Blur, Gerhard Richter and failed states (longer read)

Summary

Nothing seems further from war and failed states than the early photo-paintings of Gerhard Richter. This entry demonstrates otherwise.

Throughout his long career, Richter has been indefatigable in explaining why and how he produced the paintings. Why mechanically reproduce a photograph enlarged onto canvas and then blur the oil painted image with a squeegee passed across it? By way of answer, Richter says he was aiming at inserting chance into the painting. The blurs enabled him to see what had been a familiar photograph as if for the first time and with new objectivity (his term).

Transforming a photograph into a photo-painting and then blurring it is an optic with which to become alert to a quite different object from that known in the photo and in contradistinction to those who take photos as a baseline for objectivity. The blur foregrounds what had not been seen to that point, that is, not recognized up to then, difficult to discern otherwise, and the experience of still having something new to encounter.

I wed Richter’s concept of blurring to a “policy palimpsest,” the social science notion that controversial policies are themselves the composite of policy arguments and narratives that have overwritten each other. Any composite argument read off a policy palimpsest reads sequentially—nouns and verbs appear in order and meaning is made—but none of the previous inscriptions shine clear and whole through the intercalated layers, effacements, erasures and blockages. Arguments assembled from the palimpsest have been blurred, intertwined and re-rendered for current (often controverted) purposes. The analytic challenge is to read any composite argument with its blur visible in order to acknowledge and probe what has been rendered missing. A palimpsest, if you will, questions what kind of reader its reader is—and that reader is answerable within the confines of the palimpsest (in the same sense that a macro-principle is answerable to the local context in which it operates).

To see how a policy palimpsest works, the role of blur as its own clarifying optic and how this recasts a very difficult political issue, I discuss an article on the failed-states rationale put forth in the George W. Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy. I then draw out wider implications, namely: Where are this century’s new democracies to come from, if not from the failed states?

Introduction

“Palimpsest” refers to older documents and tablets whose text and images have been overlain by more recent ones, without entirely effacing earlier inscriptions. A first, if not the first, explicit use of “policy palimpsest” is in Harvey Simmons’ 1982 book, From Asylum to Welfare: “During the nineteenth century, not one but a series of mental retardation policies were superimposed on one another, with newer policies obscuring, blurring or relegating older policies to minor importance, although never entirely replacing them… (my italics)”.

Longstanding policy issues are typically described as progressing, regressing, or waiting to be modified for the better. New evidence, it is said, comes to light with respect to assumptions, and over the long haul policies change or evolve. The policy palimpsest perspective offers a different take. Major policy is a pastiche of overwritten policy arguments and narratives without presumption of sequential change and learning. Each erasure or effacement takes the policy audience further away from any kind of “original” beginning, middle and end for the policy in question.

This is not news in the study of policy and management. What the policy palimpsest metaphor highlights is the very partial nature of reworking policy. Little from previous inscriptions comes to us intact or pane-clear through a policy palimpsest for a major issue. No inscription or point made shines bright and clear through the layers, fractures and lacerations in a palimpsest. Arguments putatively read from and off the palimpsest are in fact blurred; they are elided and reassembled for current purposes. They are in effect composite arguments, whose linearity and coherence are deceptive.

The failed states argument

To see how a policy palimpsest works, turn to a 2014 Foreign Affairs article, “The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm: Requiem for a Decade of Distraction,” by Michael Mazarr, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College.

Mazarr starts by arguing that it was with 9/11 and the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy that the failed states argument came to the fore. “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few,” according to the Bush Doctrine. Mazarr emphasizes how accepted this starting point and conclusion were at that time:

The Democratic foreign policy hand Susan Rice, for example, wrote in 2003 that Bush was “wise to draw attention to the significant threats to our national security posed by failed and failing states.” Where the right emphasized security and terrorism, the left added humanitarian concerns. Development specialists jumped on the bandwagon as well, thanks to new studies that highlighted the importance of institutions and good governance as requirements for sustained economic success. In his 2004 book, State-Building, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote, “Weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order.” The Washington Post editorialized the same year that “weak states can compromise security — most obviously by providing havens for terrorists but also by incubating organized crime, spurring waves of migrants, and undermining global efforts to control environmental threats and disease.” This argument, the paper concluded, “is no longer much contested.” A year later, the State Department’s director of policy planning, Stephen Krasner, and its newly minted coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, Carlos Pascual, argued. . .that “in today’s increasingly interconnected world, weak and failed states pose an acute risk to U.S. and global security. Indeed, they present one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the contemporary era.

This failed states postulate, however and in spite of initial widespread support, encountered a great many problems. The first three Mazarr identifies are quoted at length without edit:

The threat posed by weak and fragile states, for example, turned out to be both less urgent and more complex and diffuse than was originally suggested. Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index for 2013 is not exactly a roster of national security priorities; of its top 20 weak states, very few (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan) boast geostrategic significance, and they do so mostly because of their connection to terrorism. But even the threat of terrorism isn’t highly correlated with the current roster of weak states; only one of the top 20, Sudan, appears on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, and most other weak states have only a marginal connection to terrorism at best.

A lack of definitional rigor posed a second problem. There has never been a coherent set of factors that define failed states: As the political scientist Charles Call argued in a powerful 2008 corrective, the concept resulted in the “agglomeration of diverse criteria” that worked to “throw a monolithic cloak over disparate problems that require tailored solutions.” This basic methodological flaw would distort state-building missions for years, as outside powers forced generic, universal solutions onto very distinct contexts.

The specified dangers were never unique to weak states, moreover, nor would state-building campaigns necessarily have mitigated them. Take terrorism. The most effective terrorists tend to be products of the middle class, often from nations such as Saudi Arabia, Germany, and the United Kingdom, not impoverished citizens of failed states. And terrorist groups operating in weak states can shift their bases of operations: if Afghanistan becomes too risky, they can uproot themselves and move to Somalia, Yemen, or even Europe. As a result, “stabilizing” three or four sources of extremist violence would not render the United States secure. The same could be said of threats such as organized crime, which finds comfortable homes in functioning but troubled states in Asia, eastern Europe, and Latin America.

As the scholar Stewart Patrick noted in a 2006 examination of the purported threats issuing from weak states, “What is striking is how little empirical evidence underpins these assertions and policy developments. Analysts and policymakers alike have simply presumed the existence of a blanket connection between state weakness and threats to the national security of developed countries and have begun to recommend and implement policy responses.”

And although interconnectedness and interdependence may create risks, the dangers in such a world are more likely to come from strong, well-governed states with imperfect regulations than weak ones with governance deficiencies. Financial volatility that can shake the foundations of leading nations and cyber attacks that could destabilize energy or information networks pose more immediate and persistent risks than, say, terrorism.

A third problem was misplaced confidence about the possibility of the mission’s feasibility. The last decade has offered an extended, tragic reminder of the fact that forcible state building simply cannot be accomplished by outsiders in any sustainable or authentic way. When a social order has become maladapted to the globalizing world — when governing institutions are weak, personalized, or kleptocratic; corruption is rampant; and the rule of law is noticeable by its absence — there are simply no proven methods for generating major social, political, economic, or cultural change relatively quickly.

As the Australian political scientist Michael Wesley argued in a brilliant 2008 essay, state weakness is primarily a political problem, and yet state building is often conceived and executed as if it were an apolitical exercise. “The intention of remaining aloof from politics while concentrating on technocratic reforms has proved unrealistic,” he wrote. “Even seemingly technocratic tasks confront international administrators with essentially political decisions: the nature and basis of elections; which pressure groups to consult; the reintegration or de facto separation of ethnic communities; school curricula; degrees of public ownership of enterprises; the status of women; and so on. However technocratic their intention, state-building missions inevitably find themselves factored into local rivalries.”

A policy palimpsest perspective recasts this line of argumentation, because this perspective clearly has difficulties with a governance or statecraft that centers around “here’s what we learned as to why it [the Bush Doctrine] didn’t work” or “we always knew it wouldn’t work.” Both may be true, but they fall well short of pushing the truth further.

–The wider truth is that Mazarr’s critique is itself a composite argument from the remains of other arguments that have been around for some time and which were reinscribed in new ways when it came to the “failed states” doctrine. What Mazarr identifies as the lack of definitional rigor in isolating key features of failed states is the result not only of new analysis since 2002, but also of the erasure of elements in what definitions we had had, all combined with the recognition that the lack of such rigor drives an uncertainty indistinguishable at times from a sense of “terror.’

Any “we used to know X, but now we have come to know Y” is too sequential and deterministic for what has been in effect an ebb and flow of government policymaking more akin to accretion than evolution. The most interesting feature about the Bush Doctrine isn’t that it proved wrong in ways that matter, but that it was overwritten and continues to be by all manner of subsequent contingencies. Where are those points we heard at the time of 9/11, but which have since been scoured out of the record, at least in the pages of Foreign Affairs? Namely: It was a tragedy waiting to happen, and now that it happened, an opportunity for America to take the lead in a new rapprochement with the Islamic World. These arguments were dropped from policy discussions not because of “new evidence and analysis,” but because they were effaced outright or blurred over. In this way, “straight-forward” policy arguments since 9/11 have been attempts to bowdlerize the policy palimpsest.

The image of the burning twin towers of the World Trade Center has been etched into the policy palimpsest of failed states in such a way as to obscure other lines and images of argument. The criticism that the Bush Doctrine propelled along one trajectory when others were available misses the other paths that were not there until 9/11 and the subsequent contingency-fueled implementation of the Bush Doctrine. To be clear as I can, any specific reading, such as the Bush Doctrine, off of a military-strategy policy palimpsest is not just specific with respect to historical moment and context; whether or not “universalized” as principles, the composite argument arises from, when not actually reflecting, the gaps, contradictions and lack of consistency in that policy palimpsest.

When it comes to major, longstanding policy issues, the coherence of the composite argument is matched by the inability to achieve exhaustive insight into the originating palimpsest. As such, no major policy sheds its shattered origins in the palimpsest; any composite argument brings the entire policy palimpsest with it. In this way, no major policy is or could ever be only what it says it is; nor is there any position in greater need of pushing further than “it is what it is.” At best, a composite argument seeks to be the arolect or prestige language of its creole palimpsest.

–Each composite argument is always open to interrogating, “What is being missed that was effaced from the palimpsest in order to assemble the argument?,” since no composite argument can be final. As a policy palimpsest sources all manner of composite arguments, any one is “revisable,” even at the moment the policymaker is insisting “this is the right policy for the right time in the right place.” Thus, when I insist that a major policy issue is uncertain, complex, conflicted and incomplete at the same time—no matter how coherent the current composite argument—it is because its policy palimpsest itself reads that way—each reading an arrested disruption, the palimpsest serving as a brake on isolating any single argument, all readings reflecting the analyst’s curatorial function of assembling an installation.

With all of this going on, how then to take Mazarr’s argument seriously? Bluntly, that’s my job, not Mazzar’s. I don’t expect Mazarr to do my work as an analyst. It’s good enough that he provides an argument as far as it goes. I, however, am the one to find the blur in his argument and make visible what is there already and already missing. Once you have identified what is missing from the composite but was in the palimpsest being read off (no guarantees here), you have identified means to recast complex the issue in new (renewed) ways. Mazarr makes it easier for us by leaving traces for the blur in his critique, which is complicated by all manner of elections, pressure groups, ethnic communities, school curricular, degrees of public ownership, and that wonderful admixture, “and so on.”

I keep referencing “blur.” This is because blurring, rather than the conventional clarifying, turns out counterintuitively to be a powerful analytic optic with which to parse and rethink major policy. The productive “blurring” I have in mind has been a centerpiece in the photo-paintings of Gerhard Richter, the German painter. His reasons for blurring go to the heart of understanding policy palimpsests and composite arguments, like the failed states one. This entry ends with one such rescription based in the blurred and blurrable Bush Doctrine.

The role of blurring in Richter’s photo-paintings and its implications

Early in his career, Gerhard Richter copied photographs and enlarged them onto canvas as oil paintings and then mechanically blurred them (e.g., with a squeegee). Below are three of Richter’s famous photo-paintings from the 1960s incorporating the blurring effect (accessed online on November 19, 2019 from pinterest.com):

Woman with an Umbrella (Frau mit Schirm), 1964, oil on canvas.         

Aunt Marianne (Tante Marianne), 1965, oil on canvas.

Uncle Rudi (Onkel Rudi), 1965, oil on canvas.

When I tell you that the original photographs for the paintings were of Jackie Kennedy at JFK’s funeral, Richter’s aunt who was sterilized and starved to death by the Nazis, and his uncle who fought for the Nazis and died in World War II, you appreciate that more is occurring in the photo-paintings than first meets the eye.

My proposition is that a Richter photograph versus his photo-painting made from it are much like an argument we say we directly draw from the evidence versus the composite argument that is assembled from the policy palimpsest.

The photo, as has often been reiterated, is (too) easily treated as veristic depiction. “A photograph does this more reliably and more credibly than any painting,” according to Richter; the photo “usually gets believed, even where it is technically faulty and the content is barely identifiable”. It’s hackneyed that photos come to us as literal, representing things as they are, an unvarnished mechanical record of mimetic fidelity rather than something like, say, what’s reflected in a puddle. “We believe that photographs reflect reality and that the information relayed by a photograph is much more precise and convincing than even the best drawing,” says Richter.

Such too was the aspiration of the mid-20th century policy and management sciences, where our arguments would correspond to reality far better than ever before. So too, little else seems quite as direct as the image of the burning towers for what has gone terribly wrong. Yet, while we aspired to photo-clear arguments in policy, analysis and image are true only as far as they go in a world reflected in and off of all its policy palimpsests.

