammons’s late, long poem, Garbage (TCP2, 220-306). (Famously, Garbage, for which Ammons won the 1993 National Book Award for Poetry, was inspired by his passing an immense heap of garbage alongside the Florida Interstate.) Mountains and mountains of garbage are “monstrous”; in fact

… a monstrous surrounding of
gathering—the putrid, the castoff, the used,

the mucked up—all arriving for final assessment,
for the toting up in tonnage, the separations

of wet and dry, returnable, and gone for good:
(TCP2, 234)

For Ammons “gone for good” is decidedly ambiguous, begging the question about just to what good has garbage gone for. An answer—and Ammons resists being pinned down to any one answer—lies in the garbage that human beings themselves are:

we’re trash, plenty wondrous: should I want

to say in what the wonder consists: it is a tiny
wriggle of light in the mind that says, “go on”:
(TCP2, 245)

Nothing integrated about this! For: “Go on” to what, in a world where garbage and waste conjure a meaninglessness of things and of our own existence, as we too are trash? In the case of Ammons, the garbage we are and the meaninglessness that poses, like capacious uselessness, offer up the wonder of being more—of meaning possibly—once we leave space for such feelings and experience:

we should be pretty happy with the possibilities

and limits we can play through emergences free
of complexes of the Big Meaning, but is there

really any meaninglessness, isn’t meaninglessness
a funny category, meaninglessness missing

meaning, vacancy still empty, not any sort of
disordering, or miscasting or fraudulence of

irrealities’s shows, just a place not meaning
yet—…
…..
…there is truly only meaning,
only meaning, meanings, so many meanings,

meaninglessness becomes what to make of so many
meanings:…
(TCP2, 277)

That word, “becomes”—that insistence on meaning-less possibility as a “funny category”—is, we see by way of conclusion, core to having room to recast regulation.

***

Richard Howard, himself no mean commentator on Ammons’s poetry, points the way: “How often we need to be assured of what we know in the old ways of knowing—how seldom we can afford to venture beyond the pale into that chromatic fantasy where, as Rilke said (in 1908), ‘begins the revision of categories, where something past comes again, as though out of the future; something formerly accomplished as something to be completed’”.

The importance of this revising categories of thinking and living is captured in an interchange Ammons had with Zofia Burr. When pressed by Burr, he summed up: “I’m always feeling, whatever I’m saying, that I don’t really believe it, and that maybe in the next sentence I’ll get it right, but I never do”.

Imagine policymakers and regulators, when pressed, recognizing that not getting it right today places them at the start of tomorrow’s policymaking—not its end but its revision as “policymaking” and “regulation.” For that to happen, they’d have to understand just how funny-odd a category regulation is.

Ammons, if I understand him, is insisting that in the compulsionto “get it right the next time around,” there at least be a next time (room) to make it—this revision of categories—better. Ensuring (risking) there is a next time is the way we keep open to—empty for—the feeling and living and participating that, in the process, push conventional notions of regulation to the periphery, changing their milieux, rendering regulation less and less meaningful and thus returning it as a concept and instrument to us re-freshed and re-wondered about; in short: recasted.

Again, how so? Let’s jump into Ammons’s deep-end one last time:

Yield to the tantalizing mechanism:
fall, trusting and centered as a
drive, falling into the poem:
line by line pile entailments on,
arrive willfully in the deepest

fix: then, the thing is done, turn
round in the mazy terror and
question, outsmart the mechanism:
find the glide over-reaching or
dismissing—halter it into

a going concern so the wing
muscles at the neck’s base work
urgency’s compression and
openness breaks out lofting
you beyond all binds and terminals.
(TCP1, 535)

(You may want to re-read the poem one more time. I return to that “deepest//fix” momentarily.)

Ammons commented on this poem, “The Swan Ritual”: “The invention of a poem frequently is how to find a way to resolve the complications that you’ve gotten yourself into. I have a little poem about this that says that the poem begins as life does, takes on complications as novels do, and at some point, stops. Something has to be invented before you can work your way out of it, and that’s what happens at the very center of a poem”.

Ammons touches on the major implication extended here: If rendering any regulation useless takes us closer to reinventing what “regulation” is, so too reinventing “regulation” can render an existing regulation useless. Regulating to reduce risk and inequality or improve economic growth and statecraft is that way we rethink these ends so to make those other means or ends no longer useful.

To rethink (revise, redescribe, rescript, recast, refashion, recalibrate) the categories of knowing and not-knowing is to resituate—make room for—the cognitive limits of “knowing” that matter. (Think by way of different examples pastiche in visual art or remixing in dub reggae.) This is to renew, as in re-render, re-know and re-understand. The eye is no longer fixed on where it had settled before, but with a new focal point in sight (this being today’s version of our wager on redemption). That, truly, is the fix we want to be in, “the deepest//fix.” It is where wonder renders dread incomplete, where knowledge is unlearned, where knowledgeable gives way to refreshened inexperience, and, in Ammons’s astonishing lines, “where what has always happened and what/has never happened before seem for an instant reconciled”.


Principal sources:

Ammons, A.R. (1996). Set In Motion: Essays, Interviews, & Dialogues. Ed. Zofia Burr, The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI.

—————— (2017). The Complete Poems of A.R. Ammons, Volume 1 1955 – 1977 and Volume 2 1978 – 2005. Edited by Robert M. West with an Introduction by Helen Vendler. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, NY. [The volumes are referred to in the blog entry as TCP1 and TCP2, respectively.]

Howard, R. (1980). Alone With America: Essays on the Art of Poetry in the United States Since 1950. Atheneum: New York, NY. Rilke, R.M. (1988). Selected Letters 1902-1926. Transl. R.F.C. Hull, Quartet Encounters, Quartet Books: London.

Rilke, R.M. (1988). Selected Letters 1902-1926. Transl. R.F.C. Hull, Quartet Encounters, Quartet Books: London.

This week’s finding: really-existing labor markets

This article has challenged the conventional wisdom on labor markets, advancing the following propositions: (1) There is no such thing as a labor market that is not socially and politically constructed. (2) All real-world labor markets reflect specific balances of power. (3) The balances of power reflect not only the abundance or scarcity of market (exit) opportunities but a wide range of political and social factors. (4) Therefore, laws and regulations to shift those balances do not constitute “interventions” into free markets. (5) Such laws and regulations are not necessarily inefficient or undesirable, and they do not require a particular justification based on market failures.

Steven K. Vogel (2025). “Toward an Interdisciplinary Political Economy of Wages.” Politics & Society: 1 -20 (accessed online at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00323292251387041; my bold)

Why economics is not high reliability

Economics assumes substitutability, where goods and services have alternatives in the marketplace; infrastructure reliability assumes practices for ensuring nonfungibility, where nothing can substitute for the high reliability of critical infrastructures. Without the latter, there would be no markets for goods and services, right now when selecting among those alternative goods and services. There is a point at which high reliability and trade-offs are immiscible, like trying to mix oil and water.

One way of thinking about the nonfungibility of infrastructure reliability is that it’s irrecuperable economically in real time. The safe and continuous provision of a critical service, even during (specially during) turbulent times, cannot be cashed out in dollars and cents and be paid to you instead of the service. It’s the service that is needed and real time, from this perspective, is an impassable obstacle to cashing out.

Which is to say, if you were to enter the market and arbitrage a price for high reliability of critical infrastructures, the market transactions would be such you’d never be sure you’re getting what you thought you were buying. Economics is more often stated only so; high reliability more often demonstrated, or not.