1. Key method questions in complex policy and management

2. Methodological implications of using triangulation in complex policy and managment.

3. Methodologically, analogies without counter-cases are empty signifiers

4. Peer review: another area where error avoidance is the method for reliability management

5. Not all the “can’s, might’s, may’s, or could’s” in the worlds of policy and management add up to one single “must”

6. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, an infinite regress explains nothing

7. The Achilles heel of conventional risk management is the counterfactual

8. What “calling for increased granularity” means

9. Seven differences in method that matter for reliable policy and management

10. The methodological relevance of like-to-like comparisons for policy and management

11. The methodological importance of “and-yet” counternarratives (newly added)

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1. Key method questions in complex policy and management

I

A young researcher had just written up a case study of traditional irrigation in one of the districts that fell under the Government of Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) Programme. (We’re in the early 1980s.) I remember reading the report and getting excited. Here was detailed information about really-existing irrigation practices and constraints sufficient to pinpoint opportunities for improvement there.

That was, until I turned the page to the conclusions: What was really needed, the author stated, was a country-wide land reform.

Huh? Where did that come from? Not from the details and findings in the report!

This was my introduction to “solutions” in search of problems they should “solve.” Only later did I realize I should have asked him, “What kind of land reform for whom and under what conditions at your research site?”

II

Someone asserts that this policy or approach holds broadly, and that triggers your asking:

• Under what conditions?
• With respect to what?
• As opposed to what?
• What is this a case of?
• What are you–and we–missing?

Under what conditions does what you’re saying actually hold? Risk or uncertainty with respect to what failure scenario? Settler colonialism as opposed to what? Just what is this you are talking about a case of? What are you and I missing that’s right in front us?

2. Methodological implications of using triangulation in complex policy and management

I

Triangulation is the use of multiple methods, databases, theories, disciplines and/or analysts to converge on what to do about the complex issue. The goal is for analysts to increase their confidence–and that of their policy audiences–that no matter what position they take, they are led to the same problem definition, alternative, recommendation, or other desideratum. Familiar examples are the importance in the development literature of women and of the middle classes.

In triangulating, the analyst accommodates unexpected changes in positions later on. If your analysis leads you to the same conclusion regardless of initial positions that are already othogonal, then the fact you must adjust that position later on matters less because you have sought to take into account utterly different views from the get-go.

Everyone triangulates, ranging from cross-checking of sources to formal use of varied methods, strategies and theories for convergence on a shared point of departure or conclusion. Triangulation is thought to be especially helpful in identifying and compensating for biases and limitations of any single approach. Obtaining a second (and third. . .) opinion or soliciting the input of divergent stakeholders or ensuring you interview key informants with divergent backgrounds are common examples.

Detecting bias is fundamental, because reducing, or correcting and adjusting for bias is one thing analysts can actually do. To the extent that bias remains an open question for the case at hand, it must not be assumed that increasing one’s confidence automatically or always increases certainty, reduces complexity, and/or gets one closer to the truth of the matter.

II

Return now to our starting point: The approaches in triangulation are chosen because they are, in a formal sense, orthogonal. This has another methodological implication: The aim is not to select the “best” from each approach and then combine these elements into a composite that you think better fits or explains the case at hand.

Why? Because the arguments, policies and narratives for complex policy and management already come to us as composites. Current issue understandings have been overwritten, obscured, effaced and reassembled over time by myriad interventions. To my mind, a great virtue of triangulation is to make their “composite/palimpsest” nature clearer from the outset.

To triangulate asks what, if anything, has persisted or survived in the multiple interpretations and reinterpretations that the issue has undergone over time up to the point of analysis. Indeed, failure to triangulate can provide very useful information. When findings do not converge across multiple and widely diverse metrics or measures (populations, landscapes, times and scales…), the search by the analysts becomes one of identifying specific, localized or idiographic factors at work. What you are studying may be non-generalizable–that is, it may be a case it its own right–and failing to triangulate is one way to help confirm that.

3. Methodologically, analogies without counter-cases are empty signifiers

The relentless rise of modern inequality is widely appreciated to have taken on crisis dimensions, and in moments of crisis, the public, politicians and academics alike look to historical analogies for guidance.

Trevor Jackson (2023). “The new history of old inequality.” Past & Present, 259(1): 262–289 (https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtac009)

I

I bolded the preceding because its insight is major: The search for analogies from the past for the present is especially acute in turbulent times.