Richter copied a photo onto a canvas because that is not what he ended up with in the painting. “As a painting, it changes both [the photo’s] meaning and its information content.” For “even when I paint a straightforward copy, something new creeps in, whether I want it to or not: something that even I don’t really grasp”. “I’ve never found anything to be lacking in a blurry canvas. Quite the contrary: you can see many more things in it than in a sharply focused image”.

Just how does the new creep in? By deliberate means, but with accidental and contingent effect. The blurring was achieved by wiping horizontally across the canvass so that no detail stood out and everything appeared in motion. “Factors like overexposure and lack of focus found their way in unintentionally, but then they had a decisive effect on the atmosphere of the pictures”.

–But to what decisive effect?

Now comes the key point: Contingency enters into play through blurring and posing emerging elements that you now have to think about further. Having produced new effects became the occasion for thinking about what they meant for the painting, and this “thinking more about” introduced objectivity directly into the thinking. Richter explains the link between contingency (what he calls chance) and the ensuing objectivity:

What part does chance play in your paintings?

An essential one, as it always has. There have been times when this has worried me a great deal, and I’ve seen this reliance on chance as a shortcoming on my part. . . .[But] I need it in order to carry on, in order to eradicate my mistakes, to destroy what I’ve worked out wrong, to introduce something different and disruptive. I’m often astonished to find how much better chance is than I am.

So this is the level on which openness is still thinkable and credible in real terms? Chance?

It introduces objectivity, so perhaps it’s no longer chance at all. But in the way it destroys and is simultaneously constructive, it creates something that of course I would have been glad to do and work out for myself.

If I understand Richter, transforming a photograph into a photo-painting and then mechanically blurring it became a way to render an image as if for the very first time: to become alert to a quite different object from that known in the photo and in contradistinction to those who take photos as the baseline for objectivity. Blurring pops the bubble of photo-clarity, etches away any monochrome facticity. Blur winkles out objectivity from a masquerading photo-clarity—shows photo-clarity to be at best an identikit—and takes objectivity farther than it had gone before. Blur, if you will, is the generosity of chance made objective.

Anyone who has tried to operationalize a project plan or blueprint knows just this sense in which its implementation produces something objectively real via the experience of contingency and surprise amped up by difficulty and learning, however hard-won.

Yet more is going on than creating something different and new, as separate objects of knowledge, for even after that the photo-painting and the originating photo continue to resonate and reverberate, like two tuning forks in sympathetic vibration next to each other. Primarily, the photo-painting defamiliarizes any “immediacy” the photo may have had. More subtly, each authenticates the other in a resonance that unmakes and remakes both, each rotating slightly as if to shed a new light.

When I wrote earlier that it was I who blurred Mazarr’s failed states argument, I am moving myself away from how I feel about the image of the burning twin towers. By treating the image as inevitably blurring and blurrable—the double exposure that is the image branded into the brain as well as what is occluded in the process and thereafter—I claw my way to a kind of an unfamiliar naïveté: In seeing things as if for the first time I obligate myself to evaluate the things I am now stuck with, including that which has now gone missing. “Audacious reflection wants to give thought what cautious reflection drove out of it— naïveté,” as Theodor Adorno phrased it.

The point is not that the photo-painting is a hazy, smudged, imperfect rendering of what is otherwise photo-clear. Photo-clarity is a kind of clarity, but it does not go far enough. Blur, in contrast, is the kind of clarity that brings to light the presence of contingency associated with photo-clarity as well as the new that emerges, and with both the loss of any immediacy that photo-clarity had. If simplicity, clarity and transparency are valued in storytelling, blur is the clarity needed to complicate that story about storytelling.

What does this all mean for the failed states argument?

So what if a composite argument juxtaposes words, phrases and statements from other documents and sources? So what if in the process a great deal has been effaced, erased or otherwise ignored in passing off this combined assemblage as an original or straightforward argument in and of itself?

My answer: To read or listen to a composite argument is to place its readers and listeners under the cognitive demands of evaluating that argument, particularly in terms of what has been rendered missing in order to be read off coherently for the purposes sought. The obligation is to resurface the blur. But—and here is the key moment of reflexivity—to evaluate a composite argument becomes its own occasion to blur that composite argument. This means there is enormous cognitive pressure to continue to overwrite the policy palimpsest with further interpretations and effacements. Where so, then analysts should be thinking more about that blurring ahead—a blurring that works against any single focus of any “single” composite argument—for the failed states argument.

To that end, I’d like to suggest that anyone keen on the failed states argument might be better off spending time in the distractions of thinking about how failed states are to be the source of 21st century democracies rather than fountainhead of failed or worse. I had been complaining about all those “except-Africa” narratives, where everything is said to work “except in Africa,” when Aaron Wildavsky, the political scientist, upbraided me: “Now, where do these critics think the next century’s democracies are going to come from?” Our current preoccupation with failed states falls short of that need to go further. Calling them failed states registers our own historical confusions and certainties about democracy and its changing practices.

–If I’m right, the challenge of analysis in a policy palimpsest world of always-revisable composite arguments is to be two steps ahead of any clear-cut argument and one-step ahead of any new composite argument inscribed back onto the palimpsest. Two steps ahead because major policy arguments cannot be that clear-cut, where the analyst must find the blur of what’s missing. One step ahead because inscription back onto the palimpsest is itself never diamond-sharp across a clean surface. Policy arguments that are urged on us, it bears repeating, because of their mathematical elegance, engineered simplicity, crystalline logical structure or ineluctable import are a perilous kind of knowledge. They only wink at complexity; they certainly are not to be found via a policy palimpsest.

This matters because any policy palimpsest offers up the prospect of recovering blur and the forgone prospects. Analysis in such a world is like fly-fishing, where the artificial fly cast onto the water’s surface is already hooked to what is out of sight for what seems not to be there.

Principal sources:

Mazarr, M. (2014). The rise and fall of the failed-state paradigm. Foreign Affairs (January/February): 113-121.

Richter, G. (2009). Gerhard Richter: Writings 1961 -2007. Eds., D. Elger and H. Ulrich Obrist, D.A.P. (Distributed Art Publishers): New York, NY.

Roe, E. (2019). Social Complexity, Crisis, and Management. In Oxford Encyclopedia of Crisis Analysis. Oxford University Press. Online Publication Date: Aug 2019.

Simmons, H. (1982). From Asylum to Welfare. National Institute on Mental Retardation: Ontario, Canada.

Recalibrating politics: the Kennedy White House dinner for André Malraux (longer read)

The White House dinner on May 11 1962 for French Cultural Affairs Minister, André Malraux, is most often treated as a footnote to the Kennedy Administration and the Camelot White House. If mentioned at all, it places behind the Kennedy White House dinners for Nobel Laureates and another where celloist, Pablo Casals, who had refused to perform in the U.S. to the point, did play at the White House.

When mentioned, the Malraux dinner is seen as a key step in Mrs. Kennedy’s campaign to get the Mona Lisa to the United States (which did happen in January 1963):

Perhaps no other White House dinner had more personal meaning for Jacqueline Kennedy than the evening honoring French Minister of Culture [sic] André Malraux at the White House on May 11, 1962. Both President and Mrs. Kennedy shared an admiration of Malraux’s multi-faceted career as a novelist, art historian, explorer, Spanish Civil war fighter pilot, World War II resistance leader and advocate of the arts. The first lady and Malraux had developed a friendship following a tour of Paris art museums during the Kennedy’s state visit to Paris in June 1961. By according him all the courtesies normally reserved for a head of state, the Kennedys hoped to focus national attention on the role of the arts in America and encourage the development of Washington as a cultural center. . .At the end of the evening, Monsieur Malraux whispered a promise to Jacqueline Kennedy that he would send to her France’s most famous cultural treasure, the Mona Lisa , to be displayed at the National Gallery in Washington.

What I do here is dig deeper into the palimpsest we’ve been left for this dinner. Those attending were among America’s greatest living authors, playwrights, actors and artists—in other words, those whose profession was to speak or write well and who, fortunately for my purposes, wrote about being at the dinner. I want to see this event with fresh eyes, as if state dinner just happened. Why? Because all Americans are a party to White House events, high and low.

We find the President Kennedy using the dinner as a way to get Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh to attend. Kennedy also jawbones John Rockefeller, art patron and wealthy banker, about the U.S. economy. What would be the very scary Viet Nam War also makes an appearance that evening. And there in one place was the high and low gossip that is the molecular structure of American politics.

I’ll come back to the lessons for politics I take away form from the Malraux dinner at the end, but first read for the stories.

***

“They let us in, darlings! We’re here! We’re inside!” Thornton Wilder effuses, as he moves from table to table, embracing friends. The “new insiders” are America’s high-art grandees. The occasion is a White House dinner for André Malraux, French Minister of Cultural Affairs. Time: 8 p.m., black tie. Today: May 11 1962.

J.D. Salinger sends his regrets. So do Alexander Calder, W.H. Auden, Truman Capote, Jacques Barzun, Aldous Huxley, Martha Graham, and Marianne Moore. Those attending include Edmund Wilson, Saul Bellow, Robert Lowell, Arthur Miller, Tennessee Williams, Agnes de Mille, Charles and Anne Lindbergh, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, Leonard Bernstein, Mark Rothko, Paddy Chayefsky, and Irwin Shaw.

In August 1961 Gore Vidal writes that Jackie Kennedy really “did look forward to getting Malraux to the White House. She had found him impressive. At De Gaulle’s reception for the Kennedys in Paris, Malraux had appeared with his wife, whose face was bloated from weeping…[T]heir son had just been killed in an auto crash. But he had taken Jackie around museums and theaters and completely captured her imagination.” Nicole Alphand, whose husband was France’s ambassador to the U.S., picks up the story:

Anxious to give heightened brilliance to the reign of the ‘New Frontier’, the President had decided to give a dinner at the White House for everyone who mattered in American culture—writers, novelists, musicians and men of the theatre. He asked us whether André Malraux would agree to lend his presence to this event, and it was at once arranged for the month of May 1962. We had long discussions about it with Mrs. Kennedy during a weekend spent with her in Florida at the beginning of the year. “We mustn’t allow André Malraux to be bored,” she said, “and since he speaks English badly, we should first of all invite people who speak French.” We replied that what principally mattered was to gather round her table the greatest artists in America, French speaking or not.

My husband was in Paris during April, and he discussed with Malraux the details of the journey. The Minister found it a fascinating prospect. Not only would he speak about culture, he would also talk to President Kennedy about politics in general, for this was at a time when our points of view were at variance in many ways. The General [Charles de Gaulle] was not prepared, in the immediate future, to return the visit which Kennedy had paid him in the previous year, “but”, added Malraux, “he is quite glad to send on his tanks—in other words myself—and to have them set on fire to light his path.”

As the event approached, Jacqueline Kennedy “scattered seating charts across the floor of her sitting room [and] knelt among them to work out an arrangement,” in the words of TIME. “Of all the social events held at the White House, the one that mattered the most personally to Jackie was the dinner honoring André Malraux,” writes Mrs. Kennedy’s social secretary, Letitia Baldrige.

Anne Morrow Lindbergh gives a flavor of the day and hours leading to that evening:

CAL [Charles A. Lindbergh] and I took a taxi to the White House after taking the shuttle down from New York, and after picking up CAL’s newly made “black tie” outfit on Pennsylvania Ave. It was about five p.m. and the downstairs rooms of the White House were full of people arranging flowers and moving chairs about. We waited in a small reception room (it had two Cézannes in it) next to the big cleared ballroom where the Isaac Stern Trio was practicing in their shirtsleeves for the concert they were to give after dinner. Mrs. Kennedy’s secretary then came and greeted us—a gay, informal, pretty woman with quite a line—and took us in the elevator up to our rooms: “The Queen’s room for Mrs. L. and the Lincoln room for Mr. L.”

“So far away!” I cried out in dismay, so we were both put together in the Queen’s room.

We then had tea, brought us by a nice Negro maid who took my dress to press it, and I sewed some brilliant buckles on my new evening shoes (bought in Stamford that morning). I was handed the list of guests to look over and decided there was no use trying to read any more Malraux—I would never get to speak to him!. . .We dressed and were ushered (“Call Usher’s Office”) to a small private upstairs salon where the house guests and French Embassy were having cocktails. M. and Mme. Malraux, the French Ambassador and his umpteenth wife (he urban, intelligent and very smooth; she blond, beautiful and hard as nails), Vice President and Mrs. Johnson, and various members of the French Embassy, the Kennedys, etc.

…The French ladies were all dressed up and made up like mannequins—rather terrifying. M. Malraux, a nervous and interesting white mask. Mme. Malraux less mask-like than the others, quite sympathetic. Mrs. Kennedy swept in like a queen, looking extremely beautiful in a long pink stiff gown, hair high and stiff—rather Japanese—with a diamond star set in it! I talked in English to Mrs. Johnson, who was kind and quite natural and American, and in French to the French women (not too well—but they were surprised to have me speak at all).

Then we went downstairs to the main reception hall—where all the other guests were…

Edmund Wilson calls the Malraux dinner a “big cultural blowout,” Saul Bellow “a sort of crazy fantasy evening,” S.N. Behrman “a mass dinner,” and Arthur Miller, “manifestly a show of American intellectual pride.” Gawping was palpable. “It was such a celebrity roster that I wished I had brought an autograph book and swallowed enough pride to use it,” writes Baldrige. “It was a little like ‘heaven’ in that you kept seeing people who looked rather familiar and you had never met: Is that Tennessee Williams? Or Arthur Miller? Or Edmund Wilson? (I would like to have met E.W.),” Anne Morrow Lindbergh tells a close friend two days later.

