The campaign’s collateral damage is clearest in the compensation record. In March 1953, for
example, two Fulani herders received £50 after losing eighteen cattle and six sheep that drank
from a poisoned water hole. Officials marked contaminated sites and instructed Native
Authorities to notify village heads and Fulani chiefs, but these precautions were unevenly
effective, especially given pastoral mobility and the uneven circulation of information. When
doubts arose about whether herders had been adequately warned, token compensation was
sometimes paid in the interest of preserving local relations, revealing both the administrative
limits and political sensitivities of the campaign.(accessed online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6898438)
Of course, colonialism caused this campaign of poisoning baboons. But it is equally true that the campaign was first proven wrong by the Fulani, among others.
One thought on “Why the difference matters between ultimate and proximate causes: an example from an anti-baboon campaign in colonial Northern Nigeria”