The methdological problem–which is also a matter of historical record–is any misleading analogy. Jackson, by way of illustrating this point, provides ample evidence to question the commonplace that the US is presently in “the Second (New) Gilded Age,” with rising inequality, populism and corruption last seen in the final quarter of our 19th century.

II

Even here, we are still stuck with the fallacy of composition: Just because a tree is shady does not mean each leaf provides shade. Not all of the country was going through the Gilded Age, even when underway. And doubtless parts of the country are now going through a Second Gilded Age, even if not nationally.

The upshot is that we must press the advocates of this or that analogy to go further. The burden of proof is on the advocates to demonstrate their generalizations hold regardless of the more granular exceptions, including those reframed by other analogies.

Why would they concede exceptions? Because we, their interlocutors, know empirically that micro and macro can be loosely-coupled, and most certainly not as tightly coupled as theory and ideology often would have it. Broad analogies that do not admit granular counter-cases float unhelpfully above policy and management.

III

A fairly uncontroversial upshot, I should have thought, but let’s make the matter harder for us.

The same day I read Jackson’s article, I can across the following analogy for current events. Asked if there were any parallels to the Roman Empire, Edward Luttwak, a scholar on international, military and grand strategy, offered this:

Well, here is one parallel: after 378 years of success, Rome, which was surrounded by barbarians, slowly started admitting them until it completely changed society and the whole thing collapsed. I am sure you know that the so-called barbarian invasions were, in fact, illegal migrations. These barbarians were pressing against the border. They wanted to come into the Empire because the Romans had facilities like roads and waterworks. They knew that life in the Roman Empire was great. Some of these barbarians were “asylum seekers,” like the Goths who crossed the Danube while fleeing the Huns. 

https://im1776.com/2023/10/04/edward-luttwak-interview/?ref=thebrowser.com&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

Of course, some read this as inflammatory and go no further. Others, of course, dismiss this outright as racist, adding the ad hominem “Just look at who is writing and publishes this stuff!”

But the method to adopt would be to press Luttwak for definitions and, most importantly, counter-examples.

4. Peer review: another area where error avoidance is the method for reliability management

Below is part of an interchange in the Comments section of a recent Financial Times article on scientific fraud:

Comment: I am a scientist. I spend all my time trying not to be wrong in print. Even then, occasionally I am. It is the same for all of us. Furthermore, some scientists are very poor at dealing with statistics and are thus wrong more than others. Our common incompetence is different from actual fraud. The proportion of frauds has probably held steady since the time science became a profession and has grown as the number of scientists has grown. I find it unlikely that the proportion of scientists with this character flaw has increased recently. Possibly much more common than fraud is ripping off your collaborators, or stealing ideas during reviews of manuscripts and grant applications. That is quite hard to prove and so it seems to be popular among certain character types but again, there is no reason to think their proportion has increased.

Reply: It actually doesn’t matter if the proportion is remaining steady – even though it almost certainly is growing, with so much more financial, career and political pressure on academics these days, and a for-profit publishing system that reduces public oversight and is massively biased towards positive outcomes.

The goal should remain zero.

It’s unacceptable for scientists to publish errors due to being ‘poor at statistics’. Huge amounts of money is being wasted, lives are being lost – the least people can do is get training, or work with someone else who IS good at them.

https://www.ft.com/content/c88634cd-ea99-41ec-8422-b47ed2ffc45a

Upshot: If peer review isn’t solely about error avoidance, how can it aspire to be reliable?

5. Not all the “can’s, might’s, may’s, or could’s” in the worlds of policy and management add up to one single “must”

Consider the following example (my bolding):

Our expert-interview exercise with leading thinkers on the topic revealed how climate technologies can potentially propagate very different types of conflict at different scales and among diverse political actors. Conflict and war could be pursued intentionally (direct targeted deployment, especially weather-modification efforts targeting key resources such as fishing, agriculture, or forests) or result accidently (unintended collateral damage during existing conflicts or even owing to miscalculation). Conflict could be over material resources (mines or technology supply chains) or even immaterial resources (patents, soft- ware, control systems prone to hacking). The protagonists of conflict could be unilateral (a state, a populist leader, a billionaire) or multi- lateral in nature (via cartels and clubs, a new “Green OPEC”). Research and deployment could exacerbate ongoing instability and conflict, or cause and contribute to entirely new conflicts. Militarization could be over perceptions of unauthorized or destabilizing deployment (India worrying that China has utilized it to affect the monsoon cycle), or to enforce deployment or deter noncompliance (militaries sent in to protect carbon reservoirs or large-scale afforestation or ecosystem projects). Conflict potential could involve a catastrophic, one-off event such as a great power war or nuclear war, or instead a more chronic and recurring series of events, such as heightening tensions in the global political system to the point of miscalculation, counter-geoengineering, permissive tolerance and brinksmanship. . . .