Tennessee Williams remembers Wilder, “bustling about like a self-appointed field marshal” (Wilder had been in the two world wars). Lining everyone up in alphabetical order for the reception line, “Mr. Wilder rushed up to me with the radiant smile of a mortician and shrieked, ‘Mr. Williams, you’re a bit out of place, you come behind me.'” “If I am behind you it’s the first and last time in my life,” assayed Williams. (Williams remembers Shelley Winters in the reception line. Her assistant tells me she didn’t attend.) A “nice little contingent in ‘W’s’: Penn Warrens, Wilder, Tennessee Williams,” writes Wilder to a friend. A week or so later, Wilder is on the road in search of a desert town far from Washington where he could stay “without neckties, without shoelaces and without cultivated conversation.”

Behind Williams in the reception line comes Edmund Wilson and his wife. “Elena feels such physical revulsion [toward Williams] that she says she cannot stand to be near him,” records Wilson. “She said something of this kind to me in Russian. Williams turned: ‘What language is that?’ ‘Russian.’ ‘Fine.'” Behind the Wilsons stands another loner, Andrew Wyeth, “who has become the official American painter” in Edmund Wilson’s estimation. “When the long alphabetical line had nearly all shuffled past the President and First Lady and had been presented to M. Malraux, it came my turn to meet him and I had actually never heard of him before,” insists Tennessee Williams. “I said to him, ‘Enchanté, Monsieur Maurois’—and this made Jackie smile, but did not seem to amuse M. Malraux.” “‘Good evening’ and that was all—and not even in French,” is how Thornton Wilder describes his interchange with Malraux. During handshakes, President Kennedy tells Wilder, “I want to thank you, Mr. Wilder, for what you said last week,” when the playwright gave a reading at the State Department.

That other American playwright, Arthur Miller, isn’t in alphabetical order. “I found myself at the very end of the line, as had been my fate since grammar school due to my height,” writes Miller,

and as I slowly moved forward, I saw one lone man remaining outside. Of towering height, wearing a ruffled pale blue shirt, he was almost demonstrably disdaining the occasion, standing with one knee raised and a shoe pressed against the immaculate wainscoting, studiously cleaning his fingernails with a file like an idler in front of a country store. He looked friendless, if not peeved. I only gradually recognized his face. He was Lyndon B. Johnson, the vice-president of the United States, and clearly not in his element tonight. It was the only time I ever felt sorry for a vice-president.

Other theater people cast the consummate insider, Lyndon Johnson, also in the stock role of outsider. “There was this tall guy standing off there in a doorway all alone with no guards, no Marine Corps adjutants, no secretary, aides, nothing,” remembers Lee Strasberg. “I walked right by him…[I]t was Johnson over there on the side by himself waiting to get his hand shook. I literally stiffed the Vice President of the United States!” “It was terribly embarrassing,” remembers Susan Strasberg, who accompanies her father.

“All these people,” Tennessee Williams says at the dinner, “were absolutely overwhelmed by being invited. If our mothers could see us now.” Arthur Miller tells the Washington Post, “All these people are used to earning their living by pushing a pencil or a fiddle…They are absolutely overwhelmed by being invited.” “I wish my mother could be here,” actress Geraldine Page tells Williams. “I wish all our mothers could be,” he returns. Saul Bellow remembers Mark Rothko whisper that “all of this was a lot of crap, and meant nothing to [Rothko].” “But my sister!,” Rothko says to him: “It’s a great day for my sister.” “What he meant,” Bellow said, “was ‘If Mama could only see me now.'” “In this crowd, [I] saw several novelists and poets at one time strongly alienated, ex-intransigent’s, former enemies of society, old grumblers and life-long manger-dogs,” writes Bellow, “all having a hell of a good time, their faces beaming, their wives in evening gowns (could they afford them?).”

“I’d like to dine at the White House every night!” Elena Wilson confesses. Allen Tate tells her that the dinner is the first time “a man of my [Southern] blood” has been to the White House since President Buchanan. George Balanchine arrives depressed over a forthcoming trip to Russia (Wilder tells Balanchine that evening, “plump, in his face all that I owed him”). Gail Jones, daughter of singer Lena Horne, is introduced to Sargent Shriver, the President’s brother-in-law and director of the new Peace Corps. He asks if she wants to join the Corps; she declines. (“Miss Gail Jones colored” says a handwritten note in one of the White House’s files on the dinner.) “There was not a single social occasion at the White House, whether it was for Pablo Casals, André Malraux, or a host of others, to which I was not invited,” Adam Clayton Powell writes.

Archibald MacLeish tells Robert Lowell that the White House’s “trumpets made his heart beat.” “Red Warren [and] I had a frantic search for the men’s room,” Lowell remembers about Penn Warren. “[W]e drank a great deal at the White House, and had to sort of be told not to take our champagne into the concert, and to put our cigarettes out like children—though nicely, it wasn’t peremptory.” By the end of the evening, Lowell was insulting playwright, Paddy Chayefsky. “Chayefsky does provide a temptation,” notes Edmund Wilson, who considered Chayefsky “cheap, conceited, and corny”. Chayefsky tells Wilson earlier “that he [Chayefsky] wanted to talk to me about the Russian Revolution—I could see what he was going to do with it: he had some stupid conception of Lenin that he thought would make him a dramatic character, and it was evident that Stalin was going to be rather a noble fellow, too. There were people at that White House dinner—Chayefsky, for example—who would certainly never have been there if they hadn’t been friends of Arthur’s [Arthur Schlesinger].”

Some 170 guests sit at 17 tables in the State Dining Room and the adjoining Blue Room. (“Gracious sakes, there were 162 guests,” Thornton Wilder puffed to a friend.) The table decorations include lilies-of-the-valley, baby’s breath, red and white tulips and blue iris, while the “food at dinner was delicious: soup with double crème in the middle and on top of that a dab of caviar,” recalls Edmund Wilson. “Since it was Friday with a Catholic President in the White House, this was followed by lobster and fish.” “Vendredi, maigre,” Wilder parenthesizes to a friend, meaning no meat served that day.

“Paddy was a deeply if erratically cultivated man, endlessly curious, widely read in literature, history, science,” writes Schlesinger. “My wife and I introduced him to the Kennedys…” For Wilson, “Arthur’s hand was everywhere visible” at the dinner, “and these parties are really vast expansions of the parties they gave in Cambridge.” (It is Schlesinger who requests Behrman be invited as well.) During the evening, Wilson consults Schlesinger on his (Wilson’s) tax problems. “It was only through President Kennedy’s intervention that the matter was settled as favorably as it turned out to be,” Wilson admits.

The President’s table includes Irwin Shaw, Agnes de Mille, Charles Lindbergh, Edmund Wilson, Andrew Wyeth, Geraldine Page, and Mme Malraux. Wilder sits at the Vice-President’s table along with Robert Lowell and Anne Morrow Lindbergh. At the First Lady’s table sit André Malraux, Julie Harris, Arthur Miller, and Elspeth Rostow (wife of W.W. Rostow). According to Shaw’s biographer: “So anxious was Marian [Shaw] about her appearance the night of the dinner that the Shaws arrived notably late to the White House; Shaw would rail about the embarrassment for years…President Kennedy professed to have read Shaw’s work; the two men had mutual friends…” Edmund Wilson spins it another way. Shaw “has been living in Switzerland to avoid taxes, and had flown over especially for the dinner. The New Yorker people, who don’t much like him, expressed surprise at his being there; but I found out from Alfred Kazin the probable reason: Kennedy has a friend who wants to make a play out of one of Shaw’s stories, and he must have been asked at the President’s [request].”

The President expresses interest in Wilson’s work. “Kennedy told me he had seen a review of Patriotic Gore and asked why I had called it that. He asked what conclusions I had come to about the Civil War. I answered that I couldn’t very well tell him then and there and referred him to the Introduction. He said something about its being unusual for an author not to want to talk about his book.” Kennedy doesn’t let the topic go, we see in a moment.

“I found myself at Kennedy’s Table between Agnes de Mille and Geraldine Page,” continues Wilson. “Kennedy had Mme Malraux, looking very beautiful, on his right, Mme Alphand on the other side, the wife of the French ambassador, a much less attractive lady. I didn’t know then who Geraldine Page was, but she took it very well. She is handsome and seems intelligent; is not at all like an actress, has no public personality for off the stage…Agnes de Mille explained to me that she [de Mille] was a granddaughter of Henry George, and we talked about [George’s] Progress and Poverty.” Wilson remembers Irwin Shaw “on Mme Malraux’s other side, talking vigorously to her in French.” As for Page, she had “such a good time,” according to Newsweek. She later enthuses in a thank-you letter to Jacqueline Kennedy,

I hope you are First Lady for the next three hundred years at least! I have been trying to write to you ever since I experienced the honor of my life – being present at your unforgettable dinner for Monsieur and Madame Malraux.

I may never recover.

I have tried to write a dignified expression of my gratitude but I invariably fall into uncontrollable gushing & have finally decided to gush and be damned. You see – it’s like a fairy-tale from my childhood come true. All the legends of sleeping princesses awakened – ugly ducklings turning into swans – beasts into princes – all the life renewing myths are brought to mind by the stirring and awakening and coming to life all over the country and all around the world that is taking place because you two are who you are.

You remind us all who we can be and the re-establishing of values is bringing us all to life again. I had the sensation at your party of being a single blossom in a huge field of flowers all basking in the sun so we could hold up our heads and be beautiful.

With profound and all-embracing gratitude. . . you make us believe in miracles.

Newsweek captioned Charles Lindbergh “ill at ease” at the President’s table. According to TIME, the Kennedys “scored a real social coup by the presence of reclusive Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh.” At one point in the evening, Mrs. Kennedy took Colonel Lindbergh over to André Malraux, who had been in an animated conversation with Anne Lindbergh about French literature. Malraux was later asked what Charles Lindbergh had said to him. “He said, ‘I’m sorry I don’t speak French,’” Malraux reported. When reviewing the original invitation list for the dinner, President Kennedy had asked, “Where are the great Americans on this list? I mean really great Americans, like Charles Lindbergh.” Mrs. Kennedy, in turn, admired Anne Morrow Lindbergh and her writing. When she finally tracked the Lindberghs down, Letitia Baldrige remembers,

Anne Morrow Lindbergh answered the phone. That surprised me, but she was equally surprised to find Washington on the line. “My dear Miss Baldrige,” she exclaimed, “how did you reach us? No one knows our number. Oh, dear!”…I heard Mrs. Lindbergh whisper to her husband, “It’s the White House.” The next thing I knew, he was on the telephone…I managed to tell him that President Kennedy had said, “Of all the people who would do us the honor by coming to dinner, the Lindberghs would be number one.” “Did the President really say that?” asked Mr. Lindbergh skeptically. “He really did. I am telling you the truth.” There was a hushed conversation between husband and wife, then the general [sic] spoke into the telephone again. “We will come.”

Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis reminisced:

The person that President Kennedy was most anxious to have attend the dinner was Charles Lindbergh, because of his life-long admiration for him and for Mrs. Lindbergh. We knew that Colonel and Mrs. Lindbergh did not like to attend public functions and for that reason we invited them to stay in the White House where they might be spared some press attention. I will never forget how sweet the Lindberghs were to the children. Mrs. Lindbergh gave an inscribed copy of North to the Orient to Caroline and Colonel Lindbergh gave The Spirit of St. Louis inscribed to John. They treasure these books now, and that occasion will always remain one of my happiest memories.

Impressions were mutual. Anne Morrow Lindbergh writes: “The next morning [after the dinner]…Mrs. K. came up with the children and we talked informally in the hall—without a mask and quite real and simple…The children were refreshingly children and she was quite real and still beautiful…We also saw the President in his office as we left. You have a sense of great integrity and naturalness—no pose. We were both impressed.” For his part, however, Saul Bellow “was deeply amused at the White House by the presence of [Edmund] Wilson who had had a tax problem, by Charles Lindbergh who had been a Nazi sympathizer and by Irwin Shaw who had established residence abroad in order to avoid taxes.” Bellow later recalls Lindbergh that evening “would look at everybody with his furious blue eyes, and knock them down mentally and pass on.”

At Mrs. Kennedy’s table, “Malraux spoke in passionate outbursts of French at a speed that defied comprehension by the president’s wife much of the time and by me at any time,” according to Arthur Miller. “He was a star fencer flicking his foil before you had a chance to get set. He smoked almost violently and had a fascinating and disconcerting tic that made you wonder how he ever relaxed enough to sleep.” Elspeth Rostow remembers Miller as “almost apoplectic,” when he was unable to talk to Malraux directly, using Rostow as a translator.

“In the Blue Room, Jacqueline Kennedy, brilliant in a pink strapless Dior, chatted in confidential murmurs with Malraux,” reports TIME. “At the table, Mrs. Kennedy in ‘hot-pink’ silk by Dior, talked French with Malraux” is Newsweek‘s version. (Part of Marian Shaw’s anxiety was she had been warned by her Paris couturier that Jackie might wear the same dress Shaw had chosen for the dinner. Wilder described the First Lady as “glorious in a white and pale raspberry Dior.”) “Whenever a wife says anything in this town,” President Kennedy comments later, “everyone assumes she is saying what her husband really thinks. Imagine how I felt last night when I thought I heard Jackie telling Malraux that Adenauer was ‘un peu gaga‘!” Mrs. Kennedy had just taken Malraux on a tour of the National Art Gallery in Washington. When asked what were her favorite pieces, she replies: “Mine are whatever his are.”

