Domestically, the Confucian revival [in mainland China] dates to the 1980s, raising the question of whether Orientalism and its objectification of the Orient are a thing of the past—as proclaimed by
postcolonial critics—or if Orientalism, now re-appropriated by “Orientals” themselves, has
emerged victorious in the age of global capitalism.(accessed online at https://www.anpec.org.br/encontro/2022/submissao/files_I/i2-cc30002858ddbe3439ced57760bda47e.pdf)
Environmental degradation driven by the climate crisis systemically worsens living standards, thereby heightening socioeconomic and political tensions. These tensions often ignite armed conflicts, forcing populations to migrate and creating environmental refugees. The mass migration stems from both the decline of ecosystems and conflicts intensified by resource shortages. As a result, the climate crisis inflicts extensive and lasting damage on ecosystems and human communities, aligning with the definition of ecocide. Recognizing this causal chain highlights the necessity for global governance to address the ecological and humanitarian impacts of climate-induced conflicts.
(accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217251382404)
And yet:
We draw three initial conclusions from [our review of the literature]. First, across the five environmental issues surveyed, the evidence on the contribution of environmental variables to violent political conflict is thin, weak, uncertain, and/or contradictory. Notwithstanding headline claims about climate being “a risk factor for conflict,” for instance, the consensus view of even the mainstream scholars who reached this verdict is that climate is a relatively low risk factor for conflict (evaluated as fourteenth out of 16 factors considered), is particularly uncertain (evaluated as the most uncertain of 16 factors), and is a factor over which there is “low confidence” in the mechanisms through which
climate affects conflict. . .Second, scarcity accounts of environmental conflict, which focus on the security impacts of natural resource availability shortages, are particularly unconvincing, there being much stronger evidence on the conflict effects of relative resource abundance, as argued in “resource curse” or “honey pot” . . .interpretations of environmental conflict, and discussed further in the next section. And third, although the body of evidence on climatic variables and conflict is much more extensive than on the other environmental issues considered here, dominating climate–security research, it is no less uneven. Indeed, our assessment is that the evidence is most robust on water and forests, through resource curse dynamics; that it is most extensive but also mixed on climatic variables; and that it is thinnest in relation to biodiversity and pollution.(accessed online at https://www.annualreviews.org/docserver/fulltext/energy/49/1/annurev-environ-112922-114232.pdf?expires=1770499611&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=C4CF5A6FB183C2A3D71433B9DE1662700
Take-away: All broad narratives, including those for the climate emergency, come with more granular counternarratives. Does one negate or cancel the other? No, but it does force new questions, e.g. in this case: What local injustices would the global governance produce?
With all the usual caveats about surveillance and manipulation by the big tech companies, digital
technology has played a transformative role in the mobility and organisation of refugee, migrant
and diaspora communities. People on the move make impressive use of GPS technology,
increasing their capacities to anticipate danger, plan new routes, connect with family and
communities at home and in their planned destinations, and liaise with sympathetic citizens in
host settings (Eluère 2024). As well as for functions like sending remittances, refugee networks
have turned to digital platforms to mobilise resources, share information, and advocate for their
rights. For example, WhatsApp groups enable refugees to use digital tools to take control of their
circumstances, particularly in regions where state infrastructure is weak or non-existent. Among
Somalis, this use of digital technology has enabled a form of ‘platform kinship’ (Norman 2024),
where online networks function as substitutes for state-based social welfare systems and even
some functions of governance and justice – in the latter case, exclusion from a digital group
provides a sanction for infraction and dereliction. In the Somali case this has been dubbed a
‘WhatsAppocracy’ (Economist 2025a).
(accessed online at https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/refugia-reflection-five-years-on