States and actors will need to proceed even more cautiously in the future if they are to avoid making these predictions into reality, and more effective governance architectures may be warranted to constrain rather than enable deployment, particularly in cases that might lead to spiralling, retaliatory developments toward greater conflict. After all, to address the wicked problem of climate change while creating more pernicious political problems that damage our collective security is a future we must avoid.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X22002255 (my bolds)

Let’s be clear: All such “could’s-as-possibilities” do not add up to one single “must-as-necessity.”

The only way in this particular passage that “could” and “can” link to “must” would mean that the article (and like ones) actually began with “We must avoid this or that” and then proceeded to demonstrate how to undertake really-existing error avoidance with respect to those could-events and might-be’s.

6. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, methodologically an infinite regress explains nothing

Stop fossil fuels; stop cutting down trees; stop using plastics; stop this defense spending; stop being imperialist; stop techno-solutionism; start being small-d democratic and small-p participatory; dismantle capitalism, racism and the rest; transform cities; save biodiversity; never forget class, gender, race, inequality, religions, bad faith, identity. . .and. . .and. . .

7. The Achilles heel of conventional risk management methods is the counterfactual

I

For me, the crux of counterfactual history is a present always not one way only. You want a counterfactual, but for which current interpretation or set of historical interpretations?

What are at work are the two blades of a scissors.

One devotes time and attention to “what is happening,” a state of affairs that can be interpreted in multiple different ways. The other devotes time and attention to “what has happened,” a state of affairs that could have turned out differently and so too the allied interpretations. Where the blades slice, they open up not only the contingent nature of events past and present, but also the recasting of what is and has been.

II

For example, consider a city’s building code. Viewed one way, it is sequential interconnectivity (do this-now followed by then-that). But if cities also view their respective building codes as the means to bring structures up to or better than current seismic standards, then the code becomes a focal mechanism for pooled interconnectivity among developers and builders.

That neither is guaranteed should be obvious. That you in no way need recourse to the language of conventional risk management to conclude so should also be obvious.

8. What “calling for increased granularity” means

I

When I say concepts like regulation, inequality, and poverty are too abstract, I am not criticizing abstraction altogether. I am saying (1) that these concepts are not differentiated enough for an actionable policy or management and (2) that this actionable granularity requires a particular kind abstraction from the get-go.

What then does “actionable granularity” mean?

II

I have in mind the range of policy analysis and management that exists between, on the one side, the adaptation of policy and management designs and principles to local circumstances and, on the other side, the recognition that systemwide patterns emerging across a diverse set of existing cases inevitably contrast with official and context-specific policy and management designs.

Think here of adapting your systemwide definition of poverty to local contingencies and having to accommodate the fact that patterns that emerge across how really-existing people identify poverty differ from not only system definitions but also from localized poverty scenarios based in these definitions.

III

One implication is that cases that are not framed by emerging patterns and, on the other side, by localized design scenarios are rightfully called “unique.” Unique cases of poverty cannot be abstracted, just as some concepts of poverty are, in my view, too abstract. Unique cases stand outside the actionable granularity of interest here for policy and management.

Where so, then there is the methodological problem of cases that are assumed to be unique or stand-alone, when in fact no prior effort has been made to ascertain (1) systemwide patterns and local contingency scenarios in which the case might be embedded along with (2) the practices, if any, of adaptation and modification that emerge as a result.

From a policy and management perspective, such cases have been prematurely rendered unique: They have been, if you will, over-complexified so as to permit no abstraction. Unique cases are not themselves something we can even abstract as sui generis or even “‘a case’ in its own right.”

I stress this point if only because of the exceptionalism assigned to “wicked policy problems”. Where the methodological problem of premature complexification isn’t addressed beforehand, then by definition the so-called wicked policy problem is prematurely “wickedly unique.” Or, more ironically, uniquely wicked problems are abstracted insufficiently for the purposes of systemwide pattern recognition and design scenario modification.

9. Seven differences in method that matter for reliable policy and management

When I and others call for better recognition and accommodation of complexity, we mean the complex as well as the uncertain, unfinished and conflicted must be particularized and contextualized so that we can analyze and manage, if only case-by-granular case.