One or two confidential murmurs seem to stick. “What’s so great about Malraux?” Jackie is asked a few weeks before the dinner. “He isn’t even attractive looking.” She shot back: “He happens to be a war hero, a brilliant, sensitive writer, and he happens to have a great mind.” In 1964, Mrs. Kennedy speaks about Malraux and that evening with Arthur Schlesinger in a taped interview,

[Malraux] is the most fascinating man I’ve ever talked to. But again, he’s rather disillusioning because he sort of admires the simplest things. I mean, that dinner at the White House, he—well, his most impressive moment was when they took the color—you know the color flags—the Honor Guard downstairs. And, then, who was it? Oh, Irwin Shaw told me his greatest moment in life was when he was the head of a brigade or something, in the Maquis [guerrillas in the French Resistance]

When asked if she understood Malraux’s French, Mrs. Kennedy says, “Well, he talks so fast, but I can. Or else he repeats—it’s like being taken over this incredible obstacle course at ninety miles an hour.” Malraux dedicates the American edition of his next book, Anti-Memoirs, to “Mrs. John Fitzgerald Kennedy.” “We all thought she would marry someone like André Malraux,” a Polish writer is reported to have said after Jackie’s marriage to Aristotle Onassis, “and here she goes off with a gangster.” But that disappointment comes later. The evening was still fresh and better captured by the then-editor of Art News, who also sat at Mrs. Kennedy’s table. He telegrams the White House beforehand: “PLEASE TELL [Mrs. Kennedy] THAT HER TV PROGRAM WAS IN SUCH EXCELLENT TASTE AND SCHOLARLY STANDING THAT I EXPECT SHE WILL HAVE AN OFFER FROM THE LOUVRE AS CHIEF CURATOR AFTER THE SECOND TERM. BEST REGARDS  ALFRED FRANKFURTER”.

Little is recorded of conversations at other tables. “I was at the table with Thornton Wilder, Robert Lowell and Alexis Léger,” writes Anne Morrow Lindbergh. “I loved talking to Alexis—and Vice President Johnson was sympathetic and very, very tired! (He had just flown in from Seattle where he had opened the [World’s] Fair!)”. Letitia Baldrige recalls “that, in contrast to the merrymakers at the [earlier] Nobel Prize winners’ dinner, this was a subdued group of people”. Mark Rothko, according to one of his biographers, “feigned aloofness” at his table with Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson. “I sat next to Mrs. Auchincloss, the mother of our hostess,” S.N. Behrman writes. “I had a play then on tour with Charles Boyer. Mrs. Auchincloss inquired about it. She was, she said, greatly interested in the theatre; she had, in fact, once written a play herself.”  Elena Wilson sits next to Chip Bohlen and complains later that Bohlen “didn’t have the right reaction to Russia.”

What gets considerable press is President Kennedy’s dinner toast, as well as Malraux’s. Each causes its own stir. Edmund Wilson remembers: “The President, who had had paper and pencil brought to him and who had either been writing a message or making notes, now got up and introduced Malraux.” “Ladies and Gentlemen,” Kennedy begins,

I want to express a very warm welcome to all of you, and particularly to our distinguished guests Mr. and Madame Malraux.

This will be the first speech about relations between France and the United States that does not include a tribute to General Lafayette. It seems that almost every Frenchman who comes to the United States feels that Lafayette was a rather confused sort of ineffectual, elderly figure, hovering over French politics, and is astonished to find that we regard him as a golden, young, romantic figure, next to George Washington our most distinguished citizen. Therefore he will not be mentioned, but instead I will mention a predecessor of mine, John Adams, who was our first President to live in the White House and whose prayer on occupancy is written here. John Adams asked that on his gravestone be written, “He kept the peace with France.”

I am very glad to welcome here some of our most distinguished artists. This is becoming a sort of eating place for artists. But they never ask us out.

Earlier at the table, “I said to Kennedy,” writes Edmund Wilson, “that he had certainly done a thorough job of entertaining the literary world: ‘Maybe they ought to entertain me,'” Kennedy replies. But back to the President’s toast:

I want to tell you how very pleased we are to have so many distinguished writers and artists and actresses and creative thinkers.

You know, one of the great myths of American life is that nothing is pleasanter or easier than lying around all day and painting a picture or writing a book and leading a rather easy life. In my opinion, the ultimate in self-discipline is a creative work. Those of us who work in an office every day are actually the real gentle livers of American society.

We do not manage our cultural life in this country, nor does any free society, but it is an important part. It is one of the great purposes. And I would hope that this tremendous energy obtained in the intellectual life of America could be communicated not only to the people in this country but all around the world.

There are so many more people playing a musical instrument now, going to symphonies, going to the theatre, to art galleries, painting, than anyone realizes. And it is our hope that Americans will begin to look about them and realize that here in these years we are building a life, which, as I say, develops the maximum in each individual.

Now we have the best model that we could have this evening in welcoming Mr. and Madame Malraux. I suppose all of us wish to participate in all the experiences of life, but he has left us all behind. We are the descendants of early founders who were themselves men of great variety and vitality. But he has led an archeological expedition to Cambodia, been connected with Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung—and has been active in the civil war—participated in the defense of his country—been  involved with General de Gaulle—and has been at the same time a great creative figure in his own right. He has left, I think, most of us way behind.

So we regard him as an honored guest in this country, as participants in the cultural stream, and also as admirers of those who travel the far horizons of human destiny. So we are very proud to have him—and we are particularly proud to have him because of his association with a distinguished leader of the West—a good deal of which has been written by some of our distinguished correspondents about the difficulties that have occasionally come up between the President of the United States and General de Gaulle. But I want to say that there is a tradition in that regard, with Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and General de Gaulle continues on his way, and has built for his country and his friends in Europe a strength which is the most valuable source of comfort to us all.

I know that there are sometimes difficulties in life but I hope that those who live in both our countries realize how fortunate we are in the last two decades to be associated in the great effort with him. And we are glad to have Mr. Malraux and Madame Malraux here because we believe that they will go back to France and say a kind word for the United States—and its President.

So I hope you will drink to all of us, in the sense that you are leaders in our free society—and particularly to our distinguished leader whom we are very glad to have with us tonight—and most especially to drink to the President of France, General de Gaulle.

Malraux’s toast was calculated in a different way (the next day he concedes to Edmund Wilson that “Mon discours d´hier soir—c´était de la courtoisie” [“My speech last night—it was a matter of courtesy”]). For Robert Lowell, Malraux “refrained from saying anything objectionable.” Because Kennedy and Malraux are in separate rooms, a two-mike public address system is rigged for their toasts. At one point, the system fails, and Malraux begins his toast with

Mr. President, I believe [I am] to be the first guest you have received here who will have to reply to your speech without knowing what you have said. This may be difficult. It does not, however, make it difficult for me to thank you and to thank the United States for the hospitality with which I was greeted here, the hospitality with which you have greeted an artist and also a humble Minister of Cultural Affairs. You have greeted me here with the masterpieces of the world—and you have greeted me even better by having your masterpieces shown to me by Mrs. Kennedy.

I will say that I am greatly moved by it. And I will say that not only as something which is polite, I will say it because at one time I was in another country, in a country named Russia, and there in the enormous expanse of sorrow I felt something great—a great hope.

Here the situation is different. Here I feel also something great—we feel the very spirit of the Free World—we feel brotherhood, we feel the brotherhood of man, in this country. This is the brotherhood which so many people for so long had thought they would find elsewhere, in that other country, but which really exists and lives here.

And I believe that this shows to us a duty, a right, at the same time the right to give to every child, to every poor child, the riches of the mind and of the spirit in this country than can be hoped for by any poor child of Russia. This perhaps is a simple statement, but it is a statement of the very essence of our freedom.

I also wish to say that here in the United States of America is the only country which has become the leader of the world without having sought to become that leader, the country to which is entrusted the future—the destiny of mankind—and is the country, once again, to achieve this position without having sought it, without even having wished it.

History is full of great empires, history knows so many countries which have reached the first place in the world in their time, but they all did it through strenuous work, through strenuous attempts, through bloodshed—through thousands and millions of deaths. There was the Syrian empire, there was the Babylonian empire, the Roman empire. There is no American empire. There is the United States. There is the United States which has been the leader of the Free World without having conquered the word, without having conquered the world, without having sought to conquer it.

And it is really strange that in some many millennia there is for the first time today—that we find a country which has become the leader not through conquest but by seeking justice…

TIME quotes the last sentence approvingly. By this point in the toast, Edmund Wilson—described in the White House background notes as “responsible for Malraux’s early fame here”—has had enough of the “diplomatic absurdities.” He turns to Mme Malraux, “Dites à Malraux que je n´en crois rien” [“Tell Malraux I don’t believe anything he says”]. Kennedy, who had been taking French lessons, overhears. “You don’t tell us what you think,” the President says. Malraux continues,

…And so, ladies and gentlemen, I will raise my glass to the United States, to this country so great. And I would like also to reverse, perhaps, the order of precedence to thank you once again for having greeted me with your masterpieces…

“I couldn’t imagine at first what masterpieces he meant,” writes Wilson, “then realized he was referring to the pictures in the National Gallery,”

…and for having those masterpieces shown to me by Mrs. Kennedy. I will raise my glass to you, Mr. President, and to the first people in history, let me say, which has acquired a position of leadership without having conquered, without having sought it—without even having willed it.  Thank you.

(Malraux said at the National Gallery that some of the Gallery’s “masterpieces” belong to humanity, while others belong to the U.S. Referring to a new acquisition, he adds archly, “I am glad to see that this one is here for the second reason.”)

Bellow sums up the toasts. “Mr. Kennedy’s after-dinner speech was very witty, and a witty President is worth more to artists than a congressional porkbarrel. M. Malraux, an impressive-looking man, spoke in greater earnest, saying that America had not sought imperial power and domination. In private, Mr. Edmund Wilson exclaimed irascibly, in tones of Mr. Magoo, ‘Hooey!’ There was an American empire! I felt it would be a pity to waste Mr. Wilson’s fine old rumblings on a lousy republic and that his eccentricities deserved at least an imperial setting.” (Later that evening after leaving the White House, Bellow meets up with Wilson, Wilder, Balanchine, Lowell and others for late night drinks.)

Kennedy’s toast did not pass without criticism. Robert Lowell sends Edmund Wilson a worried letter at the end of that May,

I meant to write you a little fan note after Washington. Except for you, every one there seemed addled with adulation at having been invited. It was all good fun but next morning you read that the President had sent the 7th fleet to Laos [New York Times headline: “US, Shifting Laos Policy,…”]…I feel we intellectuals play a very pompous and frivolous role—we should be windows, not window-dressing. Then, now in our times, of all times, the sword hangs over us and our children, and not a voice is lifted. I thought of all the big names there, only you acted yourself.

Laos may have been on the mind of others during that evening. One guest, Michael Forrestal, summarizes in a memo from that day an earlier conversation with former President Eisenhower: “If [Eisenhower] were sending troops into Laos, he would follow them up with whatever support was necessary to achieve the objectives of their mission, including—if necessary—the use of tactical nuclear weapons.” Almost three years later to the day, a letter of Lowell’s appears in the New York Times—this time to President Johnson—turning down his invitation to another White House event for the arts, with Lowell again objecting to a president’s military policy and statecraft in Southeast Asia.

But back to May 11 and this White House dinner. For Bellow, “Only Mr. [Adlai] Stevenson preserved a shade of intellectual irony. Everybody else seemed absurdly and deeply tickled” at being in the White House for the Malraux dinner. A few days afterwards, Thomas Hart Benton, the American painter, says his art “has nothing to do with high society,” nor did “a bunch of artists playing up to a social game.” He goes on and suggests that it was the artists rather than their work that the White House was putting on show. Whatever, “John Kennedy leaned back, lit an Upmann cigar and smiled” once the eating had finished, in the words of TIME.

Some look twice at the President’s smile. “[Kennedy’s] hard glazed eyes I found mechanized and a little frightening,” writes Arthur Miller. “He might have a quick mind, but I had to wonder about his compassion. Still the excitement and happiness with the company he had attracted tonight swept everyone.” Eugene Istomin observes: “I had never met a President before and was practically paralyzed with awe, but he was so likable. He looked at everyone so inquiringly, as if he really wanted to know what you thought. Sometime during our conversation, [Leonard] Bernstein said, of some policy matter Kennedy was considering, ‘Your problem is you don’t see the forest from the trees,’ and I saw Kennedy’s eyelids come down like the slamming of a gate.”

George Herman, the broadcast correspondent, remembers Kennedy “abandoned Mme Malraux once dinner was over, absolutely refusing to speak French to her,” presumably because he knew so little. “After dinner, there was a concert,” writes Edmund Wilson. “Schubert’s Trio in B Flat Major. The violinist was Isaac Stern. I had never heard it before—it was lovely, but I did not feel much like listening to music. Malraux, it seems, went to sleep. Marian Schlesinger said afterwards that he had had a little too much to drink; but I don’t think this was necessarily true.” Thornton Wilder remembers: “Stern-Rose-Istomin played the Schubert E-flat [sic] superbly but the audience, excited by all that glamour and a little tight, did not behave as it should…I sat next to Mrs. Sam Behrman—a lovely person she is—who is Jascha Heifetz’s sister. We listened.” “Three wines, champagne, Stern and Istomin playing a long Schubert trio,” remembers Robert Lowell.

From Saul Bellow’s vantage, “Even the drunks were well behaved, though at the end of the evening the Schubert trio seemed to be getting them and some were tapping the time on their neighbors’ knees.” Others were uncomfortable. Anne Lindbergh writes: “After supper…we went into the ballroom to listen to the concert. I found CAL, who was much disturbed by the numbers of press around and would not sit in the front rows as we were intended. We sat in the back rows and the music was heavenly, but I was concerned about C. and not entirely at ease.”

No encore followed. The President stands and thanks Isaac Stern and “those who accompanied them.” When George Herman asks Eugene Istomin if he felt slighted, Istomin says it was so wonderful just being there that the details didn’t matter. Stern remembers: “At the conclusion of the performance, when people were applauding, Kennedy rose, as was his custom, and said, ‘I want to thank Isaac Stern and his two accompanists.’ That didn’t go over too well with Lennie [Rose] and Eugene, and I wanted to sink through the floor.”

President Kennedy didn’t enjoy after-dinner concerts and he was apt to mistake the pause between movements as the end of the concert, when he “dashed up on the stage to congratulate the musician. Each time, the artist whispered—although the entire room heard it—‘But Mr President, the concert isn’t over.'” Letitia Baldrige continues:

We worked out an elaborate code system for the Malraux dinner concert: One of our military social aides, on loan from the Pentagon, was a music expert. I asked him to stand next to me, and when the concert was over, he cued me, I waggled my finger at the President through a slightly open French door close to him, and he jumped up to congratulate the artists, with Mrs. Kennedy trailing behind….The concert ended at about eleven-thirty and…[t]he Kennedys walked out of the East Room, expecting their guests to follow, but found themselves halfway down the hall with nary a guest in sight. White House aides urged the shy party forward, but no one wanted to make the first move. Finally a few brave souls ventured out and the rest followed.

This evening is not without the business of managing the economy. David Rockefeller, as president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, remembers: “During the reception the President took me aside for a brief conversation on the state of the U.S. economy. As we parted, he asked me to set down my ideas in writing, which I proceeded to do. The President then responded with a letter to me. Although there were obvious points of disagreement, both of us agreed a tax cut would help get the sluggish economy moving again. Henry Luce asked to see the letters and found them so intriguing that he published them side by side in Life magazine in July 1962.” (This interchange follows hard on the heels of the April 1962 steel crisis where Kennedy jawboned industry executives to rescind their price increases.) “So far as I know there have been no letters about the state of American culture,” gripes Saul Bellow.

American politics is nothing if not the personal on the public stage, and Rockefeller’s opening remarks in the Life interchange are little different. “Two weeks ago you were kind enough to suggest that I write you a personal and confidential letter concerning my views on the balance of payments problem confronting our country,” David Rockefeller begins. He then moves to the point: “Certainly one of the most critical tasks confronting you, as chief executive of our nation, is to cut down the persistent drain through military expenditures abroad, without doing damage to our essential military posture.” Even on an evening like this, the problem is defense.

Kennedy’s reply strikes a theme that he has worked out in discussions with Malraux and others—namely, the nation as a state can manage its way through economic difficulties. “I have said many times that we must meet this [balance of payments] problem with positive solutions,” the President writes to Rockefeller. Earlier, the President invites Malraux to luncheon, and

as Kennedy later described it [records Arthur Schlesinger], they fell into a discussion of the persistence of mythology in the contemporary world. “In the nineteenth century,” Malraux said, “the ostensible issue within the European states was the monarchy vs. the republic. But the real issue was capitalism vs. the proletariat. But the world has moved on. What is the real issue now?” The real issue today, Kennedy replied, was the management of industrial society—a problem, he said, not of ideology but of administration.

“This conversation, held through interpreters (Kennedy spoke little French), was quite vague,” in the view of Chip Bohlen, who also was at the luncheon. Schlesinger continues,

This conversation remained in [Kennedy’s] mind. A few days later, when he spoke to the White House conference on national economic issues, the “difference between myth and reality” provided the theme for his remarks. The old debates of FDR and [Woodrow] Wilson and [William Jennings] Bryan, the President observed, were increasingly irrelevant to the complex technical decisions of modern society…”[T]he fact of the matter is that most of the problems, or at least many of them, that we now face are technical problems, are administrative problems. They are very sophisticated judgments which do not lend themselves to the great sort of “passionate movements” which have stirred the country so often in the past…”

The President spells out these themes in more detail a little later in his 1962 commencement address at Yale:

[The central issues of our time] relate not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology but to ways and means of reaching common goals….What is at stake is not some grand warfare of rival ideologies which will sweep the country with passion but the practical management of modern economy. What we need is not labels and clichés but more basic discussion of the sophisticated and technical issues involved in keeping a great economic machinery moving ahead.

Bohlen remembers the President in his discussion with Malraux “maintaining that in twenty or thirty years political problems would begin to fade away as economic prosperity grew.” Other discussions seem less weighty. Mrs. Kennedy remembered one private discussion involving Malraux and President Kennedy in these terms: “Malraux would talk brilliantly, and so would Jack, and [McGeorge] Bundy would always be there. So, you know, it was a wonderful exchange, but Malraux sort of off in a marvelous fog or—It was very interesting and they never you know, really got into policy or all that…”

Policy writ large worries others at the dinner. “If Mr. Wilson is right about the American empire,” writes Saul Bellow of that evening, “we must think the whole thing through clearly….A better understanding between writers and the imperial state has its dangers. I can foresee a bureaucratic situation, partly created by men of letters, in which the very call girls (who owe so many of their privileges to the Federal tax structure) may be required to pass Civil Service examinations administered by poets!”

The day after the dinner, Edmund Wilson and André Malraux meet for lunch. During their conversation, Malraux

expounded the difference between being an intellectual and being un homme politique. He had thought once that society would run all right if Marxists could be in control (I doubt whether he had really thought this); but to be actually in practical politics was something completely different, the problems and means of dealing with them were something altogether different. The intellectuals sometimes did a lot of harm through not understanding this.

Yet Wilson feels compelled to conclude that Malraux “sounded impressive without making much sense. He has, in fact, become a master of double-talk.”

At a French embassy party several nights later, Mme Malraux sits next to Arthur Schlesinger and tells him her husband was a great admirer of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind. As for Ethel Kennedy’s get-together for Malraux, it turns into farce:

Ethel’s party, later in the week, also a black-tie, long-dress affair, was outdoors. Ethel’s guests always faced the same hurdles in the hall—a variety of animals. Malraux was no exception. He stumbled over two dogs, one a huge Newfoundland that was easily mistaken for a rug.

It began raining in the middle of the dinner, a heavy rain difficult to ignore. Astronaut John Glenn found the back legs of his chair sinking into the lawn and Ethel assigned someone to stand behind his chair to keep it upright. The more it rained, the more Ethel laughed about it. Malraux insisted he had “a perfectly grand time,” and told the story for years afterwards.

Back again to the White House dinner, August Heckscher, who was the Kennedy’s consultant on the arts, remembers the President engaging Heckscher’s wife in a short conversation as they are leaving that evening. She mentions to Kennedy that she had a chance to talk to Malraux. Kennedy then points his finger at her and says mock seriously that he wanted all the details. The Kennedys are such “magnificent people, very friendly, very warm,” recalls another guest. “When we said good-bye to the Kennedys,” Edmund Wilson notes, “[Kennedy] said something again about my not wanting to tell him about my [Patriotic Gore]: ‘I suppose I’ll have to buy it.’ ‘I’m afraid so.'” The Wilsons and others leave, though some, like Stern, Istomin and Bernstein, stay on talking to Kennedy in his private quarters. “We joined him for a last drink,” remembers Stern,” and he was charming. By that time, he realized he had made a gaffe [over treating Istomin and Rose as accompanists], and he was especially gracious to Eugene and Lennie.”

The Kennedys also had a long talk alone with the Lindberghs. Anne Morrow Lindbergh recalls: “After the concert, people began to leave and we found ourselves being ushered upstairs to the same private salon, where about the same group were gathered as before supper—chiefly the French set. C. and I talked to the French Ambassador but nothing very real was said. And rather quickly, goodbyes were being said again. We said goodbye tactfully and went to our rooms though apparently Isaac Stern went on playing the violin until late at night. I wished we had stayed up.” After saying good-night to the Lindberghs, Mrs. Kennedy whispered to her social secretary, “You know, these are the moments of history I will really remember the rest of my life.”

The “guests drifted into Washington’s midnight while around them the great White House fountains shot prisms of lighted water into the darkness,” wrote TIME. “For the New Society, it had been another marvelous evening.”

***

Should it need saying, the above sequence of recollections is my composite among many possible combinations. But what images does my mosaic leave? What might we now know that we didn’t before about state politics, or for that matter, “managing the economy”?

A few days after the dinner, Anne Morrow Lindbergh wrote a thank-you letter to Mrs. Kennedy,

It was an extraordinarily beautiful and stimulating occasion, which is not surprising. All parties—even big parties—I believe in some measure reflect the spirit of the people at their center. From this core radiates the beauty, vividness and good feeling which spread to the guests. That such an atmosphere was created, at such a party at the highest point of our government and in a formal and dignified setting, is a great tribute to you both and an inspiration to the people who were privileged to be witnesses.

As with so much in U.S. political culture, what is fresh astonishment, including the Malraux dinner, has a short half-life. Disappointment with the Kennedys was never far away, thanks in part to the likes of those at the dinner. Before long, the only thing unique about the Malraux dinner was its date.

Yet that falls very short of a point to be made here. I tried to find all the first-hand reports and personal recollections I could on the Malraux dinner (over several decades I also contacted a few living attendees left). That was to be my policy palimpsest—those scraps of conversation, over-heard remarks, and contemporary news reports—most if not all unfamiliar to the reader. My aim, as said at the outset, was to see this event—and in turn something of politics (also culture politics)—afresh in their complexity. I found I could only do that by seeing the evening in the present tense.

So what?

“Managing the economy” sounds so 20th century, but isn’t. What sociologist, Daniel Bell termed long ago, “the end of ideology,” is promised all the time, if not by administration and management, then through markets and technology. Yet a self-organizing economy is about as realistic as a self-organizing reception line of public intellectuals at the White House. Management depends on who has been let in and what those around the table are being distracted by, in a real time experienced then.

To see things afresh and in the present tense isn’t a faux innocence. It is to walk toward understanding that that some of the best parts of high politics is when it is distracted by low politics, that keeping the high and low contingencies together is the itinerant work of real time and about as far from trivializing the present as we can get.

Such is why the most significant episode of that evening, the one that I ask you to take as the exemplar for what this blog is all about, is the interchange between the country’s leading politician, John F. Kennedy, and the country’s leading literary critic, Edmund Wilson, over Patriotic Gore. It is perfectly legitimate for a policymaker to want a precis of the issue and what it offers; it is perfectly understandable for any type of advisor to say it’s more complex than a precis can indicate.

Principal sources:

Cindy Adams (1980), Lee Strasberg: The Imperfect Genius of the Actors Studio, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York.

Nicole Alphand (1976), “Escorting the Mona Lisa,” (Translator, Robert Speaight), in Malraux: Life and Work (Editor, Martine de Courcel), Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.

Letitia Baldrige (1998), The Kennedy Style: Magical Evenings in the Kennedy White House, Doubleday, New York.

Saul Bellow (1962), “White House and Artists,” The Noble Savage 5, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland.

M. Beschloss (2011), Jacqueline Kennedy: Historic Conversations on Life with John F. Kennedy—Interviews with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 1964. Hyperion: New York, NY.

Charles E. Bohlen (1973), Witness to History, 1929-1969, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.

Ben Bradlee (1995), A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures, Simon & Schuster, New York.

Shaun Considine (1994), Mad as Hell: The Life and Work of Paddy Chayefsky, Random House, New York.

John H. Davis (1984), The Kennedys: Dynasty and Disaster, 1848-1983, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.

Carol Easton (1996), No Intermissions: The Life of Agnes de Mille, Little, Brown and Company, Boston.

Ian Hamilton (1982), Robert Lowell: A Biography, Random House, New York.

Gilbert A. Harrison (1983), The Enthusiast: A Life of Thornton Wilder, Ticknor & Fields, New Haven.

Dorothy Herrmann (1993), Anne Morrow Lindbergh: A Gift of Life, Ticknor & Fields, New York.

Carolyn Kennedy and Michael Beschloss (2011), Jacqueline Kennedy: Historic Conversations on Life with John F. Kennedy—Interviews with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 1964, Hyperion: New York

John F. Kennedy (1962), “Editorials: A Businessman’s Letter to J.F.K. and His Reply,” Life, Vol. 53, No. 1, July 6.

John F. Kennedy Library files and webpages on the Malraux dinner, Boston, MA.

Evelyn Lincoln (1965), My Twelve Years with John F. Kennedy, David McKay Company, New York.

Anne Morrow Lindbergh (2012), Against Wind and Tide: Letters and Journals, 1947-1986. Pantheon Books: New York, NY.

Dwight Macdonald (1974), “A Day at the White House,” in Discriminations: Essays & Afterthoughts 1938-1974, Grossman Publishers, New York.

Paul Mariani (1994), Lost Puritan: A Life of Robert Lowell, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.

Ralph G. Martin (1983), A Hero for Our Time: An Intimate Story of the Kennedy Years, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York.

Jeffrey Meyers (1995), Edmund Wilson: A Biography, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.

Arthur Miller (1987), Timebends: A Life, Harper & Row Publishers, New York.

Leonard Mosley (1976), Lindbergh: A Biography, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York.

Newsweek (1962), Vol. LIX, No. 21, May 21.

Personal communications with: August Heckscher; George Herman; Elspeth Rostow; Raymond Sanders; Arthur Schelsinger, Jr.; and Shelley Winters;

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (1971), Adam by Adam, The Dial Press, New York.

David Rockefeller (1962), “Editorials: A Businessman’s Letter to J.F.K. and His Reply,” Life, Vol. 53, No. 1, July 6.