When I and others say we need more findings that can be replicated across a range of cases, we are calling for identifying not only emerging better practices across cases, but also greater equifinality: finding multiple but different pathways to achieve similar objectives, given case diversity.

What I and others mean by calling for greater collaboration is not just more teamwork or working with more and different stakeholders, but that team members and stakeholders “bring the system into the room” for the purposes of making the services in question reliable and safe.

When I and others call for more system integration, we mean the need to recouple the decoupled activities in ways that better mimic but can never fully reproduce the coupled nature of the wider system environment.

When I and others call for more flexibility, we mean the need for greater maneuverability across different performance modes in the face of changing system volatility and options to respond to those changes. (“Only the middle road does not lead to Rome,” said composer, Arnold Schoenberg.)

Where we need more experimentation, we do not mean more trial-and-error learning, when the systemwide error ends up being the last systemwide trial by destroying the limits of survival.

While others talk about risks in a system’s hazardous components, we point to different systemwide reliability standards and then, to the different risks and uncertainties that follow from different standards.

10. The methodological relevance of like-to-like comparisons for policy and management

Assume you come across the following typology, a 2 X 2 table identifying four types of confidence you have over empirical findings for policy analysis and policymaking:

It’s fairly easy to question the above. Do we really believe, for example, that well-established evidence and high certainty are as tightly coupled and correlated? In fact, each dimension can be problematize in ways relevant to policy analysis and policymaking.

But the methodological issue at stake here is to compare like to like.

That is, interrogate the cells of the above typology using the cells of another typology whose overlapping dimensions also problematize those of the above. Consider, for example, the famous Thompson-Tuden typology, where the key decisionmaking process is a function of agreement (or lack thereof) over policy-relevant means and ends:

This latter world has a few surprises for the former one. Contrary to the notion that inconclusive evidence is “solved” by more and better evidence, the persistence of “inconclusive” (because, say, of increasing urgency and interruptions) implies eventually lapsing, it is hypothesized, into decisionmaking-by-inspiration. So too the persistence of “unresolved” or “established but incomplete” shuttles, again and again, between decisionmaking by majority-rule and compromises. More, what is tightly coupled in the latter isn’t “evidence and certainty” as in the former, but rather the beliefs over evidence with respect to causation and the preferences for agreed-upon ends and goals.

In case it needs saying, methodological like-to-like comparisons of typologies need not stop at a comparison of two only. Social and organizational complexity means the more the better by way of finding something more tractable to policy or management.

11. The methodological importance of “and-yet” counternarratives (newly added)

The paragraph I’ve just read is immediately bookended by two quotes:

Just before: “Therefore, rather than being schools of democracy, ACs [associative councils] may be spaces where associative and political elites interact and, therefore, just reproduce existing political inequities (Navarro, 2000). Furthermore, these institutions may have limited impact in growing and diversifying the body of citizens making contributions to public debate (Fraser, 1990).”

Just after: “The professionalised model results from a complex combination of inequalities in associationism and a specific type of participation labour. Analysing the qualitative interviews, regulations and documents was fundamental to understanding the underlying logic of selecting professionals as the main components.”

Now try to guess the gist of the paragraph in between. More of the same? Well, no. Six paragraphs from the article’s end emerges an “and-yet” that had been there from the beginning:

Nevertheless, an alternative interpretation of professionalisation should be considered. The fact that ACs perform so poorly in inclusiveness does not mean that they are not valuable for other purposes, such as voicing a plurality of interests in policymaking (Cohen, 2009). In this respect, participants can act as representatives of associations that, in many cases, promote the needs of oppressed and exploited groups (De Graaf et al., 2015; Wampler, 2007). Suffice it to say, for example, that labour unions or migrants’ associations frequently send lawyers or social workers to ACs to defend their needs and positions. Problems with inclusion should not take away from other purposes, that is, struggles to introduce critical issues and redistribution demands to the state agenda. Other studies have already shown that groups make strategic decisions to achieve better negotiation outcomes in the context of technical debates (Grillos, 2022). Thus, the choice of selecting professionals can be a strategy to improve the capacity of pressure in institutional spaces dominated by experts. (my bold; accessed online at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00323217251319065)

Methodological upshot: What the counterfactual is to economic analysis, the and-yet counternarratives are to policy analysis. What

A home of hiddenness, poet Jane Hirshfield writes, “is the Ryoan-ji rock garden in Kyoto: wherever in it a person stands, one of the fifteen rocks cannot be seen. The garden reminds us something unknowable is always present in life, just beyond what can be perceived or comprehended  – yet as real as any other rock amid the raked gravel.”