———————– (2002),  Memoirs. Random House: New York, NY.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1965), A Thousand Days, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.

Meryle Secrest (1994), Leonard Bernstein: A Life, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.

Lee Seldes (1978), The Legacy of Mark Rothko, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York.

Michael Shnayerson (1989), Irwin Shaw: A Biography, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York.

Isaac Stern with Chaim Potok (1999), My First 79 Years, Alfred A. Knopf, New York

Susan Strasberg (1980), Bittersweet, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York.

TIME (1962), Vol. LXXIX, No. 20, May 18.

Gore Vidal (1995), Palimpsest: A Memoir, Penguin Books, New York.

Austin Wehrwein (1962), “‘Dilettante’ Approach to Art and Culture is Laid to White House,” The New York Times, May 14.

White House, Office of the White House Secretary (1962), “Toasts of the President and Andre Malraux, Minister of State for Cultural Affairs of the Republic of France at the Dinner in the State Dining Room and the Blue Room,” May 11.

Thornton Wilder (2008), The Selected Letters of Thornton Wilder, edited by Robin G. Wilder and Jackson R. Bryer, HarpersCollinsPublishers, New York.

Tennessee Williams (1977), Memoirs, W.H. Allen, London.

Edmund Wilson (1993), The Sixties: The Last Journal, 1960-1972 (Editor, Lewis M. Dabney), Farrar Straus Giroux, New York.

The next Constitutional Convention (longer read)

Summary

When I argue for a new Constitutional Convention and the break-up of the United States, I’m still met with disbelief. All manner of, well, insurmountable legal difficulties are referenced. More express the dread: To talk about breaking up the country opens the Pandora Box of horrible knowns and the horribly unknown; we already tried that and look how the US Civil War ended; how could a professional, such as myself, even think this….

My entry point here centers around an exchange of letters between critic, Edmund Wilson, and novelist, John Dos Passos, during the first half of the 1930s. Their interchange focused on the need for radical structural change in the US government and the Constitution. One of Edmund Wilson’s biographers calls the Wilson/Dos Passos correspondence “in its scope and dramatic interest second in American letters only to that of Jefferson and John Adams”. The picture I seek to recast with this interchange from the Republic of Letters is the entrenched institution of this US republic and its fifty states.

It is true this proposal for a new Constitutional Convention fails to consult those experts in constitutional law, economics, and political science. My point is that other minds, like Wilson and Dos Passos, were ignored in considering the case for new constitutional arrangements and the country’s break-up.

The interchange

The correspondence was provoked by Edmund Wilson’s 1931 Appeal to Progressives in the New Republic [NR], parts of which read:

Not only are the people in a capitalist society very often completely ignorant as to what their incomes come from; it is actually sometimes impossible or very difficult for them to find this out. And as long as a fair proportion of the bankers, the manufacturers, the middle men, the merchants and the workers whom their capital and machines keep busy are able to make a little more money than before, no matter how unscrupulously or short-sightedly, we are able, as a nation, to maintain our belief in our prosperity and even in our happiness….

Our society has finally produced in its specialized professional politicians one of the most useless and obnoxious groups which has perhaps ever disgraced human history—a group that seems unique among governing classes in having managed to be corrupt, uncultivated and incompetent all at once….

Outdated? Hardly, when the bankers have metastasized into global finance, when our public utilities have been sold off to corporate risk-takers, and when the best news we have is that the rich like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, wearying of empire, try to make good in the happy-talk of philanthropy what we once demanded and expected of government.

Edmund Wilson’s proposal? “It may be that the whole money-making and -spending psychology has definitely played itself out, and that the Americans would be willing, for the first time now, to put their traditional idealism and their genius for organization behind a radical social experiment.”

Whoa! We’ve tried those Big Experiments! What more do we need than the intervening decades to convince us that the more radical the social experiment, the deadlier the bolt-hole utopia realized?

Wilson’s point still holds, though: “[W]ith the kind of administrations that the country has lately been getting, do not all our progressive proposals, however reasonable or modest, seem utopian?”

Yet it’s easier to dismiss a massive social experiment than it is to ignore the more massive laboratory of modern life created for ourselves. (If utopias fail and if utopia and failure go together, when then does recovery from failed utopianism end and a new normal begin? Answer: There is no normal, when this very big laboratory can’t tell the difference between the experiment and recovery.)

But what then to do in today’s laboratory? Stay with Edmund Wilson and his then-friend, John Dos Passos, and their interchange over the NR manifesto and its follow-on. Dos Passos’s response to the publications, his increasing disillusionment with the machinations of left politics in the early 1930s, and the disagreements between Dos Passos and Wilson help identify a direction for us.

From the Republic of Letters

“Just read your battlecry,” Dos Passos writes a few weeks after Wilson’s 1931 piece appears,

Of course all the [New Republic] can do is stir things up and try to smoke out a few honest men who do know something about industrial life as she is lived…If you can keep up a series like this you really will have started something—though I’m beginning to think that every publication ought to be required by law to print at the bottom of each page:

NB. THIS IS BULLSHIT

. . . .[T]he trouble with all our political economic writing and the reason maybe why it doesnt interest the ordinary guy who hasn’t joined the fraternity of word-addicts is that it is made up right in the office and springs from neither experience nor observation…

True enough, and Wilson eventually circulates a more urgent manifesto. “The present crisis of the world—and specifically the United States—is something more than a mere crisis of politics or economics; and it will not pass with the depression. It is crisis of human culture. What faces us today is the imperative need for new social forms, new values, a new human order.”

What is needed, Wilson feels, has moved beyond experiment to revolution. “Sure I’ll subscribe to it,” Dos Passos writes Wilson in reply to the new battle cry,

—but I don’t think it’ll cause any bankers to jump out of fiftieth story windows—what are you going to do with it?—post it up on billboards? it might go well on toilet paper like [ laxative] advertizing—or is it going to be laid on [President] Hoover’s breakfast table?….Where is it going to be used—?

Wilson ends up forwarding material to Dos Passos from another periodical, New Masses, and Dos Passos writes back in March 1934,

I think it’s very important not to add to this mass of inept rubbish on this subject—what is happening is that the whole Marxian radical movement is in a moment of intense disintegration—all people like us, who have no taste for political leadership or chewing the rag, can do, is to sit on the sidelines and try to put a word in now and then for the underdog or for the cooperative commonwealth or whatever….

The only alternative is passionate unmarxian revival of AngloSaxon democracy or an industrial crisis helped by a collapse in the director’s offices—That would be different from nazi socialism only in this way: that it would be a reaction towards old time Fourth of July democracy….How you can coordinate Fourth of July democracy with the present industrial-financial setup I dont see.

Late 1934, Dos Passos writes to Wilson about recent events in the Soviet Union, including the murder of Stalin’s intelligence chief,

This business about Kirov looks very very bad to me. In fact it has completely destroyed my benefit-of-the-doubt attitude towards the Stalinists—It seems to be another convolution of the self-destructive tendency that began with the Trotski-Stalin row. From now on events in Russian have no more interest—except as a terrible example—for world socialism—if you take socialism to mean the educative or constructive tendency rather than politics. The thing has gone into its Napoleonic stage and the progressive tendencies in the Soviet Government have definitely gone under before the self-protective tendencies….Meanwhile I think we should be very careful not to damage any latent spores of democracy that there still may be in the local American soil.

These remarks provoke Wilson to respond in early January 1935:

…I don’t think you ought to say, as you do, that a country which is still trying to put socialism into practice has ceased to be politically interesting…One doesn’t want to give aid and comfort to people who have hopped on the shootings in Russia as a means of discrediting socialism. Aside from this, you are right, of course, in saying that Americans who are in favor of socialism oughtn’t to try to import the methods of the Russians….

Dos Passos fires back,

[N]o government is in good shape that has to keep on massacring its people. Suppose, when that curious little [Italian] Zangara took a potshot a Franklin D. [Roosevelt], the U.S. Secret Service had massacred a hundred miscellaneous people, some because they were [Italians], others because they were anarchists and others because they had stomach trouble, what would all us reds be saying…What’s the use of losing your “chains” if you get a firing squad instead…Some entirely new attack on the problem of human freedom under monopolized industry has to be worked out—if the coming period of wars and dictatorships give anybody a chance to work anything out….

About Russia I should have said not politically useful rather than politically interesting….By Anglo Saxon Institutions I mean the almost obliterated traditions of trial by jury common law etc—they don’t count for much all the time but they do constitute a habit more or less implanted in Western Europeans outside of Russians….

Intellectual theories and hypotheses dont have to be a success, but political parties do—and I cant see any reason for giving the impression of trying to induce others to engage in forlorn hopes one wouldn’t go in for oneself.

“Don’t agitate me, comrade, I’m with you,” Wilson countered at the end of that January,

Surely it’s entirely unnecessary to worry about the possibility of a Stalin regime in America. I can’t imagine an American Stalin. You talk as if there were a real choice between Henry Ford on the one hand and [American Communists] on the other; but who outside the Communists themselves has ever seriously entertained the idea that these individuals would every lead a national movement?

“But” responds Dos Passos in February 1935,

it’s not the possibility of Stalinism in the U.S. that’s worrying me, it’s the fact that the Stalinist [Communist Party] seems doomed to fail and to bring down with it all the humanitarian tendencies I personally believe in—all the while acting as a mould on which its obverse the fascist mentality is made—and this recent massacre is certainly a sign of Stalinism’s weakness and not of its strength. None of that has anything to do with Marx’s work—but it certainly does influence one’s attitude towards a given political party. I’ve felt all along that the Communists were valuable as agitators as the abolitionist were before the Civil War—but now I ‘m not so happy about it.

Dos Passos then shifts his letter to a point Wilson had made to the effect that Marx belonged to a group of romantics that “came out of a world (before 1848) that was less sick, had much more spirit.” “By the way,” Dos Passos continues,

I don’t agree with you that a hundred years ago was a better time than now—they had a great advantage that everything was technically less cluttered and simpler—but dont you think perhaps in every time the landscape seems somewhat obstructed by human lice for those who view it? We have more information to go on, more technical ability to carry ideas out and ought to produce a whale of a lot of stuff—if I was a European I wouldn’t think so, but here we still have a margin to operate on—

Later that February Wilson writes Dos Passos another letter, the parting shot of which is its own “By the way,”

it is being rumored that you are “rubbing your belly” and saying that “the good old Republican party is good enough for you.” Maybe you ought to make a statement of your present position.

…which Dos Passos does. The month after, he writes Wilson,

I finally consented, against my better judgement, to put my name down on the [leftist] Writers Congress roster. I’m going to try to write them a little preachment about liberty of conscience or freedom of inwit or something of the sort that I hope will queer me with the world savers so thoroughly that they’ll leave me alone for a while. I frankly cant see anything in this middleclass communism of the literati but a racket….People haven’t any right to make a living out of politics—It’s selling stock in a corpse-factory.

“It’s selling stock in a corpse-factory.” “Some entirely new attack on the problem of human freedom under monopolized industry has to be worked out.” “Intellectual theories and hypotheses dont have to be a success, but political parties do.” “How you can coordinate Fourth of July democracy with the present industrial-financial setup I dont see.” That said, at least here in the US, according to Dos Passos, “we still have margin to operate on”.

What margin do we have today?

My proposal

In reply, start with the margin that the framers of the US Constitution saw fit to endorse in Article 5—a new constitutional convention. Oh no, no that won’t work, you say. How would most of our state legislatures or Congressmembers ever agree to hold a Constitutional Convention?

Answer: We hold it for them. We don’t wait. We start our own constitutional convention.

The idea here is this: We have 465 congressional districts, and 465 delegates to a Peoples’ Constitutional Convention sounds about right. Anyone on the voter rolls or adult able to show district residency would be eligible to vote and any voter from the district could run as a convention delegate. Party affiliation or endorsement would, of course, not be required. The candidate with the greatest vote plurality would be the district’s delegate. The cost of this nationwide election and delegate process would be, say, US$1-2 per person, or some $600 million, with another $50 million to hold the actual convention. The US government won’t finance this, and corporate funding would for obvious reasons be ruled out. One can imagine a consortium of individuals, foundations and overseas governments willing to defray what we can’t pay ourselves. (To put these numbers in some kind of perspective, Forbes estimated in 2017 that the net worth of author and large charity giver, J.K. Rowling, was roughly $650 million.)

The charge of the Peoples’ Constitutional Convention: To redraft the US Constitution through a series of amendments.

What a waste of time and money, you interject, since the real government—the states and feds—would just ignore the work of any Peoples’ Constitutional Convention.

Let them. Let them say the peoples’ mandate is illegitimate. Let them ignore a convention that represents no government, no court, no army, and none of the techno-managerial elites, just those elected to come together to hold our government, our courts, our military, and our techno-managerial elites to account. Let them ignore the Peoples’ Constitutional Convention and if they do, we’ll hold a different-premised one, and if that also does not work, we’ll go global and elect a World Parliament and then let them ignore that too. (As some readers may have realized I am adapting and paraphrasing George Monbiot’s proposal in The Age of Consent.)

But Americans could never, never, never support something as utopian—so Fourth of July democracy—as that!

Which takes us back to Edmund Wilson. Late in his life, he published a slim volume, The Cold War and The Income Tax. Pursued by the US Internal Revenue Service for non-payment of taxes and appalled at what his federal tax dollars were going to once paid—namely, the interdigitated grip of war and commerce—Wilson only could muster mordant wit in a way that the early 1930s’ Dos Passos would have appreciated:

I have always thought myself patriotic and have been in the habit in the past of favorably contrasting the United States with Europe and the Soviet Union; but our country has become today a huge blundering power controlled more and more by bureaucracies whose rule is making it more and more difficult to carry on the tradition of American individualism; and since I can accept neither this power unit’s aims nor the methods it employs to finance them, I have finally come to feel that this country, whether or not I continue to live in it, is no longer any place for me….