And that is one of the paradoxes of hiddenness, at least for a time when it comes to policy and management: If unhidden, it becomes real in another way.

“Nobody knows for sure what is hidden in the depths of the European Treaties as they now stand, hundreds, even thousands of pages depending on the typeface,” notes critic, Wolfgang Streeck: “The only exception is the CJEU [Court of Justice for the European Union], and this is because what it says it finds in there is for all practical purposes what is in there, as the court always has the last word” (https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/rusty-charley). Better, of course, to say: . . .” as the court always has the last word, for now.

The tanker hits the dock and the Coast Guard investigates the incident from the vessel and waterway side it regulates. But isn’t there now the “dock-side” as well? Isn’t one response to accidents within the Coast Guard’s anchorage area to render safer the area as an area (its own level of analysis with its visible elements inside and outside)? In fact, how could we now “unknow”–forgetting later is another matter–that the dock would be more reliable if better armored against such incidents?

I

How often have we heard versions of the following?

• Studies of actual project and policy implementation ratify the status quo, claiming it is a miracle anything gets done as planned or designed; where
• Policymakers never have had time anyway for social science findings (either the evaluation finds nothing good to say or finds evidence-based hesitations the only thing worth saying); where also it must be assumed that
• Market-based instruments of management—outsourcing, vouchers, service level agreements—determine the design of the public agencies responsible for their implementation, a rather unpromising assumption given the mountain of evidence that bureaucracy frequently determines policy; all of which is said to lead to
• “Therefore,” better policy and management require, by default, better leaders as our last line of defense and we must design for that (back to “design”?); albeit
• Leadership looks more and more to be the unexplained variance after politics, dollars and jerks explain most of what is going on anyway. . .

Such is how the fault-filled save-all of “designing” is shackled to the fault-filled catch-all of “leadership.”

II

A much more practical implication follows, however. It is likely that that policy and regulatory leaders who do not appreciate the requirements of real-time operation of society’s complex infrastructures are apt to confuse their own values and scenarios for those of the real-time operators. Where so, the logical and empirically prior problem is not designing better leadership but correcting for the mis-designs of leaders that arise unintentionally or negatively.

Such is why I argue for the regulatory functions to be dispersed beyond the regulator of record. Real-time operators must and do play an important role in correcting for errors in official regulation, leadership and technologies.

There are any number of critiques of neoclassical economics, particularly contemporary microeconomics. The best, most recent one I’ve found is:

Glick, Mark, Lozada, Gabriel A., and Darren Bush “Antitrust’s Normative Economic Theory Needs a Reboot” (December 9, 2024). Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series No. 231, https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers/antitrusts-normative-economic-theory-needs-a-reboot

It will be a hard slog to read for the non-specialist such as myself, but even a dedicated browse is worth the effort (downloading the pdf also took some time). Its point of departure is antitrust regulation in the US, but its focus is on one of the key pillars of mainstream economics, consumer surplus, and its critique brings together a wide range of arguments from across the critical literature. In so doing, it marshals a wonderful survey of why the economic sciences are like the rest of the social sciences, knee-deep in essential ambiguities.

Below are copied the paper’s abstract and table of contents for ease of reference:

Antitrust has adopted a normative economic theory based on maximizing economic surplus. The theory originates with Marshall but was introduced into antitrust as the Consumer Welfare Standard by Judge Robert Bork, and survives today in virtually every industrial organization textbook. This persistence is unwarranted. Welfare economists abandoned it several decades ago because the theory is inconsistent, and we review those inconsistencies. Moreover, welfare economists and moral philosophers have shown that the theory is biased in favor of wealthy individuals and corporations—the very powers the antitrust law is supposed to regulate. Finally, behavioral economists and psychologists have shown that the model of human behavior behind the economic surplus theory is simplistic and often in conflict with actual human behavior. We argue that antitrust should be brought into alignment with modern welfare economics. We also discuss how the New Brandeis Movement’s proposal to replace the consumer welfare standard with the protecting competition standard could be developed to accomplish this goal.

From where I stand, I don’t think that the progressive counterpart to the market is the state. I think it should be culture, very broadly defined – culture where it encompasses the knowledge and practices of communities.

Amy Kapczynski in https://www.the-syllabus.com/ts-spotlight/post-neoliberal-moment/conversation/amy-kapczynski

And what’s wrong with the state as a progressive counterpart? Here’s one answer consistent with “communities” as an alternative:

Liberal forms of planning involve both the extension and the conscious self-limitation of the state’s responsibilities. Liberal planning redraws the boundary between the realm of political authority and the realm of free market activity without ever abolishing it. . . .The current tensions in the governance of capitalism may be best captured, not in terms of a struggle between competing hegemonic projects, but as a struggle internal to the state. This struggle consists of the political difficulties in managing the state’s impulse to mitigate the various crises of contemporary capitalism while affirming its liberal form. . .Capitalist states across the world are called to manage the consequences of the global economy’s entrenched tendency towards economic stagnation, financial instability, persistent underemployment and the accelerating climate crisis. . .Yet neither planning nor market-making offer a durable solution. The sources of crisis emanate from the mode of social interaction in civil society, not the administrative measures of the state. As long as commodity exchange constitutes the mode of socialisation in the economic realm, the state can at best palliate the socially destabilising tendencies of capitalist growth, not arrest them, no matter the scale of intervention.

Alexis Moraitis in https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08969205241303445 (my bolding)

A timely example of where the lack of actionable granularity matters is the level at which democracy and transformation are discussed in the face of the climate emergency. There is a patent asymmetry in many of these discussions: The climate emergency is manifestly empirical and context-dependent; democracy and transformation are left, too frequently but sometimes necessary, as abstractions. An example helps.

A point made about longer-term transformations in light of the climate emergency is: “Based on climate science, there is not enough time to first overhaul a critical mass of economies simultaneously according to socialist democratic planning and then to realise emission reductions” (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2024.2434469 ). And yet, so what?

For others it is increasingly obvious that the realization of democratic processes outweigh the consequences: “We emphasize the importance of taking political time and maintain that collective social responses to major climate impacts must center actually existing material and symbolic inequalities and place procedural and distributive justice at the heart of transformative action. This is so even where climate change will have devastating physical and social consequences” (https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-10242756; my italics).

What’s missing in all of this is the adverbial property of what it means to act democratically (or in varied transformative ways). To answer that requires sensitivity to diverse contexts. Here but not there, to behave democratically means people choose leaders by these elections, pay these taxes, have these social protections, and more. Elsewhere the really-existing practices of “behaving democratically” can and do differ.

All of which means that without first differentiating the impacts of the climate emergency by location and time, it is next to impossible to identify, let alone differentiate, the consequences with respect to the disparate and different practices of acting democratically or transformationally.

I

Proposition. The expression, M&R (maintenance and repair), signals an already-established state/stage of infrastructure operations (e.g., “operations and maintenance” or “maintenance and repair,” for which there are official and unofficial procedures, routines and protocols).

M&R is a widely accepted, indeed formal, stage of infrastructure operations, and as such deserving of scholarly study with respect to enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructures. Indeed, M&R provides an officially-recognized period for and expectations about identifying and updating what are precursors to system disruption and failure and their prevention/avoidance strategies. Recurrent M&R is all about continuous building in of precursor resilience (e.g., using M&R for identifying obsolescent and now possibly hazardous software or other components). M&R moves closer to the center-stage of infrastructure operations, if only because of the common perception about infrastructures, i.e., “they’re invisible until they break, right?”

II

Implications. Start at the macro-level but with more granularity than conventionally assumed. A form of societal regulation occurs when critical infrastructures, like energy and water, prioritize systemwide reliability and safety as social values in real time. For our purposes here, these values are further differentiated and uniquely so within infrastructures.

Consider the commonplace that regulatory compliance is “the baseline for risk mitigation in infrastructures.” There is no reason to assume that compliance is the same baseline for, inter alios, the infrastructure’s micro-operators on the ground, including the eyes-and-ears field staff; the infrastructure’s headquarters’ compliance staff responsible for monitoring industry practices for meeting government mandates; the senior officials in the infrastructure who see the need for more and better enterprise risk management; and, last but never least, the infrastructure’s reliability professionals—its real-time control room operators, should they exist, and immediate support staff— in the middle of all this, especially in their role of surmounting any stickiness by way of official procedures and protocols undermining real-time system reliability.

To put it another way, where reliable infrastructures matter to a society, it must be expected that the social values reflected through these infrastructures differ by staff and their duties/responsibilities (e.g., responsibilities of control room operators necessarily go beyond their official duties). This in turn also holds for the the operational stage, “maintenance and repair.”