How to get rid of this huge growth, which is no longer a private organization, like one of Theodore Roosevelt’s old trust that could be busted, that is not even a thriving corporation protected by a business administration but an excrescence of government itself which officially drains our resources and which stupidly and insolently threatens our lives?…But now that things have gone so far, is there any chance, short of catastrophe, of dismembering and reassembling this image and constructing a nobler one that answers better to what we pretend to?

Wilson was right, as was Dos Passos before him, and their questions still hold. It’s long past time for 4th of July democracy to get constitutional. But instead of stopping here, push our thought experiment further.

If corporations are more like fictive people, real people need to become more like fictive corporations. That is, really-existing people with really-existing problems need to organize and destroy corporations claiming to be their equal. Assume the Peoples’ Constitutional Convention, its delegates having met, resolves that the country should break up.

The break-up

Just hold on buddy! Stop right there. Break up the country? No, no, and again no: absolutely not. After all, our current Constitution is a living document. . .

NB. THAT’S BULLSHIT

I do not see how anyone can pretend that the Constitution we now have is a living organism, able to evolve into the reliability mandates we demand of it. “You would have to be an idiot to believe that,” said Justice Scalia, who to my mind was right on this point. When it comes to the legal document that I can vote for with my feet, I want privacy rights guaranteed constitutionally and, puh-leese, none of that bald canard about corporations being fictive, immortal individuals.

Yes, of course, we all must avoid a replay of the mass migration and slaughter that followed the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan. As a sign of willingness to compromise, I for one am quite willing to let the wee boys keep beltway Reaganland and its airport; if they want Bozo the Prez as their own, let them; I really don’t care whether the schismatics call another breakaway, Prophetland or Profitland. As for Mexifornia, it’s ok by me. If any one of new entities wants to keep parallel wording of the present Constitution, so be it.

Then what? “It is hard to imagine [this] happening without a certain amount of civil war,” Edmund Wilson admitted, and the last time we tried that…well, need we say more?

Yes we do need to say more, and now is the time to say it. Now as then, the priority is to fund and run any new government with all ingenuity available, and not just in drafting new policies but also in doing things differently.

If our Civil War over southern separatism is a guide to the coming break-up, most state constitutions will remain in place as governing documents, while any interstate confederation would most probably be modeled on parts of the current US Constitution—though with the significant changes. Constitution-making in the Confederacy witnessed not just further entrenchment of unconscionable chattel slavery, but also the first Department of Justice, a national citizenship requirement for voting, no functioning supreme court, a six-year term limit for president, civil service reform, strictures against protective tariffs, a district court structure, disavowal of the Monroe Doctrine, and provisions for a presidential item veto, executive budget, and no recess appointments. How else are we to get a parallel version of this range of changes without breaking up the country?

(And those appalled by any appeal to the Confederacy might want to remember that four states—Vermont, Texas, California and Hawaii—opted to give up their sovereignty to join the Union–so why is the reverse out of the question?)

Be that as it may, when the-now US breaks up, a cadre of professionals will be needed who keep the government services operating under the new conditions. The immediate decline in security and economic growth that comes with the break-up means priority would have to be to keeping the control rooms of our critical infrastructures in hospitals, energy, water, telecommunications, transportation, and public safety operating as reliably as possible. These systems frequently cross current state borders, and the challenge will be to continue inter-regional collaboration for their operation until alternatives—if needed—are devised.

I can think of no more important a task than that the delegates at the Peoples’ Constitution Convention grapple with and address the logistics involved and ingenuity required in keeping critical services provided in a reliable fashion, doubtless as messy as it will be, as the nation undergoes the Great Scission into differing constitutional arrangements. Even today’s reliability professionals like those needed when the US breaks up are presently imagining the unimaginable, thinking the unthinkable, and balancing imponderables all over the place and in real time.

Yes, there is no room for complacency here. But the next constitutional convention everywhere an unthinkably bad mess? Everywhere then the drip-drip-drip of calamities-on-tap? This unimaginably worst mess is just another carking conceit of decline-and-fall (decline-and-stall).

Principal sources:

The letters are in: Edmund Wilson (1977), Letters on Literature and Politics, 1912-1972, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, NY and John Dos Passos (1973) The Fourteenth Chronicle: Letters and Diaries of John Dos Passos, Gambit, Inc., Boston, MA. I’ve followed their spelling and grammar throughout, while editing in one case still-offensive ethnic expletives.

Four other key sources are: (1) L. Dabney (2005), Edmund Wilson: A Life in Literature, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, NY; (2) G. Monbiot (2003), The Age of Consent, Flamingo, London: Chapter 4; (3) E. Wilson (1963), The Cold War and the Income Tax: A Protest, Farrar, Straus and Company, New York, NY; and J. Israel (2017), The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-1848, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford, Chapter 3.

My Confederacy cites are from: (1) W.B. Yearns (1960), The Confederate Congress, University of Georgia Press: Athens, GA; R. Bensel (1990), Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK: Chapter 3; P. Van Riper and H. Scheiber (1959), “The Confederate Civil Service,” The Journal of Southern History, 25(4): 448-470; C.R. Lee (1963), The Confederate Constitutions, Greenwood Press Publishers: Westport, CN; and E. Thomas (1979), The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865, Harper & Row: New York, NY.

Major Read: Ammons and regulation (updated)

The proposition I write to support is: “When having less knowledge is key to knowing more.” I want to demonstrate how tomorrow we might get all manner of official regulations right—when today we rethink “regulation” as a category of knowledge. In arguing so, I appeal to the poetry of A.R. Ammons.

Ammons, a great American poet of the last half of the 20th century, was tenacious in returning again and again to a set of topics he felt he hadn’t gotten quite right. One of the subjects was how knowing less entails “knowing” more. It’s his analytic sensibility in persistent revisiting a topic from tangents affording different insight and nuance that I rely on as an optic to parse my own topic of government regulation.

Policy types typically fasten to knowledge as a Good Thing in the sense that, on net, more information is better in a world where information is power. Over an array of accounts—and his tenacity meant he wrote a great deal—Ammons insists that the less information I have, the better off I am—not all the time, but when so, then importantly so. (To be clear and telegraph ahead, he is not talking about “ignorance is bliss.”)

For those working in policy and management—and I include myself—how could “the less we know, the more we gain” be the case and what would that mean when it comes to the heavy machinery called official regulation? Is there something here about the value of foregrounding inexperience—having less “knowledge”—as a way of adding purchase to rethinking difficult issues, in this case, regulation?

***

Start by dispensing with popular meanings of “the less I know, the more I know.” It is easily reversed to “the more I know, the less I really know.” This is the conventional wisdom that “data and information” are not knowledge—in fact the opposite. I also do not pursue another sense of “the less I know, the more I know” that Ammons foregrounds from time to time: the hiving off what we thought we knew creates the stuff from which new knowledge is formed. It is my failing—not Ammons’s—that I cannot see how “from-ruins-and-waste-come-something-altogether-better” applies to the 70,000+ paged IRS code and other volumes of government regulations.

My focus instead is on a very difficult set of insights in some of his poems. Let’s jump into the hard part—Ammons’s poem, “Offset,” in its entirety:

Losing information he
rose gaining
view
till at total
loss gain was
extreme:
extreme & invisible:
the eye
seeing nothing
lost its
separation:
self-song
(that is a mere motion)
fanned out
into failing swirls
slowed &
became continuum.
(TCP1, 418)

Please reread the poem once more.

Part of what Ammons seems to be saying is that by losing information—the bits and pieces that make up “you”—you gain by becoming whole and continuous. As it were, “loss gain” becomes a single term. You cease to be separate, your bits and pieces slow down, fan out, spread into a vital one. We empty our minds so as to attend to what matters—emptying the eye to have the I. An obvious example others have noted: If obsessive thoughts, compulsive behaviors, and restraining inhibitions are, in their own ways, altogether absorbing forms of self-knowledge, then this is knowledge we need not to know in order to have more to know better.

How, though, is this different from ignorance is bliss or, less pejoratively, seeking to know only what you need to know? Part of Ammons’s answer appears to be getting to the point where you know enough to be naïve again, to be open to the wonder of it all, to give yourself up to the kind of attention that is, if you will, self-reabsorbing. To telegraph ahead once again, naïveté does not center around knowing and not-knowing for Ammons: There’s feeling and living, wishing and dreaming, desire and more, and such are different kinds of “knowing,” as if thinking feels and feeling thinks.

Naïveté here is the adult version of child-like, decidedly not the childish that gutters out early. It is positive, because adult wonder and curiosity are the space for noticing and being alert to more—an orientation that gains from the loss of information. Compare this, however, to what is expected of government regulators: Whatever happens, they must not be uninformed or naïve—in a word, inexperienced—and when they are, shame on them.

The ways in which this wonder and inexperience do matter for regulation means staying with Ammons a bit longer. For him, staying uninformed and open to new experiences is the hard work of an affirming study:

….my empty-headed

contemplation is still where the ideas of permanence
and transience fuse in a single body, ice, for example,
or a leaf: green pushes white up the slope: a maple
leaf gets the wobbles in a light wind and comes loose

half-ready: where what has always happened and what
has never happened before seem for an instant reconciled:
that takes up most of my time and keeps me uninformed:
(TCP1, 497-498)

Being empty-headed is part of knowing enough: having to know less so as to be ready for whatever the next experience you proved to have been half-ready for in hindsight. It’s as if Ammons is asking us to be smart enough to see it’s more than about a knowing doubt and a knowing certainty.

Living is the space for feeling, which is where “knowing,” writ large, belongs: “how can I know I/am not/trying to know my way into feeling/as//feeling/tries to feel its way into knowing,” he asks in “Pray Without Ceasing” (TCP1, 779). This notion of a half-readiness open to new experience and the wonder awaiting is nicely caught in the ending lines of one of my favorites, “Cascadilla Falls”:

Oh
I do
not know where I am going
that I can live my life
by this single creek.
(TCP1, 426)

By the time you surge to those lines, there is so much feeling in that “Oh” you might miss how living takes place beyond not-knowing.” Or better, the line break of “do/not know” intimates that the doing of “not know” is a good part of living that life.

***

Regulation from this viewpoint is never a case of regulators starting with knowledge and assuming what matters for living resides elsewhere. Regulation isn’t about expunging naïveté as inexperience but—in ways not yet clear—cultivating it. What is clear is the starting point, however: Wonder is not dread; naïveté is not ignorance; and no-longer-knowing is not not-knowing.

In this way, Ammons makes a frontal attack on what policy types hold very dear: the notion of usefulness. In his essay, “A poem is a walk,” Ammons defers to a paradox: “Only uselessness is empty enough for the presence of so many uses”. Only uselessness is a sufficiently capacious category to embrace all the uses that come and go with experience and ensuring space for more feeling and living.

What could better capture all the many uses as they shift to the wayside than uselessness, “an emptiness/that is plenitude” (TCP1, 503)? Less and less information, against this backdrop, empties us and thereby makes us—leaves us open—differently. It is, in Ammons’s wonderful turn of phrase, to be “emptied full” (TCP2, 4). To seek more and more knowledge and information and never waste what has already been gotten leads to in Ammons’s acid throwaway, “total comprehension is/a wipe-out” (TCP1, 659). It’s a wipe-out because this totality leaves no room for more. 

Where, then, does this leave us when it comes to “knowing” regulation better?

***

In answer, I ended up going back to Ammons’s “The Eternal City”—“After the explosion or cataclysm, that big/display that does its work but then fails/out with destructions, one is left with the//pieces. . .” (TCP1, 596). These lines resonate with what I had read in one of Rainer Maria Rilke’s letters. He is writing about the sculpture studio of Auguste Rodin:

It is indescribable. Acres of fragments lie there, one beside the other. Nudes the size of my hand and no bigger, but only bits, scarcely one of them whole: often only a piece of arm, a piece of leg just as they go together, and the portion of the body which belongs to them. Here the torso of one figure with the head of another stuck onto it, with the arm of a third. . .as though an unspeakable storm, an unparalleled cataclysm had passed over this work. And yet the closer you look the deeper you feel that it would all be less complete if the separate bodies were complete. Each of these fragments is of such a peculiarly striking unit, so possible by itself, so little in need of completion, that you forget that they are only parts and often parts of different bodies which cling so passionately to one another.

I read the passage—at least one other translation captures the same sense—as suggesting that Rodin’s “cataclysm” incorporated fragments that were, in a sense that matters for our purpose, more complete as separate fragments. So too Ammons’s “cataclysm” in “The Eternal City” refers to pieces that are themselves whole—asynoptic, unassimilable, piece next to piece. Another of Ammons’s lines, “all the way to a finished Fragment,” catches the sense I am after here (TCP1, 366).

By extension, we’d have to believe that official regulations ad seriatim, while appearing a growing shambles, are in fact more complete as the piece-work of individual regulations than they would be were they improvised into something new or part of, in policy-speak, a more integrated body of regulations for use over time.

How could this be?