So what?

III

The above implies that M&R provides for increasing precursor resilience, which is best seen now as a differentiated process (resilience will look very different from the intra-infrastructural perspectives of enterprise risk management and real-time control room operations) and which takes place within a wider framework of social regulation not associated solely with the official regulator of record.

Note that infrastructures do convey and instantiate social values, but these values—particularly for systemwide reliability and safety—are not the command and control typically discussed in “infrastructure power”. In the latter, formal design is the starting point for eventual operations; in the former actual operations are the informal starting point for real-time redesign. Not only do actual implementation and operations fall short of initial designs, one major function of operations is to redesign in real time what are the inevitably incomplete or defective technologies of infrastructure designers and defective regulations of the regulator of record.

In this way, it’s better to see “maintenance and repair” as part and parcel of normal operations that follow from and modify formal infrastructure design. M&R’s focus on improving precursor resilience becomes one way of maintaining the infrastructure’s process reliability when older forms of high reliability are no longer to be achieved because of inter-infrastructural dependencies and vulnerabilities.

IV

These distinctions have major implications for reinterpreting “infrastructure resilience.” For example, noncompliance by an infrastructure’s control room may be a regulatory error for the regulator of record; the same noncompliance may reflect a (more) resilient infrastructure (or at least a more resilient control room if there) able to ensure system reliability when the task environment indicates the said regulation to be defective.

In fact for real-time operations, noncompliance is not an error, if following that regulation jeopardizes infrastructure reliability and safety now or in planning the next steps ahead. So too in the case of defective technologies. To put it another way, the criticality of time from discovery to correction of error reinforces a process of dispersed regulatory functions, where one of the regulatory functions of the infrastructure’s real-time operations is to catch and correct for error by the regulator of record and/or design errors by engineers under conditions of mandated reliability. In fact, the latter catching and correcting error are part and parcel of what we mean by a resilient infrastructure and its control room.

V

Finally, the M&R perspective presented here can help us rethink the formal design and planning processes for creating new infrastructures or majorly repurposing existing ones after a major emergency. As Paul Schulman argues “adaptive capacity [for emergency management] can be facilitated in part by planning and design processes that themselves create prior conditions, such as contacts among diversely skilled people in other infrastructures, robust communications systems and contingent resources in different locations, for restoration actions.” I interpret the passage to mean that the mentioned design and planning interventions pass the ‘‘reliability matters’’ test.

That is, the aim of maintaining or enhancing contact lists, communication systems and distributed inventories is to reduce the task volatility that emergency managers and infrastructure operators face, increase their options to respond more effectively, and/or enhance their maneuverability in responding to different, often unpredictable or uncontrollable, performance conditions. That is what we mean by resilience in aid of system reliability. (In case it needs saying, not all design and planning pass the test!)

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My thanks to Paul Schulman and Antti Silvast for thinking through some points. Any errors that remain are due to my stubborness. Some material has appeared in earlier blog entries.

Not to worry, we’ll scale up later, soothes the techno-managerial elite. Later on, presses the happy-talk, we’ll relax assumptions and add realism. Anyway, we know how to reduce inequality (just give them money!), overpopulation (just don’t have babies!) and save the environment (just don’t cut down the trees!). So many of these just-do-this suffocate in their repetitive fat of “Well, this time is different,” “This time we really don’t have any other choice,” and “This time, you have to believe us, failure is not an option here and now.”

The chief problem with “start simple here and now” is that each scale/level is complex in its own right. The shoreline only looks smooth on the map. “Keep it simple” and “Break it down to essentials” only work, if they work at all, when context complexity is first admitted as helpful. “Which do you find to be simpler,” asks novelist and essayist, William Gass: “The radio that goes on when you turn a single knob, or the one that won’t work because the parts are all lined up on the floor?”

When I hear someone telling us “Keep it simple!” I immediately suspect they’ve lost the plot, like the actor playing Hamlet, who finished the bedroom scene with Gertrude but forgot to kill Polonius.

For many policy practitioners, incompleteness is the stuff of their working lives. At any point, problems remain to be addressed, obstacles surmounted, and goals attained, along with fires to put out, constraints to be lifted, objectives to be met, missions to be fulfilled, and crises to be faced. These policy and management worlds become one in terms of unwanted interruptions, and interruptions make for unfinished business. The only thing not interrupted are disasters, which is why they are so often described as “complete.”