***

One way ahead, Ammons implies, is to see how the waste of regulation isn’t decline-and-fall, but rather the rearguard action against such declension narratives: an argument for creating room for us to recast decline. Ammons directs our attention, for example, to waste-as-generosity in “The City Limits,”

. . . .when you consider
the abundance of such resource as illuminates the glow-blue

bodies and gold-skeined wings of flies swarming the dumped
guts of a natural slaughter or the coil of shit and in no
way winces from its storms of generosity; when you consider

that air or vacuum, snow or shale, squid or wolf, rose or lichen,
each is accepted into as much light as it will take, then
the heart moves roomier. . .
(TCP1, 498)

The “heart moves roomier” not because the pile is any less shite, but because it opens to being more—certainly more than that mortal coil. This is the hot mess of feeling and living expansively, of being somatically sprawled all over the place, now. Regulatory waste in this mode is a spectacularly, can’t-keep-our-eyes-off-it sight/site to behold, maverick and inciting at the same time.

The hot mess that you can’t keep your eyes—our inner and physical I’s—off and the incitements it offers take us to Ammons’s late, long poem, Garbage (TCP2, 220-306). (Famously, Garbage, for which Ammons won the 1993 National Book Award for Poetry, was inspired by his passing an immense heap of garbage alongside the Florida Interstate.) Mountains and mountains of garbage are “monstrous”; in fact

… a monstrous surrounding of
gathering—the putrid, the castoff, the used,

the mucked up—all arriving for final assessment,
for the toting up in tonnage, the separations

of wet and dry, returnable, and gone for good:
(TCP2, 234)

For Ammons “gone for good” is decidedly ambiguous, begging the question about just to what good has garbage gone for. An answer—and Ammons resists being pinned down to any one answer—lies in the garbage that human beings themselves are:

we’re trash, plenty wondrous: should I want

to say in what the wonder consists: it is a tiny
wriggle of light in the mind that says, “go on”:
(TCP2, 245)

Nothing integrated about this! For: “Go on” to what, in a world where garbage and waste conjure a meaninglessness of things and of our own existence, as we too are trash? In the case of Ammons, the garbage we are and the meaninglessness that poses, like capacious uselessness, offer up the wonder of being more—of meaning possibly—once we leave space for such feelings and experience:

we should be pretty happy with the possibilities

and limits we can play through emergences free
of complexes of the Big Meaning, but is there

really any meaninglessness, isn’t meaninglessness
a funny category, meaninglessness missing

meaning, vacancy still empty, not any sort of
disordering, or miscasting or fraudulence of

irrealities’s shows, just a place not meaning
yet—…
…..
…there is truly only meaning,
only meaning, meanings, so many meanings,

meaninglessness becomes what to make of so many
meanings:…
(TCP2, 277)

That word, “becomes”—that insistence on meaning-less possibility as a “funny category”—is, we see by way of conclusion, core to having room to recast regulation.

***

Richard Howard, himself no mean commentator on Ammons’s poetry, points the way: “How often we need to be assured of what we know in the old ways of knowing—how seldom we can afford to venture beyond the pale into that chromatic fantasy where, as Rilke said (in 1908), ‘begins the revision of categories, where something past comes again, as though out of the future; something formerly accomplished as something to be completed’”.

The importance of this revising categories of thinking and living is captured in an interchange Ammons had with Zofia Burr. When pressed by Burr, he summed up: “I’m always feeling, whatever I’m saying, that I don’t really believe it, and that maybe in the next sentence I’ll get it right, but I never do”.

Imagine policymakers and regulators, when pressed, recognizing that not getting it right today places them at the start of tomorrow’s policymaking—not its end but its revision as “policymaking” and “regulation.” For that to happen, they’d have to understand just how funny-odd a category regulation is.

Ammons, if I understand him, is insisting that in the compulsionto “get it right the next time around,” there at least be a next time (room) to make it—this revision of categories—better. Ensuring (risking) there is a next time is the way we keep open to—empty for—the feeling and living and participating that, in the process, push conventional notions of regulation to the periphery, changing their milieux, rendering regulation less and less meaningful and thus returning it as a concept and instrument to us re-freshed and re-wondered about; in short: recasted.

Again, how so? Let’s jump into Ammons’s deep-end one last time:

Yield to the tantalizing mechanism:
fall, trusting and centered as a
drive, falling into the poem:
line by line pile entailments on,
arrive willfully in the deepest

fix: then, the thing is done, turn
round in the mazy terror and
question, outsmart the mechanism:
find the glide over-reaching or
dismissing—halter it into

a going concern so the wing
muscles at the neck’s base work
urgency’s compression and
openness breaks out lofting
you beyond all binds and terminals.
(TCP1, 535)

(You may want to re-read the poem one more time. I return to that “deepest//fix” momentarily.)

Ammons commented on this poem, “The Swan Ritual”: “The invention of a poem frequently is how to find a way to resolve the complications that you’ve gotten yourself into. I have a little poem about this that says that the poem begins as life does, takes on complications as novels do, and at some point, stops. Something has to be invented before you can work your way out of it, and that’s what happens at the very center of a poem”.

Ammons touches on the major implication extended here: If rendering any regulation useless takes us closer to reinventing what “regulation” is, so too reinventing “regulation” can render an existing regulation useless. Regulating to reduce risk and inequality or improve economic growth and statecraft is that way we rethink these ends so to make those other means or ends no longer useful.

To rethink (revise, redescribe, rescript, recast, refashion, recalibrate) the categories of knowing and not-knowing is to resituate—make room for—the cognitive limits of “knowing” that matter. (Think by way of different examples pastiche in visual art or remixing in dub reggae.) This is to renew, as in re-render, re-know and re-understand. The eye is no longer fixed on where it had settled before, but with a new focal point in sight (this being today’s version of our wager on redemption). That, truly, is the fix we want to be in, “the deepest//fix.” It is where wonder renders dread incomplete, where knowledge is unlearned, where knowledgeable gives way to refreshened inexperience, and, in Ammons’s astonishing lines, “where what has always happened and what/has never happened before seem for an instant reconciled”.


Principal sources:

Ammons, A.R. (1996). Set In Motion: Essays, Interviews, & Dialogues. Ed. Zofia Burr, The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI.

—————— (2017). The Complete Poems of A.R. Ammons, Volume 1 1955 – 1977 and Volume 2 1978 – 2005. Edited by Robert M. West with an Introduction by Helen Vendler. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, NY. [The volumes are referred to in the blog entry as TCP1 and TCP2, respectively.]

Howard, R. (1980). Alone With America: Essays on the Art of Poetry in the United States Since 1950. Atheneum: New York, NY. Rilke, R.M. (1988). Selected Letters 1902-1926. Transl. R.F.C. Hull, Quartet Encounters, Quartet Books: London.

Rilke, R.M. (1988). Selected Letters 1902-1926. Transl. R.F.C. Hull, Quartet Encounters, Quartet Books: London.

Optimal ignorance

I

When I started out in rural development in the early 1970s, one challenge was to manage for optimal ignorance: Professionals should manage to the point where what they are learning is not worth knowing. Learning need take them only to where what they don’t know doesn’t add or subtract value for their acting now. Managing for optimal ignorance and its variants got a good deal of press from a range of writers at that time, notably social scientists Warren Ilchmann and Norman Uphoff, the development scholar Robert Chambers, and Peter Berger the sociologist.

The appeal of optimal ignorance waned when I implemented projects that I had helped plan. On those occasions, I’d find myself mulling over what my first boss, the district commissioner, told me when I arrived in rural Botswana: “A piece of advice, my dear boy. Either stay in the kitchen all the time or never go in.” Nothing major gets implemented as planned, and only by staying in implementation (later, management) did I appreciate how little I knew with my formal education in public policy analysis. 

My view is that “optimize” should be banned, as a term, from policymaking and management. Like the dog returning to its vomit, optimality criteria are never satisfied in the imperfection of circumstance. But I didn’t fully understand that until later when I started researching large critical infrastructures, their control rooms and control operators. These large sociotechnical systems are so complex that their managers cannot really “know” what are inevitably unstudied conditions and their real-time inexperience and difficulties are permanent reminders of this. Optimizers with whom I’ve worked, on the other hand, seemed to think it’s better to burn the building down to save the rest of us the trouble of repairing it.

Yes, of course, studying and adapting to unknown unknowns are important and that’s why the idea of “chipping away at ignorance” is not all just hubris. But control room operators are attuned to stay out of unstudied conditions not because some things are not worth knowing but for the opposite reason: No way can these professionals afford to be in prolonged ignorance when the safe and continuous provision of critical services, like water and electricity, is paramount. “[I]f the grid fails and there are blackouts, people die,” one control room executive told us. Control rooms put up with uncertainties they can live with in order to avoid unknown unknowns they can’t or mustn’t tolerate.

II

But you press: What could be more respectful of complexity than managing and learning adaptively? Change course as uncertainties are reduced and more is learned. No one can be against learning, right?

That may be true as far as it goes, but even then it doesn’t go far enough. Here’s a story from my time as an advisor in Kenya. I had oversight responsibilities for a handful of integrated rural development projects in Kenya’s arid and semi-arid districts. One of the worst projects, in my judgment, was fixed around soil and water conservation measures. You asked villagers there what their three most important development priorities were and they’d say: water, water, water. Water for drinking, water for cooking, water for their livestock, water for everything that mattered in their daily lives. Here instead the donor was spending a fortune on ditches and bunds to prevent soil erosion on the hillsides primarily for crop purposes, without any direct increase in water supply for the households.

Unsurprisingly, villagers just wouldn’t “participate” in the project: Food-for-work schemes didn’t work, giving them hoes or such didn’t work, nothing worked. Later on, I tracked down one of the project’s designer and asked: “Why ever was the project designed that way? Absolutely no one there was for soil and water conservation.” It was like he’d been waiting years for someone to ask him that question. He leaned forward, “But who can be against soil and water conservation?”

So too for managing adaptively: Who, really, can be against it? Why, that would be like arguing against norms of rationality, the scientific method or evidence-based policymaking, worse yet trial and error learning.

III

Yet, as with soil and water conservation and other projects, we must ask: managing adaptively for what? And here too, what is often desired is its own version of high reliability water, water, water—reliable water for urban use, for agricultural use, for ecosystem rehabilitation and the environment; for ports, for shipping lanes, for recreation, for hydropower, for…you name it, water is needed for it. And a very great deal of that provision depends on large-scale water supplies, electricity supplies and other infrastructures—which is why I keep coming back to their importance.

Obviously, control room operators of large infrastructures (and not all critical infrastructures have control rooms) are from time to time pushed into the unknown unknowns by contingent events. (In case it needs saying, unknown unknowns have been contingent in the myriad ways past “unobservables” have been, e.g., Epicurean atomism, phlogiston, and aether.) It turns out that to ask really-existing control room operators—“What if the unimaginable happened?”—is not to ask something new or unusual in systemwide control centers. The fact of the matter is that all manner of people all across the world are having to imagine the unimaginable and think the unthinkable, and acting upon that without recourse to faith-based “Innovation will get us out of the mess we’re in.”

But it’s still too easy to confuse being pushed into ignorance unwillingly with a much valorized albeit half-blind trial and error learning that places a premium on “testing” unstudied conditions intentionally. (Not to worry when being “fully creative, imaginative, and inspired” means being bereft of vigilance and self-reflection at the same time!)

For control operators, real time is too important to experiment in when their first error ends up being our final system trial. The last thing we want is our airplane pilots “to embrace failure” mid-flight, notwithstanding all those anodyne business and management articles on the virtues of error, failure and unstudied conditions. Too much of that privileging borders on modern-day priestcraft, miracle-mongering, and the criminal.

Uncertain superlatives

I

Certainty has such a strong place in politics not just because it serves as the preferred foundation/platform from which to act, but also because certainty supports and drives the belief that any such choice to act can be superlative, i.e., serve as the best or superior or optimal course of action.

A key part of the challenge of a politics of uncertainty is to insist superior and superlative are still achievable, and not in a diminished sense of the economist’s “second best.” The challenge is to show, with and through examples, where superlative and best are not only really-existing in the midst uncertainty, but also how uncertainty’s superlative and best are better than so many of certainty’s counterparts.

II

Each of us probably has our own examples. Three additional pathways ahead are, I feel, under-acknowledged and deserve further consideration:

  • The first is to underscore how certainty can truly mislead, whatever your starting point, as in: Francois Jacob, Nobel Laureate, reflecting that “Our breakthrough was the result of ‘night science’: a stumbling, wandering exploration of the natural world that relies on intuition as much as it does on the cold, orderly logic of ‘day science’”. As in: Nothing quite smacks of certainty as do habits, inhibitions and defense mechanisms. As in: We all know of revered ideals that ended in irrelevance. As in: Humans are never fully in the present; we are ourselves now, but reserve other of our intermittent selves for later action. As in: When in doubt, make the puzzle bigger.
  • The second pathway is to recognize the impossible is never perforce a bar to action in the face of uncertainty. Here is Richard Falk writing on the critic and Palestinian activist, Edward Said: “To dedicate action to achieve the impossible should never be a matter of optimistic false consciousness. It is rather a recognition that there is no way for the rational mind, in light of present circumstances, to figure out a solution that accords with the postulates of a just peace. Yet at the same time there are present moral and political imperatives of carrying on the struggle to reach such a solution, because the future is unknowable and the present circumstance of occupation, oppression, dispossession, and dispersal intolerable.” The insight, I take it, is that we might well be in a position to do something but not know it until we start trying (a position also associated with economist, A.O. Hirschman)..
  • A third way ahead is to insist that uncertainty is real and unavoidable and that this “certainty of uncertainty” looks nothing like the certainties offered up by the political class and deskoid pundits. Lines from one of Norman MacCaig’s poems make the point:

Who owns this landscape? –
The millionaire who bought it or
the poacher staggering downhill in the early morning
with a deer on his back?

Who possesses this landscape? –
The man who bought it or
I who am possessed by it?

False questions, for
this landscape is
masterless
and intractable in any terms
that are human.