Briefly put, issue incompleteness is the persistence of unfinished business for policymakers, politicians and policy analysts. Granted, interruptions can arise out of complexity and leave us with uncertainty and, of course, tasks do get done of sorts. A few things even turn out better than we could have hoped for. Fires are contained, problems handled, goals addressed, objectives recongized–work does get done. But–and this is the point–our policy worlds are recognizably incomplete and unfinished for all that.

This point has to be pushed further, though. All manner of granularities and context are involved when it comes to managing or coping ahead with the interruptions and unfinished business.

I

There is a sense in which each of our mental models of a complex policy and management issue always unfinished, if it matters to us. By way of example, Jean Cocteau, French litterateur, records the following interchange of composer, Darius Milhaud:

[Milhaud] shows his old housekeeper a very faithful painting of the great square at Aix.
You see, it’s the square at Aix.
Answer: ‘I don’t know.’
What? You don’t recognize the square at Aix?
‘No sir, because I’ve never seen it painted before.’

The rub isn’t how well the painting (or any representation for that matter) depicts that which it is a painting of, but rather that representations problematize recognition itself. Moving toward uncertainty (from the direction of certainty–we’ve seen the square–or from the direction of unstudied conditions–but never before as painted) means not only that we have a better appreciation of reality as contingent, provisional or messy. We also end up seeing how the incompletion of representation drives the very production of more representation.

Of the original Venus De Milo statue, Cocteau asks, “Suppose a farmer finds the arms. To whom do they belong? To the farmer or to the Venus de Milo?” Or to something or someone altogether different? To ask the latter question is to open up incompletion, where knowledge is unsettled and knowledgeable gives way to inexperience.

II

Is this sense of incompleteness at the micro level the felt part of an irreducible particularity of being, that sense we never body forth as representative or total? George Steiner recounts a childhood experience:

. . .if there are in this obscure province of one small county (diminished Austria) so many coats of arms, each unique, how many must there be in Europe, across the globe? I do not recall what grasp I had, if any, of large numbers. But I do remember that the word ‘millions’ came to me and left me unnerved. How was any human being to see, to master this plurality? Suddenly, it came to me, in some sort of exultant but also appalled revelation, that no inventory, no heraldic encyclopedia, no summa of fabled beasts, inscriptions, chivalric hallmarks, however compendious, could ever be complete.

But what is to be learned from a run of such individual experiences across more diverse people?

As I understand it, this diversity means no single or new representation could ever complete social reality or erase the initial condition that other recastings are both irresistibly forthcoming and inescapably required. Yes, the photograph recasts the way racing horses were portrayed compared to earlier paintings of them; no, the photograph is not the only or exhaustive way to portray racing horses. So for the policy and management worlds.

III

In those worlds, we have the techno-managerial elite still talking like this. “If people acted at the level of rationality presumed in standard economics textbooks, the world’s standard of living would be measurably higher,” assured Alan Greenspan, former chair of the US Federal Reserve.

So what if really-existing markets are one of the most diverse and hybridized of social institutions? So what’s wrong with believing that the answer to always-incomplete regulation must be always-incomplete markets?

Suspended somewhere between the always-incomplete pull of utopia and the never-good enough push from dystopia is more like the policy and management realism we–you and I–know and experience.

1. “Recalibrating politics: the Kennedy White House dinner for André Malraux (longer read)” https://mess-and-reliability.blog/2019/12/16/recalibrating-politics-the-kennedy-white-house-dinner-for-andre-malraux-longer-read/

2. “Spread the word: We need more Extreme Climate Resilience Desks for real-time infrastructure operations!” https://mess-and-reliability.blog/2024/04/23/spread-the-word-we-need-more-extreme-climate-resilience-desks-for-real-time-infrastructure-operations/

3. “What the Thai BL series, “Bad Buddy,” has to tell us about societal reset” https://mess-and-reliability.blog/2022/02/26/what-the-thai-bl-series-bad-buddy-has-to-tell-us-about-societal-reset-updated-2/

4. “Five most policy-relevant entries on pastoralists and pastoralisms” https://mess-and-reliability.blog/2024/01/27/five-most-policy-relevant-entries-on-pastoralists-and-pastoralisms/

5. “How the structural analysis of narrative is relevant for recasting pastoralist development” https://mess-and-reliability.blog/2024/01/06/how-the-structural-analysis-of-narratives-is-relevant-for-recasting-pastoralist-development/